Strategy in the 21st Century

[Bill Moore]

https://nationalinterest.org/feature...rregular-29672

The Future of Warfare is Irregular
These realities suggest that competition between the United States and its main adversaries will likely be irregular—not conventional.
by Seth Jones

America’s adversaries are unlikely to compete with the United States directly in a series of set-piece battles. Instead, they will likely continue to engage in cyber, proxy and information campaigns. Thus far, the United States has failed to compete effectively in this field, except for some efforts by U.S. special operations forces. Washington has been far too reactive, defensive, and cautious—not to mention discordant among multiple U.S. government agencies. Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have embraced irregular warfare. But the United States has not. It isn’t too late to adjust course.

It has been awhile since I provided an update to this, and Seth Jones’ recent article provides an opportunity to reopen the discussion. Jones argues our adversaries / competitors will likely continue to resort to irregular or more accurately non-conventional strategies to pursue their strategic aims, while our current focus on building a superior conventional and nuclear capability fails to address the gaps in our ability to protect our interests in competition short of traditional armed conflict, also known as the gray zone. He is not opposed to a conventional force build up and modernizing our nuclear forces, but correctly points out our adversaries can still defeat us (undermine our strategic interests) if we fail to address their use of what we call irregular warfare.

While Jones did a good job of advocating for the U.S. to enhance its irregular warfare (IW) capabilities throughout the military (especially SOF), the CIA, and other government agencies, he fails to identify how these capabilities would be used to achieve desired ends. He clearly is talking about a much more comprehensive form of IW, than the narrow view of conceived in response to our protracted conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. He is focused on the full range of irregular or unconventional activities (what Kenan calls political warfare) that can be executed unilaterally and through proxies. Unfortunately, he fails to describe how these capabilities and ways would be employed to achieve strategic ends. While old time SOF operators would say it is obvious, the articles is focused on convincing conventional military leadership on the need to ramp up our IW capabilities, not downsize them.

He recommendations include the need to educate our public on how our adversaries use irregular warfare. Presumably this will enhance our resilience and generate the political will to counter it once it is recognized as a strategic threat. Second, professional education at military schools need to add more irregular warfare topics to the curriculum. In my view, most military education in this area is tied to faulty strategic approaches for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. One is focused on the non-strategic tactical approach of find, fix, finish to defeat terrorism, where we have 17 plus years of tactical success and strategic failure, and the other naively assumes the center of gravity is always the local populace to defeat an insurgency. That view was questionable during Cold War, and even more so now when various external actors can continue to leverage proxies strategically regardless of the populace’s leanings. For great power competition, the educational curriculum needs to address unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, cyber, and other topics at the strategic level, which was actually his third recommendation (reduce the focus on counterterrorism).

It is a good article, but one that I hope he follows up on with an article on how the U.S. government and military would employ irregular warfare to achieve strategic ends in the 21st Century. We can’t repeat the Cold War, the strategic environment has changed too much. We’re now in a multipolar world that is increasingly interdependent economically, which results in more limitations, but perhaps also more opportunities.

[Bill Moore]

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...seone_today_nl

This short article is the most concise, yet comprehensive description of the gray zone or competition short of armed conflict that I have seen.

augmenting their substantial political, economic, military, and commercial capabilities, Beijing and Moscow are mastering the “weaponization of everything” to achieve exploitable hypercompetitive advantages vis-à-vis the United States. Their “hammers” range from political coercion, predatory economics and strategic extortion, to information warfare and subversion, covert action, and overt disregard for international norms.

We need to expand our view of multi-domain warfare to address other domains beyond the doctrinal ones and compete in those domains short of armed conflict. These strategies are hardly new in the historical sense, but the U.S. has become an astrategic nation. As the article states, we have failed to adapt to a post U.S. primacy world. I would add we subconsciously cling to the "End of History" myth and over emphasize the value of soft power as a means and way to an end.

Our adversaries decisively and deliberately maneuver and compete in domains beyond maritime, land, space, air, and cyber to achieve their policy aims over time (extended battles that require strategic patience). In contrast, the U.S. military national defense strategy narrowly focuses on improving lethality in the doctrinal domains, while our adversaries execute sophisticated whole of society campaigns to achieve their ends that largely neutralize our conventional military power.

