Strategy in the 21st Century

[Bob's World]

Certainly one can kill their way to victory in war, it just depends on what type of victory one seeks.

But if the war is an internal one, this is likely to be a pyrrhic victory.

The "American Way of War" remains a valid model for state on state warfare. Defeat the military, government and population of one's opponent completely; and then be generous in peace with broad reconciliation in peace, avoiding overly corrupting the perceived self-determination of the new governance that emerges, and remember that the defeated state will tolerate much more "influence" over their future if one is perceived as lessor of two evils (i.e., US presence in Germany, South Korea and Japan prevented much harsher occupations from impacting those places and people. We tend to forget that).

When one stops the war when the opposing government capitulates, but their military and population are not defeated, it is still a win, but not one that validates treating the affected nation and people as "defeated" (i.e., Germany post WWI, and equally Russia post-Cold War).

What Luttwak advocated for in "Give War a Chance" was the importance of letting political conflicts play out. When an external power intervenes to force a winner through the application of their power, it corrupts the legitimacy of the victory. The loser will always rationalize "but for...". This is when external power comes in as arbitrator. I believe increasingly external power should come in as mediator. Not to pick winners and losers; but to use their power to force the internal parties to the table and address issues that the current government would prefer to ignore. Like mediation in a failing marriage, terms developed and agreed to by the parties are more palatable and durable than those imposed by a judge.

The nature of war is not much changed by the modern strategic environment, but as power shifts to populations relative to governments it is highlighting that political conflict within a single system is not the same as that between two or more systems. War is the final argument of Kings; but revolution is the final vote of the people.

[Bill Moore]

Bob,

Where we sometimes disagree is over the following statement.

The nature of war is not much changed by the modern strategic environment, but as power shifts to populations relative to governments it is highlighting that political conflict within a single system is not the same as that between two or more systems. War is the final argument of Kings; but revolution is the final vote of the people.

Some the VEOs are waging a war within a single political system, many are waging a global jihad with ambitions to change political systems external to their country. To your point about power shifting between states, and power shifting to super empowered individuals and groups, I agree. Some of these non-state groups are waging war against the U.S. and our allies. Attempting to solve this challenge by addressing local governance issues will not work. We have to recognize the type of conflict we're in, and not confuse everything with traditional Cold War COIN/FID models. At the same time, we can't paint with too broad of brush, because not every group employing terrorism if part of this global jihad movement.

[Bob's World]

Bob,

Where we sometimes disagree is over the following statement.



Some the VEOs are waging a war within a single political system, many are waging a global jihad with ambitions to change political systems external to their country. To your point about power shifting between states, and power shifting to super empowered individuals and groups, I agree. Some of these non-state groups are waging war against the U.S. and our allies. Attempting to solve this challenge by addressing local governance issues will not work. We have to recognize the type of conflict we're in, and not confuse everything with traditional Cold War COIN/FID models. At the same time, we can't paint with too broad of brush, because not every group employing terrorism if part of this global jihad movement.

Bill, I suspect we disagree less than you might imagine on this. Obviously we do not live in a black and white world. Rare is the conflict that is purely "within" or "between." Most are a fusion of both. And yes, this new breed of VEO that the core groups for ISIS and AQ are prime examples of, conduct global UW campaigns in very state-like ways (but without the burden of state-like vulnerabilities).

Many in recent years have conflated these UW campaigns by slapping AQ or ISIS prefixes onto dozens of disparate revolutionary movements around the globe. That totally confuses the nature of those individual movements, as well as the character of the overall campaign. That is why I have long advocated for abandoning the reactive, symptomatic logic of CT and adopting a C-UW approach that focuses on the strategies, campaigns and alliances of these organizations.

By recognizing that the drivers of resistance insurgency are unique from the nature of the drivers of revolutionary insurgency it allows us to design more comprehensive campaigns that recognize that distinction and are designed to address both from the top down (as well as dealing with the UW efforts of state and VEO actors seeking to leverage both to their advantage).

Many have argued in places like Afghanistan that the problem must be solved from the bottom up. The problem is, that at the "bottom" there is no way to know the motivations of the fighter before you. Also, most of these places are broken from the top down through bad policies and poor governance.

