Strategy in the 21st Century

[Bill Moore]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUNm852We0o

The Sublime: Is it the same for IBM and Special Ops?

The enclosed link is to a YouTube video where LTC Grant Martin shares his view on design. It may seem out of place in a forum focused on Strategy in the 21st Century, but in my view, we need hybrid strategy/campaign plans that facilitate learning and adaption. Design thinking even the Army /Joint Operational design process that some seem to look down their nose at, is a process to facilitate this type of strategy/campaign development and continuing refinement.

My response to the YouTube video follows:

An interesting presentation and I admire Grant’s passion. You can’t move mountains or create what Kun refers to as a Paradigm Shift without passion and the continuing accumulation of evidence that our current processes and beliefs are no longer adequate. My thoughts on this presentation are both supportive and critical. I wouldn’t dismiss the term design but focus on what you’re ultimately trying to achieve. In my opinion, it is creating a process to facilitate continuous learning and adaption, and ultimately develop a learning organization.
MDMP and JOPP do not facilitate effective learning and adaption to an ever-evolving ecosystem. As you stated, linear military processes are O.K. for short duration operations with limited objectives. However, beyond short duration operations, this linear process has limited utility. It partly explains why the American way of war is apolitical, acultural, ahistoric, and non-strategic. In response to some comments by the attendees, MDMP/JOPP didn’t get us to where we are with Syria or China. Those were policy decisions well above the military planning level. The military develops strategy and operational approaches to achieve policy aims, and if we’re in a state of policy confusion, then obviously our plans/designs will fall short. Place the issue squarely where it fits.

Design thinking could lead to gaining a greater understanding over time as we interact with multiple variables (not just the adversary) in the strategic ecosystem. To be effective, it needs to facilitate a common understanding, but not groupthink, from the NSC to tactical formations. I have met several very creative Generals and Admirals (older gentlemen), but their staffs frequently resist change, most commonly at the O-6 and GS-15 levels. Why? Their bureaucratic expertise is in the current system, and they fear they’ll lose influence if they expand into new territory. Age is a variable, but it is only one variable, so judge each individual on his or her individual merit, not their age, color, religion, education, etc.

I hope this idea of design thinking will bring back the art of war and reintegrate into policy. Even the old dogs you frequently criticize would value this. Clausewitz fully recognized we cannot reduce the complexity of war to a scientific method, so in some respect, there is already buy-in from some noted experts in the study and practice of war. I valued Grant’s comments on our deeply flawed assessment process where we foolishly attempt to apply business metrics to great power competition, counterinsurgency, and traditional war as though we can reduce it a math problem. McNamara pushed this on DOD during the Vietnam War, and it continues to have toxic effects to this day. The feedback we need for our OODA loop (tactical through strategic) differs depending upon our aims, but it is nonsense that every objective must be scientifically measurable. Very few objectives will fall into this realm. I think there is an awakening across the force that our current assessment processes need to change. Assessments are critical, but the most valuable assessments are more art than science. It is not about measuring whether we have increased our earning fiscal quarter to fiscal quarter.

I’ll refute Grant’s point that SOF was first to human domain. In WWII conventional forces used anthropologists to gain an understanding of different populations because they realized it was critical to achieving strategic effects. The Navy used anthropologists throughout the SW Pacific, and MacArthur understood the necessity of working within Japanese cultural norms to achieve our political ends. That may have been the last time that the U.S. truly integrated the military to achieve strategic political ends instead of standalone military objectives. If SOF continues to pursue its aim to make all SOF global instead of maintaining its deep regional expertise, SOF will no longer have a competitive advantage in the human domain over conventional forces or our adversaries.

Finally, comments about the young being more creative or equally unsubstantiated we need to recruit and put kids with noserings in charge of the information domain because they know how to operate in the Cyber domain get a little tiresome because they are meaningless. They are little more than statements expressing frustration. Even if the cupcake with a nose ring is a great hacker, he or she won’t make any more difference than a great rifleman if they operate in a strategic void. Furthermore, studies prove these are false assertions. A recent study shows young people today want more precision than previous generations. They’re not comfortable operating in gray areas or complexity. The study is ongoing to further examine why, but it points to the likely factor being the impact of the digital age and how it shapes their thinking (or lack of). Another study states physicists today make their most significant discoveries at 48 and explains why this wasn’t true a century ago. The bottom line is it is more personality dependent than age dependent. I have met several very creative Generals and Admirals, but their staffs effectively resisted change, most commonly at the O-6 and GS-15 levels. Age is a variable, but it is only one variable. When I asked a variety of people to review a non-doctrinal plan I received significant pushback from those under 35 and general support from those over 35. Why? The young know what they learned in school and probably don’t have the confidence to buck the system yet. The older ones know our current processes are falling short based on hard-earned experience.

[Bill Moore]

https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-conten...l-16Mar19R.pdf

Grand Strategy Alternatives 2019

This study focuses on Great Power Competition with China, and less so with Russia. Since it is competition the grand strategy focuses on developing a strategy to build a better future short of traditional armed conflict. The author states grand strategy includes diverse means (DIME), adds building the means, and has expansive ends. He provides readers with what he calls a diversity of strategic options for consideration. Grand strategy focuses on building a better future based on relationships with specific states and non-state actors conceived in terms of an international order,

John Ikenberry useful defines as: “a political formation in which settled rules and arrangements exist between states to guide their interaction.” Types of international order possible include balancing, a concert of powers, democracy, economic interdependence, and hegemony.

He provides an admittedly simplistic way to frame our view of a grand strategy to help policymakers think about grand strategy in broader terms while avoiding cognitive overload.

There are three fundamental ways of changing an existing relationship between two or more entities: stopping another doing something, working with another, or trying to change anotherÂ’s mind. Adding international relations theoretical perspectives then leads to a grand strategy typology of denial, engagement, and reform.

He goes on for 16 pages of easy, yet informative reading on the varying aspects of each of the three grand strategy typologies to include their pros and cons, plus feasibility considering the actors involved. If you're interested in grand strategy, then you find this a valuable read.

A couple of personal thoughts. I think he makes a hollow argument when he states national interests are astrategic because they only address one country in a bilateral or multilateral situation. That is only true if the strategist only considers one view; most strategic analysis I have seen include convergent and divergent interests of all known actors involved. Yet at the end of the day, we do have interests that we're pursuing.

Nowhere in his writing did he state we can only use one grand strategy, but he also didn't point it out. In fact, we generally use denial (balance of power, hegemonic stability, etc.), engagement (interdependence, institutionalist, etc.) and reform (build more favorable norms, change minds) grand strategies simultaneously with the same actor to ultimately get to the desired relationship. We can put resources into the approach that gains the greatest traction.

He argues, probably correctly, that both Russia and China fear color revolutions so much that have dedicated considerable resources to prevent them, so it is infeasible we could generate one. Yet it is helpful for them to believe we can because the resources dedicated to internal security diverts resources from conventional military build-ups. For Russia, he argues if Putin shifts more resources to focus on improving the lives of individual citizens he become less aggressive. Yet, this is China's focus, and it has made them more aggressive because global expansion is critical to sustaining their economic growth.

It is the nature of American strategy to myopically focus on major threat while managing others, but I wonder is that approach is sustainable in a post-American world that is increasingly multipolar. We need new models for assessing risk and opportunity that are global in perspective and not narrowly focused on one of our two known adversaries.