Strategy in the 21st Century

[Bill Moore]

Expanding on the desired ends or conditions as it relates to strategy, I found this article of interest.

http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016...seone_today_nl

America Can’t Do Much About ISIS

That leaves patience, containment, and humanitarian aid as the least-bad policies while waiting for this awful war to play itself out.

After an explanation of why wars like this drag on for years and why ISIL won't be defeated by some proxy conquering Raqqa and pulling down their flag, though we still have many conventional thinkers in the military to include SOF who continue to buy into the curse of Clausewitz, his center of gravity, while ignoring his true wisdom about understanding the nature of war you're about to engage in. The authors focus on how to answer GEN Petraeus's famous question, "Tell me how this ends?"

In practical terms, the answer to Petraeus’s famous question is thus relatively insensitive to U.S. policy. If this war plays out the way so many others have, its end will come not through an allied offensive to conquer a capital city but through the mutual exhaustion of multiple actors with multiple, often wealthy outside benefactors. This will eventually happen—but it will likely take many years yet. U.S. efforts won’t change these fundamentals much absent a major stabilization and nation-building effort that few Americans now support, or some diplomatic breakthrough that assuages Iranian, Russian, and Saudi long-run security concerns. And that leaves Americans with patience and containment as the least-bad policy while waiting for this awful war to play itself out.

One of the explanations on why this conflict will likely continue for years, even if the actors change their names (ISIL becomes ?) is the about of external support the various combatants are receiving, and the failure of West to address the humanitarian crisis that is destabilizing the region (beyond the conflict zones) and Europe. Same as it ever was, or have strategic factors in the 21st Century resulted in new conditions that strategy must adjust to? A little or a lot of both I suspect. Maybe the nature and character of these conflicts haven't changed, but we changed as a nation and are no longer capable of developing effective strategy based on our current ideology, which includes the false dichotomy between war and peace, which results in a failure to recognize the risk of not acting short of traditional war, or trying to solve a problem using traditional war where it is an inappropriate response.

The latest National Military Strategy and subsequent articles indicate that military strategy remains threat centric. The military discusses 4 potential state actors plus VEOs as the plus one. Is it incorrect for the military to be threat centric? If you don't anticipate who you may have to fight and understand their capabilities and doctrine, how to do you project future force requirements?

http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Docume...y_Strategy.pdf

On the other hand, Haynes in his book, "Toward a New Maritime Strategy," argues the value of having a strategy that is focused on our national interests. I don't think he stated or implied that threats were irrelevant, but rather if you understood your interests, then you can place threats in the correct context. What U.S. interests does ISIL or the Islamic State threaten?

I think there are several starting with destabilizing the region beyond the current conflict zones, which could put a good part of the global oil supplies at risk with significant impact on the global economy, which will impact the U.S. If the U.S. continues to fail to lead in a meaningful way, it will undermine the U.S.'s ability to protect the largely U.S. led international order that has provided for our security and prosperity for several decades now. Arguably it has provided the same for our allies and partners. ISIL presents a persistent threat to the homeland and U.S. lives globally, probably not a large scale, but with 24hr news, even small attacks take on strategic significance beyond the personal tragedies suffered. Finally, and perhaps this is tied to maintaining the international order (not rigidly maintaining, but adapting it according to set rules), are promoting the values we stand for a nation. Do we have a responsibility to protect? If we don't what are the consequences from a strategy perspective (humanitarian crisis with significant second order effects) and on our character or identity as a nation?

[Bill Moore]

With all that said in the previous post, what can we actually do to protect our interests in a way that is sustainable economically and politically? This is where we repeatedly seem to fail. If we anticipate this conflict will continue for years, how do we contain it and manage its effects short of waging a traditional conventional war that will likely drag us into another quagmire with no feasible end other than pulling out when we lose the political will to stay? Furthermore, taking such as approach will harm our economy further, and create opportunities for other adversaries and potential adversaries to seek a position of advantage globally relative to the U.S. Anther perceived loss will also weaken our standing is a perceived leader.

It reminds me of Kissinger recognizing the limits of U.S. power, and the fact that U.S. could not afford a protracted war in SE Asia AND maintain it more vital interests. He recognized the world's power balances were shifting, and new forces would challenge the domains of superpowers. There were already multiple economic centers, and economic power is the key to other forms of power (The Rise and Fall of Great Nations, Kennedy).