Historically, when state power could routinely trump and suppress popular power, there was little need to make a distinction between revolution and resistance. After all, the "win" was defined as the state remaining uncoerced and the insurgent defeated. That was no true win then, and is even less of a win today. Time to put a finer point on our thinking.

[Azor]

Moral Repugnance: A Response to ‘Can’t Kill Enough to Win? Think Again’ – Foreign Policy (December 11, 2017)

By Lt. Col. Dan Sukman, U.S. Army

Source: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/11/...n-think-again/

Introduction:

There are multiple ways to describe retired Lt. Cols. David Bolgiano and John Taylor’s article in the December issue of Proceedings magazine. Rather than call a spade a spade in an ad hominem-type attack, it is worth the time to deconstruct their argument bit by bit, and then to offer an alternative position.

Key Points:

• Bolgiano and Taylor blame JAG advisors for overly restrictive ROEs, but the ROEs are the responsibility of commanders, the staff leads are J3 and J5, and staff JAGs merely assist. The authors provide no evidence of JAG incompetentence but rely upon “ad hominem attack” and “wholesale slander”.
  
• Comparing conventional past inter-state warfare with present operations against non-state actors is a logical fallacy
  
• Bolgiano and Taylor ignore that precision-guided munitions were not available in the 1940s-1950s, necessitating indiscriminate strategic bombing with an added objective of demoralization. Ironically, civilian morale was only bolstered by the bombing of Germany, Japan and Britain.
  
• The authors attribute high PTSD and suicide rates among veterans to a lack of victory parades; again, without any evidence.
  
• The authors refer to Luttwak’s 1999 essay, “Give War a Chance”, without reflecting on its logical conclusion that, “nations would be part of a never-ending global conflict lasting for centuries until one nation prevailed above all others.”
  
• Bolgiano and Taylor make “bizarre” claims that the Cold War was won entirely by the U.S. defeating the Soviet Union, despite many “competing theories as to why the Soviet Union collapsed”, and dismiss humanitarian missions as “new missions to justify force structure”, when in fact, “these types of missions have been a staple of the U.S. military” e.g. the Berlin Airlift.
  

• The authors’ insistence that the way to win wars is through attrition lacks an intellectual foundation. It is understood that conflict is about achieving a political aim. The well-known strategic theorist Sun Tzu wrote that the ultimate skill for a general is to win without fighting. Moreover, another well-known theorist named Clausewitz wrote, ‘As War is no act of blind passion, but is dominated by the political object, therefore the value of that object determines the measure of the sacrifices by which it is to be purchased.’ People who are serious about warfare understand that war, although characterized by violence, is about attaining a political objective. Nations can achieve this through ways and means other than attrition.

Conclusion:

Wars are not lost because a nation does not kill enough people, or kill enough of the enemy. Wars are lost when nations find themselves in strategic drift. Wars are lost when nations send men and women into combat without any clue to why they are sending them there. Without any clear strategic objectives or end state, nations will fight endless wars with nothing to show for it. Finally, we lose wars when we lose our moral compass. The instant we become a monster to slay a monster, war is lost.

No, We Can’t Kill Our Way To Victory Despite What 2 Misguided Lieutenant Colonels Might Think – Task & Purpose (December 8, 2017)

By Adam N. Weinstein, U.S. Marine Corps. (Reserves)

Source: http://taskandpurpose.com/no-cant-ki...s-might-think/

Introduction:

Back in 2008, Adm. Michael Mullen, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made what seemed like a self-evident observation, seven years into the Afghanistan war and five years into Iraq: “We can’t kill our way to victory.” Nine years and nearly 2,000 U.S. combat deaths later, the U.S. Naval Institute has published Can’t Kill Enough to Win? Think Again, an op-ed by two retired lieutenant colonels who charge that Mullen was dead wrong, in thrall to a culture of weakness that has permeated and hamstrung the U.S. military. The USNI is a serious outlet for professional military thought; the authors of this particular piece, David Bolgiano and John Taylor, are former paratroopers and JAGs. This article is serious but sorely misguided, another reminder that the military is slow to adapt and has never fully adjusted to counterinsurgency.

