Assessing the Police

[davidbfpo]

From a "lurker" with a long time serving in a para-military police service and only the summary is cited below:

Summary:

a) Instructions, standing orders, SOPs, shared maps, call signs and structure.
b) Command and Control which puts (a) into practice.
c) Training.
d) Exercises and wash ups.
e) Working together whenever possible and operate as joint units e.g. dogs, EOD, catering etc.

Much can be gained from:
 Checking Orders etc (in Arabic so difficult)
 Interviewing people on and off the record – they will know the problems! Do people follow the instruction and orders? Remember talk to the "Indians" not the bosses. They will make suggestions. I used to start with the boss and work downwards, increasing the number at each rank that you speak with.
 Look at Command and Control structure, you could find improvements. TEWTs, training?
 Deployment of resources – because it is simple most people go for fixed deployment – I would always push for about 50% flexible.
 Surveillance, a vital element in most aspects. Technology, cameras etc. We used everything we could get hold of, the simpler the better.
 Training, both tactical at unit and on an individual basis.
 Discipline?

[davidbfpo]

Red Rat asked, cited in part:

When assessing police elements from a different policing culture and in a COIN/Stabilisation context are there any useful police specific assessment criteria that we should be seeking to capture? Response times and detection rates are probably not relevant, but what is?

There some standard police items that need to be checked:

1. Where is everyone? How many are on duty and how many away (sick, courses, leave and holidays)?
2. Are they being paid regularly and fully? IIRC this was a constant issue for years in Afghanistan.
3. What is the level of personal police kit seen compared to the stated provision? Simple things like torches, batteries (esp. for their radios), handcuffs or restraints, notebooks, cameras, maps, property bags etc.
4. What vehicles does the unit have and how many actually work?
5. What equipment is held at unit level (platoon and higher) at their bases and in vehicles? Computers, secure property storage (for exhibits and especially documents found), riot control items (notably CS gas etc) and to stop vehicles at check points.
6. What is used for communications? Phones or radios. Personal or official.
7. What is the level of preparation and training for the unusual demand for their commitment? Can they deploy effectively locally, in the adjacent town or further afield. Handle VIP visits, public disorder, searching after a prison escape and civil disaster - I am mindful of the potential following the Mosul dam failing.
8. What training opportunities exist, either in-house, locally or further away?
9. How flexible are they? The ability to adjust rapidly is essential and some of this reflects preparation, training and above confidence in themselves alongside their commanders.
10. How do they deal with the public - not leaders - and particularly those who dissent or who are detained?
11. It will be important to know, assuming stabilization is underway, whether the court system is working. If not then and unlikely to adjustment is needed. Evidence may not matter much and instead information / intelligence and "gut" feeling may dominate.
12. How do they learn? Can they identify gaps in their professional and local knowledge?

[Red Rat]

Many thanks to John Bertetto, DavidBFPO and others for the responses, both on this forum and via other means.

Although partnering is well understood after the experience of OEF and OIF the situation now is more one of partnering from afar. There is a limited footprint of Advise and Assist teams and no mentoring per se. The issue therefore is with limited access how do we make best use of the access we do have? For the police this is exacerbated by the limited expertise available, there are no Provincial Police Transition Teams as was.

The assessment is very much at the tactical level but will feed the operational level thinking. There is a requirement to identify areas of strength and weaknesses in capability (both equipment and training), but there is also a requirement to identify issues and trends to assist local authorities in their future efforts. The police now are operating very much in an Internal Security (IS) role, and the focus is on how well that they can do that role.

Looking beyond the immediate tactical requirement there is a need to at least start to consider how the police could transition from that role to a less IS focused and more policing focused role. Build for the 'now' certainly, but with a mind that this will be the foundation for the future.

In terms of Measures of Efficiency/Effectiveness/Performance I think we will be trying to gauge the latter, although advising the local authorities how to gauge the former will be a part of any planning.

[davidbfpo]

From a "lurker" who has experience in inspecting police forces:

Assessment Note


In assessing any unit the following should be considered;


Readiness - in terms of kit, training (including awareness of role) and numbers


Operational Delivery


Leadership


Community response


Readiness
This is well covered by David’s suggestion regarding exercises and inspections of facilities and equipment.


Operational Delivery
It is easy to fall into the trap of counting activities but that should be avoided as many such measures are directionally ambivalent, in that is more or less better? Think of rape reported any increase is always presented as a positive, as more victims are willing to come forward. However, the increase may be real!
It will be better to assess outcomes the approach to this is to start at the briefing;
Is it merely informative or does it include structured tasks?
Does the tasking regime reflect the strategic priorities? If not why not?
Is there an appropriate review and debrief in place?


Next consider operational deployment;
Are the areas deployed to routine or are the selected by reference to the mission objectives?
Are the assets deployed appropriate in terms of capability and capacity?
Is there flexibility in terms of real time decisions by the leadership?


Results
Out comes not activities should be counted, the number of vehicles stopped at a VCP is irrelevant the percentage of such stops that results in either an action or intelligence is the measure that should be employed.
The number of allocated tasks resulting from the briefing that are successfully completed should be monitored not just in terms of “jobs done” but also in terms of further actions generated.


Leadership
This can be assessed by monitoring on going improvements in the results.


It can be further assessed in terms of self generated taks and actions. Are they in line with mission objectives and are they developmental in terms of the individuals and the team.


Community Response
This is best assessed in possibly hostile environments by a mechanism for discreet and anonymous feedback. (similar to the systems used in Northern Ireland)

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to an Indian "lurker" there is a book, which includes a chapter 'The Role of Police in Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq, 2003–6' by Matt Sherman and the Abstract says:

Policing is a skilled and complex task that lies at the nexus of the security sector and the criminal justice system. Police are likely to be the face government presents to the population. They live and interact in the community within which they operate, are rarely unit-based, and have significantly different objectives and accountability structures than their military counterparts. This chapter highlights the challenges to the development of the Iraqi Police Services (IPS) during 2003–2006, as well as the Service’s failures and successes. Particular attention is paid to the politics underlying security at local and national levels, as well as mismatched Coalition and donor priorities (e.g. emphasizing quantity vs. quality), the comparatively lengthy and complex process of police and criminal justice sector development, the effect of strong leadership, the correlation between the growth of civil society and policing, and the role of host nation military support for policing.

The book is 'Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents'. Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly. Published by OUP (India) in 2013. See: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/vie...4883-chapter-9

Matt Sherman was a US political adviser in Iraq 2003-2006, he spoke at a number of events and is now a SCI consultant.

[Red Rat]

The book is 'Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents'. Edited by C. Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly. Published by OUP (India) in 2013. See: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/vie...4883-chapter-9

Indeed that book is sitting on my shelves beside my desk, as yet unopened, although the book The Police In War is now well thumbed.

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to a pointer I have found a couple of historical papers on the Uk's earlier commitment to assisting the Iraqi police:

1) An academic / practitioner's article (behind a pay wall) 'The Lessons of Policing in Iraq—a Personal Perspective': http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/c.../1/102.extract

This refers to a published paper by 'HMG's Strategic Task Force into international police assistance', I wonder if the net paper is part of that. It certainly is not readily found on the web.

2) From 2010 a former diplomat's papers:http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/...-statement.pdf

3) A former Chief Constable's 2010 paper: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/...ment-final.pdf