Haynes talked about the primacy of economic power in his book also. Any strategy that fails to consider the risk to the U.S. economy over time puts the nation at long term for short term goals. We have been fighting the war on terror, arguably poorly, for close to 15 years now with little to show for it but set back after set back. We can't afford to sustain large occupations, and those who argue FID and UW are the answer, while logical from an economic standpoint tend to dismiss that our partners frequently don't have the will to engage in these fights. Meanwhile, Russia, China, and North Korea have become increasingly dangerous and confident to challenge us. Our ability to deter them has eroded. Why? Excessive focus on the war on terror? Maybe, but I suspect the reality is the diffusion of power is creating opportunities in a globalized world like never before. Opportunities best exploited for advantage by effective whole of government approaches where the military is only one tool in the strategy toolkit. Our almost total focus on winning decisive battles that don't create favorable political conditions/advantages will soon drive us into the ranks of second ranked nations. A superpower that has squandered its power in a global war of the flea. A superpower that failed to used all its tools in a synchronized manner to advance its interests.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

I thought this short article was helpful, even if USA-centric:http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the...eat-leadership

The author's very slim bio on Twitter:

British / Australian mil officer + strategist. Conducting the 'Helmand Project' @ ANU Bell School; six year exploration of US, UK + Talib strategy in Afghanistan

He blames quite a few players:

Who is responsible for this absence of strategy? The sad fact is that all those who have participated in the Global War on Terror must share the blame. Politicians have certainly been central, mis-reading Clausewitz, seeing war as a simple extension of politics and ignoring its true nature, and hubristically believing their stated intentions of policy could pass for true strategy. The military also played its role, and is guilty of inflating both threats and capabilities for its own internal agendas, and fostering a conspiracy of optimism that removed failure (or even strategic withdrawal) as an option. Even the eternally well-meaning non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are not immune to criticism as they were slaved to the thriving, billion-dollar industry of international aid and reconstruction funding governments used to excuse their lack of strategic thought.

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

I thought this short article was helpful, even if USA-centric:http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the...eat-leadership

The author's very slim bio on Twitter:

He blames quite a few players:

David,

This article is certainly relevant to the thread and points to a shared frustration about something that I also struggle with identifying exactly what is wrong. I agree with the author's argument that many of us own the blame for our collective shortcoming when it comes to strategy. We confuse McChrystal's Team of Teams as strategy, when instead it is an appropriate management/operational approach for employing forces to counter a networked threat. Warden's Five Rings have been confused as strategy, instead of a paradigm for targeting that is only applicable in select situations. We also confuse Jomini's lines on the map as strategy instead of operational maneuver. Add to this more great works emerging on how to fight in the cyber and space domains, competing in the human domain, and so forth. All interesting and valuable in their own, right, but ultimately of little value if they don't support a higher strategy that provides context, meaning, and purpose to the why of what we do beyond achieving a tactical success.

While much of what the author touches upon is well known, even if not well understood, by a select community of interest, I still found his focus on jus ad bellum very relevant and a factor that has been previously under appreciated.

[Bill Moore]

An interesting article on competitive mobilization in preparation for a great power war, but does it hit the mark?

http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/com...against-china/

Competitive Mobilization: How Would We Fare Against China?

Defining mobilization
Mobilization entails the substantial and exceptional displacement, through either government conscription or bidding, of a country’s labor and productive capacity that would otherwise naturally go to civilian purposes.

Referencing another article, he quotes:

Their stimulating essay identified six gaps — munitions, weapons platforms, manpower, planning, technology, and stamina — that a big war against a peer competitor could reveal.

Is the legacy assumption still valid?

Manpower and production mobilization are likely to provide a competitive advantage for one side during a conflict

He argues that the side (comparing the U.S. to China) that can mobilize forces/power for the air and space domains will have the competitive advantage. He also points out that if policy denies kinetic attacks against China and we engage in a military force versus military force war that attrition will play a greater role, resulting in the growing importance of mobilization.

He ends with this:

Mobilization is a competition. But dominating a mobilization competition is not enough. A player still needs a complete strategy with a sound theory of success and operational concept in order to succeed.