Key Points:

• Consider the war in Afghanistan. Kabul still can’t control large swaths of its territory and doesn’t even enjoy legitimacy. The biggest impediment to defeating the Taliban, a fractious and far-flung enemy, has never been an inability to kill its fighters, which U.S. forces still excel at; the problem has been figuring out what comes next, after the killing. The Afghan National Army is still plagued by rampant corruption and ethnic cleavages in Afghan society still hinder a strong national identity. All of these obstacles are compounded by the fact that Pakistan, Iran, and India all have interests in Afghanistan that clash with those of the United States…Despite these complexities, Bolgiano and Taylor assume that overwhelming death and destruction will fix it.

• The urge to have a clear, massive victory is understandable — but it’s never proven effective in a battlespace where multiple insurgencies are occurring at once and in competition with one another…it requires the building of central governments with legitimacy…The U.S. military has vastly superior firepower compared to its enemies, but insurgencies can still kill with ease and relative efficiency.

Conclusion:

It is important never to confuse tactics with strategy or the immediate firefight for the desired long-term outcome. What could have been an interesting critique of U.S. military tactics at the operational level by Bolgiano and Taylor instead became a disjointed bravado-filled tirade that reeks of a longing for a time when war was simpler. The U.S. Naval Institute can do better.

[Bill Moore]

Moral Repugnance: A Response to ‘Can’t Kill Enough to Win? Think Again’ – Foreign Policy (December 11, 2017)

By Lt. Col. Dan Sukman, U.S. Army

Source: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/12/11/...n-think-again/

Introduction:

Key Points:

• Bolgiano and Taylor blame JAG advisors for overly restrictive ROEs, but the ROEs are the responsibility of commanders, the staff leads are J3 and J5, and staff JAGs merely assist. The authors provide no evidence of JAG incompetentence but rely upon “ad hominem attack” and “wholesale slander”.
  
• Comparing conventional past inter-state warfare with present operations against non-state actors is a logical fallacy
  
• Bolgiano and Taylor ignore that precision-guided munitions were not available in the 1940s-1950s, necessitating indiscriminate strategic bombing with an added objective of demoralization. Ironically, civilian morale was only bolstered by the bombing of Germany, Japan and Britain.
  
• The authors attribute high PTSD and suicide rates among veterans to a lack of victory parades; again, without any evidence.
  
• The authors refer to Luttwak’s 1999 essay, “Give War a Chance”, without reflecting on its logical conclusion that, “nations would be part of a never-ending global conflict lasting for centuries until one nation prevailed above all others.”
  
• Bolgiano and Taylor make “bizarre” claims that the Cold War was won entirely by the U.S. defeating the Soviet Union, despite many “competing theories as to why the Soviet Union collapsed”, and dismiss humanitarian missions as “new missions to justify force structure”, when in fact, “these types of missions have been a staple of the U.S. military” e.g. the Berlin Airlift.
  

Conclusion:

No, We Can’t Kill Our Way To Victory Despite What 2 Misguided Lieutenant Colonels Might Think – Task & Purpose (December 8, 2017)

By Adam N. Weinstein, U.S. Marine Corps. (Reserves)

Source: http://taskandpurpose.com/no-cant-ki...s-might-think/

Introduction:

Key Points:

• 
  

Conclusion:

I would have been surprised if there wasn't a self righteous backlash to the think again article. The think again article was partially flawed by comparing the war against Japan and Germany with the war on terror. Despite this error there were a lot of uncomfortable truths in their thought piece that didn't settle well with critics, yet the counter arguments they presented are not supportable. See follow on post for examples.

[Bill Moore]

First, the Moral Repugnance response in Foreign Policy. The author's argument that commander's own the ROE, therefore, it wasn't the lawyers who hampered operations. Partially true, but commanders at what level? The tactical commanders slugging it out with the jihadists had the overly restrictive ROE imposed upon them by higher echelons of command far removed from the fight, who developed ROE based on their COIN Zen readings. I could provide multiple examples, but will simply remind those of the ridiculous escalation of force ROE for challenging a suspicious vehicle approaching your vehicle. First use a laser to get their attention, then small arms warning shots, and then if you're not destroyed by the IED, employ your 50 cal. There were certainly times when this was permissible and prevented innocents casualties, yet when a vehicle charges across the medium at you, and you have seconds are less to act, you won't survive the escalation ROE proscribed.

