Strategy in the 21st Century

[AmericanPride]

Interesting topics Bill. One thought that immediately comes to mind: I think the U.S. suffers in this regard in part due to the barrier constructed between military strategy and political strategy, often leaving both military officers and political officials confused or frustrated with the other. This barrier has become increasingly destructive because of the intensification of 'political warfare' (a term I use broadly here to describe all the non-military activity taken by states to compel other states to change behavior). So, what element that has changed is that military strategy is most directly and strongly connected with political strategy than in previous generations.

[Bill Moore]

Interesting topics Bill. One thought that immediately comes to mind: I think the U.S. suffers in this regard in part due to the barrier constructed between military strategy and political strategy, often leaving both military officers and political officials confused or frustrated with the other. This barrier has become increasingly destructive because of the intensification of 'political warfare' (a term I use broadly here to describe all the non-military activity taken by states to compel other states to change behavior). So, what element that has changed is that military strategy is most directly and strongly connected with political strategy than in previous generations.

Some would argue that our current operational art, despite claims to the contrary, are increasingly disconnected from political aims. I agree with that, how many times have you seen a senior officer state he or she just wants a clearly defined military objective or end state, so they can say they did their part? How many appreciate the complexity of strategy from the start and accept it is interactive, and that we must interact with all elements of national power and allies to pursue shifting political aims? I will never forget the claim from senior military officers in Baghdad in APR 2003 that they won the war and it is time to go home. If you only looked at from a military perspective their argument may have made sense. This is why you increasingly see a push to get military officers to start thinking strategically again. We have dumbed down the force with our mindless focus on task, condition, and standard, and it has percolated to the top ranks in many cases.

I just started reading "Toward a New Maritime Strategy," by Peter Haynes. So far I would give 5 out of 5 stars, but will offer a more thorough review later. He hooked me in the introduction, where he made an argument that the Navy had become too focused on threats, operations, and war fighting at the expense of thinking strategically. He reviewed the history of cold war strategy and post-cold war navy strategy. Of note, he made the point that civilian strategists in the early years of the Cold War (still a problem in my opinion) we hyper rational, ahistoric, and apolitical. He also noted strategy goals shifted from winning to deterrence and all that implies (I won't repeat it here).

Since we were freed from the concept of winning, the Depart of Defense focused on program management instead of winning strategies. Using best business practices to ensure we had sustainable positive balance of power (off set strategies, metrics, centralized decision making, McNamara's budgeting process, etc.). I'm still wrestling with all the implications, since deterrence is still a needed mainstay of our strategy, but it shouldn't be the sole aspect.

He argues, and I agree, that the military (he focused on the Navy) seems content focusing on threats, and largely ignoring opportunities to advance interests that are not relative to known threats. Haynes argues that instead we should be focused on vital strategic interests, which in the view of the Navy is protecting the U.S. international system (economic and political), which is what the U.S. derives most of its power from. If we focus on our vital interests, then we can put threats in perspective and that would seem to open a host of opportunities that we may be missing now.

More to follow, but overall I think the military strives to be apolitical and misguidedly focus solely on military objectives as though they can be extracted cleanly from political, economic, and information objectives. What we seem to be missing, and of course this is not a fresh insight, is whole of government integration.

[Bill Moore]

Expanding on the desired ends or conditions as it relates to strategy, I found this article of interest.

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016...seone_today_nl

America Can’t Do Much About ISIS

That leaves patience, containment, and humanitarian aid as the least-bad policies while waiting for this awful war to play itself out.

After an explanation of why wars like this drag on for years and why ISIL won't be defeated by some proxy conquering Raqqa and pulling down their flag, though we still have many conventional thinkers in the military to include SOF who continue to buy into the curse of Clausewitz, his center of gravity, while ignoring his true wisdom about understanding the nature of war you're about to engage in. The authors focus on how to answer GEN Petraeus's famous question, "Tell me how this ends?"

In practical terms, the answer to Petraeus’s famous question is thus relatively insensitive to U.S. policy. If this war plays out the way so many others have, its end will come not through an allied offensive to conquer a capital city but through the mutual exhaustion of multiple actors with multiple, often wealthy outside benefactors. This will eventually happen—but it will likely take many years yet. U.S. efforts won’t change these fundamentals much absent a major stabilization and nation-building effort that few Americans now support, or some diplomatic breakthrough that assuages Iranian, Russian, and Saudi long-run security concerns. And that leaves Americans with patience and containment as the least-bad policy while waiting for this awful war to play itself out.