The article accurately points out we are not even on the defense, much less the offense. However, once we wake up to the growing threat presented by these competitors to our way of life and internal stability, I believe we have the ability to prevail in this competition, yet time is not on our side.

As warlike behavior migrates into new competitive spaces – strategic influence, commerce, culture, domestic politics, cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum — the U.S. government and private sector must recognize the far-reaching and growing hazards of hypercompetition and rival gray-zone strategies. The boundaries between war and peace, battlefield and market, and adversary and competitor are dissolving. If the United States is to effectively compete for position and influence in this turbulent and dangerous environment, it requires an urgent meeting of the minds to bring a more collaborative stance to hypercompetitive great-power rivalry.

[davidbfpo]

This is an article by Professor Anatol Lieven, Kings War Studies, which appeared in my electronic reading list today, but was published pre-Xmas in The National Interest, so some may have read this before.
The sub-title says:

In their enthusiasm for a new cold war against China and Russia, the western establishments of today are making a mistake comparable to that of their forbears of 1914.

He opens with:

This year saw the 100th anniversary of the end of the First World War, in which some 16 million Europeans died, two great European countries were destroyed, and others crippled. This year may also be seen by future historians as the last year of the period between the cold wars, when after 29 years of relative quiet, the world's major powers once again moved into positions of deep and structural mutual hostility.

Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anatol-lieven/can-we-please-learn-from-history? or The National Interest:https://nationalinterest.org/feature...522?page=0%2C1

[Bill Moore]

This is an article by Professor Anatol Lieven, Kings War Studies, which appeared in my electronic reading list today, but was published pre-Xmas in The National Interest, so some may have read this before.
The sub-title says:
He opens with:
Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anatol-lieven/can-we-please-learn-from-history? or The National Interest:https://nationalinterest.org/feature...522?page=0%2C1

David,

I read this guy's bio and it is impressive, but his article is a bunch of hyperbole that suggests we bury our heads in the sand. The U.S. has no enthusiasm for a new Cold War, and I suspect Western Europe would prefer to avoid one also. In fact, both the U.S. and Western Europe went out of their way to accommodate China. The Russia situation is more complex, but the U.S. extended multiple olive branches. Based on Xi's increasing aggression, and Russia's military aggression and increasing gray zone interference in the internal affairs of western nations, we had to respond. To do otherwise would be to repeat the same mistake Chamberlain made prior to WWII.

We are waging a competition as a distraction from our internal troubles, and the one thing Anatol got right is we have a lot of internal troubles that have resulted in significant economic, social, and cultural insecurity leading to a higher death rate and addictions. This is exactly the reason we don't desire a new Cold War, they're expensive and distract from the work we need to do at home. If it was a distraction it certainly failed, because both Americans pay little attention to this competition. Many American college kids can't identify where the U.S. is on a globe, but they'll tell you white males destroyed the world, yet be unable to defend their position in a debate.

Here are some of his hyperbole comments:

Murderous Filipino populists? I suspect many Filipinos would take issue with this broad characterization. The Philippines has had insurgencies and high crime for the past 150 years, but they have also made significant progress and the vast majority of the population are good people.

Apparently according to the author, India is ruled by Hindu Fascists. I'm amazed that India exists as a country at all with 13 official languages and its various ethnic groups, insurgencies, separatists groups, economic disparity, etc., the fact that it does is admirable.

Millions of people from Central America fleeing to the U.S., millions? Really?

Unfortunate, but not surprising that another academic is polluting our youth's minds with with anti-Western, anti-democratic, and the West is always wrong diatribe.

[Bill Moore]

From the SWJ Journal: THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY A YEAR LATER: A SWJ DISCUSSION WITH ELBRIDGE COLBY

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/ar...elbridge-colby

Principled realism focuses through a realist lens on building a free, open, and dignified political order within the international system. The logic is that America needs to play power politics so that we don’t live in a power politics world. Principled realism accepts that power and especially the agglomeration of power determines international outcomes. But it seeks to adapt that reality in service of positive ends.

Throughout the interview, he limits his view of power to brute military force, both conventional and nuclear. While these elements will remain relevant for a nation-state vying for power on the world stage, other actors, including non-state actors that Colby largely dismisses, have demonstrated they have considerable power to influence states and their populations.

