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  1. #1
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    I recently read two excellent books. The first was A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, by Richard Haass that provides a view on challenges to the World Order, and proposals for meeting that challenge. The second book, which is the topic of this post is The World America Made, by Robert Kagan. This book also provides a view deeply informed by history on the world order that America made, the challenges that order faces, and the risk associated with what follows. A lot of strategists have different views of what is most important when it comes to strategy, but I think all strategy is worthless if the nation doesn't have the political will to execute it. This book provides a well reasoned argument on why America must stay engaged in the world.

    What follows are some key points in the book:

    1. Every international order in history has reflected the beliefs and interests of its strongest powers and every order has changed when power shifted to others with different beliefs and interests. The better idea doesn't win just because it is the better idea, it requires great power to champion it.

    2. He provided historical examples when democracy rose and fell as a prevailing political idea, emphasizing that orders are not self-sustaining. What has enabled the prolonged success of democratization the last quarter was the world's greatest power reflected this norm. The U.S. didn't pursue a persistent policy of promoting democracy, in reality the military was employed out principle only twice to install democratic governments (Panama and Haiti). Rather it was the norms that America established. The strategic, economic, political, and ideological were inseparable. If nations wanted to be part of NATO, and later the EU, they had to present democratic credentials.

    3. A Chinese strategist argues that the U.S. created “an institutionalized system of hegemony” by “establishing international norms” according to U.S. principles of behavior. Once these norms are accepted by the majority of countries, U.S. hegemony becomes legitimized. Of course we did this while the Chinese were killing millions of their own country men, and putting the rest of them in reeducation camps. If you want a voice in the world, don't be excessively stupid.

    4. Kagan warns that we are dazzled by democratization, globalization, and interdependence. We tend to believe these developments have made our world so different. But these trends have been flowing for more than a century, and they have not prevented catastrophic wars. He reminds us that prior to WWI, economic interdependence and the belief that no one would go to war over land prevailed. The outbreak of WWI revealed failed imagination. Today we suffer from similar lack of imagination. Even the arguments are the same.

    5. All great powers respond to opportunities and constraints in the international system. It is remarkable (unprecedented) that the U.S. superpower, for all its flaws, its excesses, and its failures has been accepted and tolerated by much of the world to such a degree. It has been more than tolerated, others have encouraged it, joined it, in formal and less formal agreements.

    6. International order is no an evolution; it is an imposition.

    7. He reminds us of the limits of our power, and when he puts it in historical context, we're really not as weak as we tend to believe. He writes, it is true the U.S. is not able to get what it wants much of the time. But then, it never could. Our image of the past is an illusion. For every great accomplishment during the Cold War, there was at least one equally fundamental set back. Mao winning China, N. Korea's attack on the South, couldn’t stop European allies from recognizing China. Our foreign policy created hatred for the U.S. As a result of 3d world animosity, and the U.S. steadily lost influence in the UN after 1960 (read The Brothers if you want to understand this point, the CIA and its unnecessary unconventional warfare efforts were occasionally successful operationally, but a major strategic failure). Late 60s, Kissinger wrote, “increased fragmentation of power, the greater diffusion of political activity, and the more complicated patterns of international conflict and alignment had sharply reduced the capacity of both superpowers to influence.

    The point of all this is we don't see a trend until it is in our rear view mirror, so the new we're dealing with has been around for some time.

    8. Many countries looked to the U.S. for leadership and protection throughout the Cold War and in the 1990s. The point is the U.S. was the predominant power in the world, it wielded enormous influence, and it accomplished much, but it was NOT omnipotent—far from it.

    Continued

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    9. How can we measure if the U.S. is in decline? To compare American influence today with a mythical past of overwhelming dominance can only mislead us. While the U.S. government can exercise more influence on the behavior of more actors with respect to more issues than any other government can, it does not mean it can determine all other nations’ behavior on all issues or even on most issues.

    10. The measure of the order’s success is not whether the U.S. can tell everyone what to do. It is whether the order itself—expansion of democracy, prosperity, and security is sustained. The greater freedom and independence of Brazil in foreign policy, although they disagree with us, can be a sign of the order’s success. The greater freedom of Iran to build a nuke can be a harbinger of its failure.

    11. This point was made toward of the end of the book, but in my opinion it was the motivation for the author writing the book. If Americans had a clearer picture of what might come after the American world order, they would be more inclined to continue struggling to preserve the order they made, or at least ensure changes to the system to not undermine the order from which they, and others, have so greatly benefited. (He writes earlier in the book, fighting to sustain the current order as is will be an act of futility, but we need to lead and shape the emerging order).

    What happens when autocracies shape the international order? We see China sustaining dictatorships in Burma and North Korea, and Russia’s obstruction of democratic pressures on regimes in Belarus, Armenia, and Central Asia. Since this is true today, in a world dominated by democracies, imagine a world in which the autocratic powers were stronger than the democratic powers. It might be enough to reverse liberal democratic order again.

    He adds, one key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control over the seas. What if the U.S. ceased to carry this burden? China is using its growing naval power not top open, but to close international waters offers a glimpse into the future where the U.S. Navy is no longer dominant.

    12. What has made America most attractive to much of the world has not been its culture, its wisdom, or even its ideals alone. At times these have played a part; at times they were irrelevant. More consistent has been the attraction of America’s power, the manner in which it uses it, and the ends for which it has been used. What is true since the time of Rome remains true today; there can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace.