Finally, decision-makers should incorporate mobilization into their overall concepts for deterrence. This will mean communicating competitive strategies for mobilization both to internal audiences and to allies and adversaries. Mobilization plans aren’t just for war — they should be a component of peacetime competitive strategies.

Overall a good article that is effectively argued, and probably does a flaw in our strategy if national leaders have failed to develop meaningful and realistic plans for mobilization. People is one thing, I suspect that despite the political liabilities associated with that, it will be worked out.

However, with the impact of globalization resulting in massive outsourcing of our manufacturing, or the inability to compete in basic areas such as the steel industry in a global market, does the U.S. have a sufficient infrastructure to quickly produce arms, ships, war planes (especially based on today's technical requirements)?

The author focused on the air and space domains, but what about the cyber domain? Do we have effective operational concepts for fighting in this domain? What does that mean? Would we have to rapidly recruit geek battalions or contract out an organization like Anonymous (which is multinational and reportedly mostly composed of French)? What if great powers leverage the human domain, like Russia did in the Ukraine, and Iran in Yemen? What does mobilization mean in that context? What does it mean beyond the military? USAID? State Department? etc.

Mobilization must be tailored to the conflict at hand or the projected conflict, and future wars will probably look increasingly different with more drones and other robotics playing a more predominant role. SOF, cyber, and other elements will most likely play increasingly important roles, but they will be employed differently than they are now.

[Bill Moore]

I’ll be the first to argue that the modern world has always been complex, but I also agree that complexity is increasing and this has significant implications for those developing or executing grand strategies. I found an article recently that provides a concise description of the emergent challenges due to information technology enabled globalization. Like many SWJ readers, he too was frustrated with the use of complexity as a cliché, with little explanation on what it actually implied.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/...gle-keep-13698

“The Complexity Challenge: The U.S. Government’s Struggle to Keep Up with the Times”

“The world is complex’ is the U.S. government’s greatest strategic cliché and--paradoxically—its greatest strategic challenge.” By Josh Kerbel

Kerbel correctly points out that complexity is about interconnectivity and interdependence, both of which has been and continues to be greatly accelerated by globalization, and in the virtual world via information technology. Kerbal argues this is creating a world where it increasing difficult to find strategic mooring points. In other words it isn't simply Russia and China, or violent extremists, as Joshua Ramo stated in his book, "The Age of the Unthinkable," the global order is undergoing its most significant change since the Westphalia order was created.

Kerbel then looks at U.S. government leaders and points out they do not want to face this fact. They rather dismiss the obvious by making half true claims such as the world has always been complex, and globalization has been in existence for well over 300 years. He writes, this means the real world is

increasingly at odds with traditional government thinking and organizations. He states this “more than just disturbing—it’s terrifying.”

He makes the following arguments:

1.

Complex issues cannot be looked at as discrete pieces. Everything is interconnected—and interdependent—and there are ever fewer issues solely in the portfolio of a single department or agency. Consequently, the traditional government organizational constructs—ossified and stove-piped hierarchies—simply don’t work as they impede the ability to form the necessarily holistic perspectives and approaches.

For the military, this implies there is much more to cross domain operations than simply focusing on the traditional physical domains and cyber, the human domain and its many dimensions (identity, economics, influence, political, etc.) increasingly will be decisive. Although joint doctrine addresses Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) operations, and refreshingly developed a relevant joint operations concept focused on adapting to globalization called "globally integrated operations," and they're working on an emerging concept tied to campaign planning that addresses the gray zone, the reality is in practice we are not able to effectively implement these concepts. Why? Legacy systems and bureaucratic infighting between various U.S. government interagencies. As Kerbel stated, most problems today require the synchronized approach of multiple agencies.

2. Complexity defies the desire for clear and identifiable cause-and-effect dynamics.

I'm back on my center of gravity soapbox, Kerbel points out our reductionist thinking leads us astray, and I argue our center of gravity of concept is a symptom of that mindset.

3. Complex situations are very prone to emergent macro-behaviors—cascades, bubbles and crashes, etc.—that are discontinuous and can abruptly deviate from past patterns.

We have seen this repeatedly in recent history, no need to further elaborate.