What’s wrong with the “international rules-based order” language is that rules per se do not define international order. “Rules based order” sounds like conceiving of or attempting to turn the international environment into a domestic environment. But a domestic environment requires the preponderance of power by a sovereign, which is incompatible with the preservation of meaningful state sovereignty. The other problem with the “rules-based order” phrase is that it tends to focus people on violations of the “rules” rather than the real issue, which is power. My favorite example is the South China Sea. If the Chinese could create artificial features, militarize them, and achieve military dominance in the South China Sea – and do this all legally – we would still have a problem with it.

I don't see how you can have a free and open international system that isn't based on rule and norms. Those that adhere to the rules and norms develop a shared trust in these rules and processes, that equates to a higher degree of stability in the international system. Those who violate the rules and norms destabilize the system, and it is the violation of these rules that give us some degree of legitimacy to act.

Generally, the NDS emphasizes that we need to have a theory of victory that is able to beat their theory of victory. Their theory of victory is the rapid seizure of allied territory that presents the perception through nuclear or conventional coercion that the costs and risks of ejecting the them from their seizure would be too great and too daunting to be contemplated because such action could split the alliance or at the minimum tame our response sufficiently to negate its effectiveness.

Colby is viewing the world through one soda straw instead of a more holistic kaleidoscope. He fails to adequate address competition short of armed conflict, or gray zone competition when he refers to China and Russia seeking to expand their territory and shift the preponderance of power through small, limited wars. This implies that China and Russia must conduct strategic preparation of the environment to set conditions for quick, decisive wars to achieve limited objectives. A recent example is Russia's aggression against Crimea. After seizing the territory, Russia and China will then attempt to normalize it politically in hopes that others, especially the U.S., will not seek to dislodge their military and paramilitary forces. In many ways, while Russia still controls Crimea, it was a loss for Russia strategically. In the far east, the Chinese using a strategy of incrementalism have achieved a degree of success in the South China Sea. Their activites change the facts on the ground, or blue soil, without triggering a military response. However, it now viewed as naked aggression and coercion by many countries, so this strategy is gradually backfiring.

This is largely about deterrence, not assurance. The point is to develop combat-credible forces forward (whether American or allied) that can blunt the adversary’s aggression so that they cannot consummate the fait accompli, so that they cannot seize territory or hold on to it. Ideally the alliance will deny the adversary their attempt at localized aggression so the adversary cannot achieve the fait accompli.

People tend to bifurcate political influence and military force. Of course, the real objective of having a military advantage is to develop political influence without having to use military force or using it in a very efficient way. Influence comes from the understanding that if you challenge the other side you will lose. If the states of the East are under the shadow of Russian power, including their A2/AD capability, and they perceive that the U.S. and the rest of the Alliance don’t have a credible and plausible way of defending them, then they will face strong pressure to defer to or even bandwagon with the Russians.

Deterrence hinges on a favorable balance of power, and for us that requires allies and partners who are assured we will honor our commitments before they commit to theirs. To do otherwise could prove suicidal.

This interview sidesteps the reality of gray zone competition, although it is addressed in the National Defense Strategy. Simply relying on an improved conventional and nuclear force posture will not deter these sophisticated political warfare tactics. It is not a lesser threat either, assuming a national interest is worth fighting for based on our expensive forward posture, then it is a logical assumption if that interest is threatened short of traditional armed conflict and we do not have a strategy to counter it, then we have a significant gap in our strategy. A significant gap that the Chinese have effectively exploited much more effectively than the Russians.

[AdamG]

Ongoing Conflicts as of 2019 (source unknown)

[Bill Moore]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUNm852We0o

The Sublime: Is it the same for IBM and Special Ops?

The enclosed link is to a YouTube video where LTC Grant Martin shares his view on design. It may seem out of place in a forum focused on Strategy in the 21st Century, but in my view, we need hybrid strategy/campaign plans that facilitate learning and adaption. Design thinking even the Army /Joint Operational design process that some seem to look down their nose at, is a process to facilitate this type of strategy/campaign development and continuing refinement.