Second, I agree with the critique that comparing today's conflicts with WWII and even DESERT STORM is false argument. However, the author's argument weakens when he asserts without any supporting evidence that the military can achieve its political object without attrition. That may be true sometimes, but it does apply in all cases. Going back to the false comparison as an example, the Japanese and Germans during WWII were hyper-nationalistic, and to break their will it was necessary to kill and destroy in large measure. Bringing it back to the reality of civil wars, insurgency, and countering terrorists, it still depends upon multiple factors. When the interests of both belligerents are so strong that political settlement is not feasible, then one side must apply sufficient force/violence to compel the other side to bend to their will. One relatively case in point was the civil war in Sri Lanka, the Tamils and Singhalese were not going to comprise with one another, and the war dragged on for years due to the West pushing the Sri Lankan government to take half steps. When the Sri Lankans were resourced (by the Chinese) and they took the gloves off, they finally defeated the Tamil Tigers. They were condemned by the Western media for so called war crimes, yet there was no context, such as was the peace that followed for both sides worth it, or would it be better to drag the fighting for an additional decade?

The author's point about Vietnam and Afghanistan were also flawed. While we certainly killed a lot of people in Vietnam, we didn't sustain the pressure (I'm not arguing that we should have, just questioning the author's assertion that killing doesn't work). In Afghanistan, we haven't killed that many, but more importantly the Taliban production factory in Pakistan is seldom ever touched, so we're not killing them at a sufficient sustained effort to break their will. Again, that may or may not be the preferred the course of action, but it is misleading to assert that killing our way doesn't work based on that example.

To his point about Iraq, having been there in 2007, where the strategy was to kill our way out of the seemingly uncontrollable chaos, it actually worked at the tactical and operational level. However, we didn't tie the killing to a political object beyond buying time for some magic to happen at the political level, which of course never materialized. The author is correct that we were strategically adrift.

To his final comment, "The instant we become a monster to slay a monster, war is lost." That is an opinion, arguably a nave one that has no historical support whatsoever. War is repugnant period, but allowing war to drag on endlessly with no end in sight because we think we can win it with half measures is a sin.

[Bill Moore]

The Task and Purpose critique was better, I think the author hit the nail on the head with this comment.

The biggest impediment to defeating the Taliban, a fractious and far-flung enemy, has never been an inability to kill its fighters, which U.S. forces still excel at; the problem has been figuring out what comes next, after the killing.

So even we do apply sufficient violence to clear an area of the Taliban, we can consolidate our tactical win into a political win. The reason in my view is our failure to understand the local dynamics, and we attempt to impose a Western idea solution that will never work, or at least for the foreseeable future. We need to adjust our ends, or we'll be in Afghanistan forever.

Long-term success in places like Afghanistan and Iraq requires a credible alternative to insurgency and sectarian conflict; it requires the building of central governments with legitimacy. This feat that has so far eluded the United States and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Killing many, and often, hasn’t helped.

This feat will continue to elude the U.S. and its allies, so is it really a feasible course of action to achieve a win (however we ultimately define that)? This is simply COIN Kool-Aid, one size fits all, no analysis on feasibility required. All we have to do is establish a democratic government, provide some economic aid, and presto we'll achieve our ends.

However, this critique was much better argued than the previous one. It is unfortunate that the authors of the "Think Again" piece weakened a needed argument that questioned the conventional wisdom with unneeded bravado.

[Bill Moore]

Ultimately, I do not desire to dilute this thread with an argument on whether we're applying enough violence to compel an adversary to bend to our will, but if we're going to honestly relook strategy in the 21st Century, it is important to challenge existing beliefs to see if they're enduring myths or facts, or more likely if they're applicable in one situation and not in another. In that case we confuse appropriate behavior in one situation as a principle that applies to all situations.

[Bob's World]

Strategy is rooted in principles and framed by human nature. That is why Sun Tzu, Thucydides and Clausewitz endure to serve as strategic guides. Good strategic understanding is the Appreciation of what makes different types of political conflict distinct; and equally what the common elements are within those types.

To skip or disavow this step is to be forever mired in the emotion and character of the moment, where one has no idea where they are going, but often draws comfort from the fact that they are making good time...