    13. He closes with thoughts on change and continuity. In the international realm, the distribution of power among nations, and between nations and non-state actors, is constantly in flux. It is both foolish and futile to try to hold to the past and to believe that the old ways are always going to be sufficient to meet new circumstances. However, we cannot be so entranced by change, that we fail to recognize some fundamental and enduring truths about power, about human nature, and about the way beliefs and power interact to shape a world order.

    Continued

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    My initial thoughts on implications related to Kagan's book are a combination of revisionist history, the prevailing dumbing down of the West due the toxic impact of social media, and the deliberate actions of Russia and others to undermine our institutions and values has blinded a significant portion of the West's population to the dangers that lurk around the corner if we fail to maintain a leadership role in shaping the international order and frankly imposing norms that facilitate security and prosperity. I'm not arguing that our history should not be critical of our past, frankly we have an ugly past when he compare our actions to the ideas we promote. History and the media should hold us accountable; however, there is a larger context that gets lost in our excessive self-criticism. It would be a hell of lot of worse of Putin, Xi, Castro, Maduro, or some Iranian Supreme leader was guiding the international order.

    U.S. power is not declining so much as other powers are increasing their power relative to the U.S., so our ability to impose and shape the order is increasingly limited, UNLESS our allies and partners stand with us to protect and advance common interests. Admittedly, the strategic error of invading and occupying Iraq has cost us considerable credibility and influence. While we must learn from that event, it is not an excuse for us to retreat from the world, or our allies and partners not stand with us against significant and growing threats to the international order that benefit our interests. Communicating the risk of failure to do so is imperative.

    Another complication is the administration's America First national strategy theme. Every nation looks after its interests first, but the way this is communicated calls into question our will to police and enforce the order. If we don't, no one else will, but other powers will establish regional hegemonic influence and impose their own order increasing the risk of conflict and economic disruption. If you get past the rhetoric, it is clear the U.S. is still leading, but we need our words to align with our actions.
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 01-20-2018 at 10:31 AM.

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    A decent summary of the U.S. National Defense Strategy 2018.

    https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order...ense-strategy/

    Order from Chaos, How to Read the 2018 NDS.

    Remarkably, the NDS manages to be both pithy and blunt.
    While the U.S. military faces five major challenges in line with American national security interests—China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and terrorists—countering the first two across the spectrum of conflict, including at the high-end and in the gray zone, are prioritized in this strategy
    .

    The NDS’s bumper sticker, “Compete, Deter, and Win,” should be viewed through the lens of major competitors, and the emphasis on lethality/modernization and readiness should be understood as helping the U.S. military regain its advantage over China and Russia. According to this strategy, prioritizing preparation for tomorrow and next week’s conflicts will come at the expense of fighting today’s wars against violent non-state actors.
    As the author identifies, funding to implement the NDS still remains in question. It isn't wise to develop a fall back plan for Congress that costs less because they'll choose butter over guns if given the chance. It is wise to consider options if it doesn't get funded. The alternative strategy will probably nest in this section:

    In the often-orphaned issues category, the NDS tackles two topics worth highlighting: operational concepts and professional military education. The inclusion of both issues underscores that fighting and winning in the future must not simply be about the right materiel solution, but also about how the U.S. military employs what it already has—above all, its people
    .

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    Three Steps to Avert an Accidental Nuclear War
    Human error, cyberattacks and Cold War postures are increasingly likely to set off a global disaster.
    by Ernest Moniz and Sam Nunn

    Some salient points -
    American leaders have been warned more than once of incoming Russian missiles -- in each case, it was a false alarm resulting from technical or human error. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin was mistakenly alerted to a possible U.S. missile strike after the launch of a Norwegian scientific rocket.
    The risks of human error involving nuclear weapons are compounded by the potential for deliberate cyber-threats to warning and command-and-control systems. Hackers could insert a false warning of a nuclear attack into national warning and alert systems and falsely attribute that attack to an innocent country. At a time of heightened global tensions -- with too little communication or cooperation between nuclear rivals, and only minutes of decision time -- how would leaders of states with nuclear weapons respond?
    https://www.bloomberg.com/view/artic...al-nuclear-war
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
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    Bloomberg Q&A with Hugh White, a former top Australian official who feels Beijing has already filled the U.S. leadership void.

    White put these thoughts to paper and pixel with a much-debated essay in the Australian publication Quarterly Essay. "Without America" envisions a Situation Room scene where a fictitious U.S. president decides that, even with America's superior conventional military, the risk of a confrontation with China just isn't worth it. Even if the U.S. prevailed, all China would need to do would be to inflict a couple of glancing blows and it would, politically, have triumphed.

    For context, White is no raging left-wing academic. He has worked for Bob Hawke, a former Australian prime minister, and Kim Beazley, Hawke's defense minister. Both politicians were among the most pro-American figures in the Australian Labor Party. Beazley subsequently served as Australian ambassador to Washington from 2010 to 2016.

    White's opinions have not gone unchallenged -- among others, frequent Bloomberg View contributor Hal Brands took a few shots.
    Link to Q&A:https://www.bloomberg.com/view/artic...he-u-s-in-asia
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-06-2018 at 12:59 PM. Reason: Fix link
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


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  7. #7
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    Default Australian doubts

    There has been a series of articles on WoTR over Hugh White's views and I have read a few. See:https://warontherocks.com/index.php?s=hugh+white

    From this faraway spot I rely on this website for Australian input on strategy and to say the least there is an exchange there - a development I expect accelerated by President Trump holding office.
    Link:https://www.lowyinstitute.org/issues/defence-security
    davidbfpo

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