My response to the YouTube video follows:

An interesting presentation and I admire Grant’s passion. You can’t move mountains or create what Kun refers to as a Paradigm Shift without passion and the continuing accumulation of evidence that our current processes and beliefs are no longer adequate. My thoughts on this presentation are both supportive and critical. I wouldn’t dismiss the term design but focus on what you’re ultimately trying to achieve. In my opinion, it is creating a process to facilitate continuous learning and adaption, and ultimately develop a learning organization.
MDMP and JOPP do not facilitate effective learning and adaption to an ever-evolving ecosystem. As you stated, linear military processes are O.K. for short duration operations with limited objectives. However, beyond short duration operations, this linear process has limited utility. It partly explains why the American way of war is apolitical, acultural, ahistoric, and non-strategic. In response to some comments by the attendees, MDMP/JOPP didn’t get us to where we are with Syria or China. Those were policy decisions well above the military planning level. The military develops strategy and operational approaches to achieve policy aims, and if we’re in a state of policy confusion, then obviously our plans/designs will fall short. Place the issue squarely where it fits.

Design thinking could lead to gaining a greater understanding over time as we interact with multiple variables (not just the adversary) in the strategic ecosystem. To be effective, it needs to facilitate a common understanding, but not groupthink, from the NSC to tactical formations. I have met several very creative Generals and Admirals (older gentlemen), but their staffs frequently resist change, most commonly at the O-6 and GS-15 levels. Why? Their bureaucratic expertise is in the current system, and they fear they’ll lose influence if they expand into new territory. Age is a variable, but it is only one variable, so judge each individual on his or her individual merit, not their age, color, religion, education, etc.

I hope this idea of design thinking will bring back the art of war and reintegrate into policy. Even the old dogs you frequently criticize would value this. Clausewitz fully recognized we cannot reduce the complexity of war to a scientific method, so in some respect, there is already buy-in from some noted experts in the study and practice of war. I valued Grant’s comments on our deeply flawed assessment process where we foolishly attempt to apply business metrics to great power competition, counterinsurgency, and traditional war as though we can reduce it a math problem. McNamara pushed this on DOD during the Vietnam War, and it continues to have toxic effects to this day. The feedback we need for our OODA loop (tactical through strategic) differs depending upon our aims, but it is nonsense that every objective must be scientifically measurable. Very few objectives will fall into this realm. I think there is an awakening across the force that our current assessment processes need to change. Assessments are critical, but the most valuable assessments are more art than science. It is not about measuring whether we have increased our earning fiscal quarter to fiscal quarter.

I’ll refute Grant’s point that SOF was first to human domain. In WWII conventional forces used anthropologists to gain an understanding of different populations because they realized it was critical to achieving strategic effects. The Navy used anthropologists throughout the SW Pacific, and MacArthur understood the necessity of working within Japanese cultural norms to achieve our political ends. That may have been the last time that the U.S. truly integrated the military to achieve strategic political ends instead of standalone military objectives. If SOF continues to pursue its aim to make all SOF global instead of maintaining its deep regional expertise, SOF will no longer have a competitive advantage in the human domain over conventional forces or our adversaries.

Finally, comments about the young being more creative or equally unsubstantiated we need to recruit and put kids with noserings in charge of the information domain because they know how to operate in the Cyber domain get a little tiresome because they are meaningless. They are little more than statements expressing frustration. Even if the cupcake with a nose ring is a great hacker, he or she won’t make any more difference than a great rifleman if they operate in a strategic void. Furthermore, studies prove these are false assertions. A recent study shows young people today want more precision than previous generations. They’re not comfortable operating in gray areas or complexity. The study is ongoing to further examine why, but it points to the likely factor being the impact of the digital age and how it shapes their thinking (or lack of). Another study states physicists today make their most significant discoveries at 48 and explains why this wasn’t true a century ago. The bottom line is it is more personality dependent than age dependent. I have met several very creative Generals and Admirals, but their staffs effectively resisted change, most commonly at the O-6 and GS-15 levels. Age is a variable, but it is only one variable. When I asked a variety of people to review a non-doctrinal plan I received significant pushback from those under 35 and general support from those over 35. Why? The young know what they learned in school and probably don’t have the confidence to buck the system yet. The older ones know our current processes are falling short based on hard-earned experience.