4. Increasing complexity means that already-extreme volatility is only going to get worse.

This is what I believe is the biggest so what for strategists. We could never truly afford the luxury of focusing on one threat, e.g. the USSR or Al-Qaeda. That is more true today, and increasingly so tomorrow. While the department of defense is now focused on the 4+1 threat set, which expands our myopic focus from Islamic Extremists to legacy and emerging adversary states, it still misses the larger picture in my opinion. Instead of focusing on what type of force we need based on today's threats (that must be done, hear me out), we should have a think-tank like organization focus on what type of government we need to effectively advance and protect our interests in an increasingly globalized world. Once the larger picture is understood, we can focus on the type of security forces we need to mitigate threats to U.S. interests globally. I suspect part of that security force will look constabulary like (land forces with Coast Guard like law enforcement authorities), not to mention pulling our heads out of our butts when it comes to cyber.

[OUTLAW 09]

I’ll be the first to argue that the modern world has always been complex, but I also agree that complexity is increasing and this has significant implications for those developing or executing grand strategies. I found an article recently that provides a concise description of the emergent challenges due to information technology enabled globalization. Like many SWJ readers, he too was frustrated with the use of complexity as a cliché, with little explanation on what it actually implied.

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/...gle-keep-13698

“The Complexity Challenge: The U.S. Government’s Struggle to Keep Up with the Times”

“The world is complex’ is the U.S. government’s greatest strategic cliché and--paradoxically—its greatest strategic challenge.” By Josh Kerbel

Kerbel correctly points out that complexity is about interconnectivity and interdependence, both of which has been and continues to be greatly accelerated by globalization, and in the virtual world via information technology. Kerbal argues this is creating a world where it increasing difficult to find strategic mooring points. In other words it isn't simply Russia and China, or violent extremists, as Joshua Ramo stated in his book, "The Age of the Unthinkable," the global order is undergoing its most significant change since the Westphalia order was created.

Kerbel then looks at U.S. government leaders and points out they do not want to face this fact. They rather dismiss the obvious by making half true claims such as the world has always been complex, and globalization has been in existence for well over 300 years. He writes, this means the real world is

He makes the following arguments:

1. For the military, this implies there is much more to cross domain operations than simply focusing on the traditional physical domains and cyber, the human domain and its many dimensions (identity, economics, influence, political, etc.) increasingly will be decisive. Although joint doctrine addresses Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) operations, and refreshingly developed a relevant joint operations concept focused on adapting to globalization called "globally integrated operations," and they're working on an emerging concept tied to campaign planning that addresses the gray zone, the reality is in practice we are not able to effectively implement these concepts. Why? Legacy systems and bureaucratic infighting between various U.S. government interagencies. As Kerbel stated, most problems today require the synchronized approach of multiple agencies.



I'm back on my center of gravity soapbox, Kerbel points out our reductionist thinking leads us astray, and I argue our center of gravity of concept is a symptom of that mindset.



We have seen this repeatedly in recent history, no need to further elaborate.



This is what I believe is the biggest so what for strategists. We could never truly afford the luxury of focusing on one threat, e.g. the USSR or Al-Qaeda. That is more true today, and increasingly so tomorrow. While the department of defense is now focused on the 4+1 threat set, which expands our myopic focus from Islamic Extremists to legacy and emerging adversary states, it still misses the larger picture in my opinion. Instead of focusing on what type of force we need based on today's threats (that must be done, hear me out), we should have a think-tank like organization focus on what type of government we need to effectively advance and protect our interests in an increasingly globalized world. Once the larger picture is understood, we can focus on the type of security forces we need to mitigate threats to U.S. interests globally. I suspect part of that security force will look constabulary like (land forces with Coast Guard like law enforcement authorities), not to mention pulling our heads out of our butts when it comes to cyber.

Just a side comment to the cyber threat....the core problem with the US IT world right now is that utter believe the US is the greatest IT giant and others cannot match our abilities.

Right now I see daily nation state Russian, Iranian, Chinese hackers and their related IT crime gangs doing things that major US IT companies cannot even come close to doing...

Simply put we have been left standing still in the dust on that 21st century IT highway.....we urgently need to wake and smell literally the coffee before we become "the toast".....

As a cliché..."our IT ego experts are writing checks they cannot cash and they are trying to convince they can"....