One of the explanations on why this conflict will likely continue for years, even if the actors change their names (ISIL becomes ?) is the about of external support the various combatants are receiving, and the failure of West to address the humanitarian crisis that is destabilizing the region (beyond the conflict zones) and Europe. Same as it ever was, or have strategic factors in the 21st Century resulted in new conditions that strategy must adjust to? A little or a lot of both I suspect. Maybe the nature and character of these conflicts haven't changed, but we changed as a nation and are no longer capable of developing effective strategy based on our current ideology, which includes the false dichotomy between war and peace, which results in a failure to recognize the risk of not acting short of traditional war, or trying to solve a problem using traditional war where it is an inappropriate response.

The latest National Military Strategy and subsequent articles indicate that military strategy remains threat centric. The military discusses 4 potential state actors plus VEOs as the plus one. Is it incorrect for the military to be threat centric? If you don't anticipate who you may have to fight and understand their capabilities and doctrine, how to do you project future force requirements?

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Docume...y_Strategy.pdf

On the other hand, Haynes in his book, "Toward a New Maritime Strategy," argues the value of having a strategy that is focused on our national interests. I don't think he stated or implied that threats were irrelevant, but rather if you understood your interests, then you can place threats in the correct context. What U.S. interests does ISIL or the Islamic State threaten?

I think there are several starting with destabilizing the region beyond the current conflict zones, which could put a good part of the global oil supplies at risk with significant impact on the global economy, which will impact the U.S. If the U.S. continues to fail to lead in a meaningful way, it will undermine the U.S.'s ability to protect the largely U.S. led international order that has provided for our security and prosperity for several decades now. Arguably it has provided the same for our allies and partners. ISIL presents a persistent threat to the homeland and U.S. lives globally, probably not a large scale, but with 24hr news, even small attacks take on strategic significance beyond the personal tragedies suffered. Finally, and perhaps this is tied to maintaining the international order (not rigidly maintaining, but adapting it according to set rules), are promoting the values we stand for a nation. Do we have a responsibility to protect? If we don't what are the consequences from a strategy perspective (humanitarian crisis with significant second order effects) and on our character or identity as a nation?

[Bill Moore]

With all that said in the previous post, what can we actually do to protect our interests in a way that is sustainable economically and politically? This is where we repeatedly seem to fail. If we anticipate this conflict will continue for years, how do we contain it and manage its effects short of waging a traditional conventional war that will likely drag us into another quagmire with no feasible end other than pulling out when we lose the political will to stay? Furthermore, taking such as approach will harm our economy further, and create opportunities for other adversaries and potential adversaries to seek a position of advantage globally relative to the U.S. Anther perceived loss will also weaken our standing is a perceived leader.

It reminds me of Kissinger recognizing the limits of U.S. power, and the fact that U.S. could not afford a protracted war in SE Asia AND maintain it more vital interests. He recognized the world's power balances were shifting, and new forces would challenge the domains of superpowers. There were already multiple economic centers, and economic power is the key to other forms of power (The Rise and Fall of Great Nations, Kennedy).

Haynes talked about the primacy of economic power in his book also. Any strategy that fails to consider the risk to the U.S. economy over time puts the nation at long term for short term goals. We have been fighting the war on terror, arguably poorly, for close to 15 years now with little to show for it but set back after set back. We can't afford to sustain large occupations, and those who argue FID and UW are the answer, while logical from an economic standpoint tend to dismiss that our partners frequently don't have the will to engage in these fights. Meanwhile, Russia, China, and North Korea have become increasingly dangerous and confident to challenge us. Our ability to deter them has eroded. Why? Excessive focus on the war on terror? Maybe, but I suspect the reality is the diffusion of power is creating opportunities in a globalized world like never before. Opportunities best exploited for advantage by effective whole of government approaches where the military is only one tool in the strategy toolkit. Our almost total focus on winning decisive battles that don't create favorable political conditions/advantages will soon drive us into the ranks of second ranked nations. A superpower that has squandered its power in a global war of the flea. A superpower that failed to used all its tools in a synchronized manner to advance its interests.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I thought this short article was helpful, even if USA-centric:http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the...eat-leadership

The author's very slim bio on Twitter:

British / Australian mil officer + strategist. Conducting the 'Helmand Project' @ ANU Bell School; six year exploration of US, UK + Talib strategy in Afghanistan

He blames quite a few players:

Who is responsible for this absence of strategy? The sad fact is that all those who have participated in the Global War on Terror must share the blame. Politicians have certainly been central, mis-reading Clausewitz, seeing war as a simple extension of politics and ignoring its true nature, and hubristically believing their stated intentions of policy could pass for true strategy. The military also played its role, and is guilty of inflating both threats and capabilities for its own internal agendas, and fostering a conspiracy of optimism that removed failure (or even strategic withdrawal) as an option. Even the eternally well-meaning non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not immune to criticism as they were slaved to the thriving, billion-dollar industry of international aid and reconstruction funding governments used to excuse their lack of strategic thought.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

I thought this short article was helpful, even if USA-centric:http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the...eat-leadership

The author's very slim bio on Twitter:

He blames quite a few players:

David,

This article is certainly relevant to the thread and points to a shared frustration about something that I also struggle with identifying exactly what is wrong. I agree with the author's argument that many of us own the blame for our collective shortcoming when it comes to strategy. We confuse McChrystal's Team of Teams as strategy, when instead it is an appropriate management/operational approach for employing forces to counter a networked threat. Warden's Five Rings have been confused as strategy, instead of a paradigm for targeting that is only applicable in select situations. We also confuse Jomini's lines on the map as strategy instead of operational maneuver. Add to this more great works emerging on how to fight in the cyber and space domains, competing in the human domain, and so forth. All interesting and valuable in their own, right, but ultimately of little value if they don't support a higher strategy that provides context, meaning, and purpose to the why of what we do beyond achieving a tactical success.

While much of what the author touches upon is well known, even if not well understood, by a select community of interest, I still found his focus on jus ad bellum very relevant and a factor that has been previously under appreciated.

[Bill Moore]

An interesting article on competitive mobilization in preparation for a great power war, but does it hit the mark?

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/com...against-china/

Competitive Mobilization: How Would We Fare Against China?

Defining mobilization
Mobilization entails the substantial and exceptional displacement, through either government conscription or bidding, of a country’s labor and productive capacity that would otherwise naturally go to civilian purposes.

Referencing another article, he quotes:

Their stimulating essay identified six gaps — munitions, weapons platforms, manpower, planning, technology, and stamina — that a big war against a peer competitor could reveal.

Is the legacy assumption still valid?

Manpower and production mobilization are likely to provide a competitive advantage for one side during a conflict

He argues that the side (comparing the U.S. to China) that can mobilize forces/power for the air and space domains will have the competitive advantage. He also points out that if policy denies kinetic attacks against China and we engage in a military force versus military force war that attrition will play a greater role, resulting in the growing importance of mobilization.

He ends with this:

Mobilization is a competition. But dominating a mobilization competition is not enough. A player still needs a complete strategy with a sound theory of success and operational concept in order to succeed.

Finally, decision-makers should incorporate mobilization into their overall concepts for deterrence. This will mean communicating competitive strategies for mobilization both to internal audiences and to allies and adversaries. Mobilization plans aren’t just for war — they should be a component of peacetime competitive strategies.

Overall a good article that is effectively argued, and probably does a flaw in our strategy if national leaders have failed to develop meaningful and realistic plans for mobilization. People is one thing, I suspect that despite the political liabilities associated with that, it will be worked out.

However, with the impact of globalization resulting in massive outsourcing of our manufacturing, or the inability to compete in basic areas such as the steel industry in a global market, does the U.S. have a sufficient infrastructure to quickly produce arms, ships, war planes (especially based on today's technical requirements)?

The author focused on the air and space domains, but what about the cyber domain? Do we have effective operational concepts for fighting in this domain? What does that mean? Would we have to rapidly recruit geek battalions or contract out an organization like Anonymous (which is multinational and reportedly mostly composed of French)? What if great powers leverage the human domain, like Russia did in the Ukraine, and Iran in Yemen? What does mobilization mean in that context? What does it mean beyond the military? USAID? State Department? etc.

Mobilization must be tailored to the conflict at hand or the projected conflict, and future wars will probably look increasingly different with more drones and other robotics playing a more predominant role. SOF, cyber, and other elements will most likely play increasingly important roles, but they will be employed differently than they are now.