Concur on the potential and proven benefit of CAP-type concept (i.e., US Marines/Soldiers pairing with indigenous forces and moving in among the people) in the Al Qaim AO. I've talked to many Marines that served in 3/6, at the platoon level, and they have nothing but great things to say about why the strategy worked and has changed the landscape in what used to be known as the "Wild West" for good.
A very similar CAP to that executed in Vietnam worked very well in Haditha back in spring 2004 (see http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/articl...G4T7GMRL1.DTL). Problem came when CAP Marines were pulled for Fallujah I and then again for Fallujah II. This left the young and inexperienced police force alone to fight the insurgents. 19 Iraqi Police were subsequently hanged in Haditha's athletic stadium and then Al Qaeda in Iraq moved in. It's taken subsequent Marine units almost 3 years to re-build any level of trust back with the people in Haditha.
Also, Stars & Stripes has run multiple articles over the past months on how a CAP-type concept has significantly changed the situation in Ramadi (see http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?...rchive=true ). While Ramadi's not the nicest place on earth today, many parts in the N and away from central South have seen drastic improvements due to clear-hold (move in among people)-build. Similar in so many ways to CAP in Vietnam.
I've made my Marines read "Bing" West's The Village for the past year or so in preparation for Iraq. Attached are the focus questions that I give them beforehand and the answers that I use when leading the discussion group.
1. Council member Strickland was trained to head a CAP unit for OIF and while he is very busy with SAW right know I hope he might find time to chime in here on this issue.
2. For those interested in the Vietnam CAP program I have a ton of resources in the Vietnam section of the SWJ library.
3. The Village remains my favorite book on the war in Vietnam.
I have an entry in the "Vietnam" section on CAPs (an undergrad thesis that was "borrowed" in 1997, and next thing I know, scanned and posted on a CAP website), I want to comment on the lessons and potential utility of CAPs.
CAPs are great things for enhancing local security for the time that they are deployed, but the CAP, in and of itself, cannot train up an indiginous force to take over. We focus too much on that squad of Marines and forget all the "enablers" they bring to the battle. What does a Marine squad bring to its indiginous partner unit? Yes, its 10-14 capable fighters with a corpsman. More than that, however, they bring the following:
1. Assurance that the US wan't apply indiscriminate fires in the local area
2. Trained and capable reinforcing forces in case of an emergency (and because its a US unit in trouble, the cavalry will come)
3. MEDEVAC capability and linkage to a functional medical process.
4. Priority for CMO projects.
While there are other things, I believe that we need to look at building host nation capability much more holisitically. While we wouldn't throw a squad out without the above linkages, why would we expect an indiginous small unit to be any more successful without them?
My impression is that, in Iraq, we proceeded much to quickly in creating small units without thinking through the whole structure required of a capable COIN capability, in all its facets.
As was mentioned in one of the proceeding posts, CAP-type organizations in Vietnam worked great while they were in place, but did not set the conditions for GVN success after they left.
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