Proposal for a corps of "Post Conflict Re-Builders"

[Rob Thornton]

New York Times
May 6, 2007

Giuliani, Speaking At The Citadel, Calls For A Bigger Army

By Chris Dixon and Marc Santora

CHARLESTON, S.C., May 5 — Rudolph W. Giuliani called on Saturday for a large-scale increase in the overall troop strength of the Army and the creation of a special force to specifically handle post-combat operations.

Pulled this off the earlybird this morning. I wonder how the candidates (both parties) propose to pay for the creation, equipping, training and sustainment of anything new or super sized given the current public appetite for funding?

Has any of their advisors discussed with them where you are going to get this Brigade/Division/Corps sized element of personnel who are willing to go to places of conflict and discomfort for extended periods (potentially after the military has soured the waters a bit?) when you can't even get State and OGA folks over in numbers to relieve military personnel currently filling those roles? How much are you going to pay this talented pool of nation rebuilders to get them to go for repeated tours? Are you just going to contract it out?

One thing at a time I say - rebuild the military and focus the resources on that task before trying to start something brand new. Build on the existing foundations and perhaps re-tool to fit the new security environment. While speeding up the increase in Army is a great idea, I still don't hear any debate about what its going to take to realize those goals of planned growth in light of retention issues surrounding key ranks.

The political body seems still not to understand that in order to sustain and grow an all-volunteer professional force which absorbs the burden for the other 99% of the population during times of sustained sacrifice (and we pretty much all believe there is more to come) you have to increase their compensation to do so. You have to pay them, train them, educate them and equip them and sustain their families (medical, dental, family services, education) and create other incentives which attract and retain the type of talent needed for the challenges ahead.

If a candidate wants my vote based off of this issue and those surrounding military and foreign policy - they better provide me some ideas with some thought about how they are going to be implemented, not just throw something out there based off some theorist's wish list.

[TROUFION]

In the current USEUCOM (future USAFRICOM) AO these units are already operating (sort of). Ad hoc missions of SEABEE, Army/AF and Navy Med as well as SF and Nat'l Guard have been conducting these missions in certain african states for several years. A move to consolidate them or to provide a better C2 program of coordination amongst these missions will probably coincide with USAFRICOM stand up. Having a Post-conflict reconstruction HQ in USAFRICOM that is staffed with people (familiar with PCR-SSTR or SASO) from State and DOD would be a good thing and I do not beleive it would take a huge realignment of personel or resources. COMBATANT CMDR for AFRICOM would be amble to employ the units the services can provide.

[Steve Blair]

The last thing we need is another "special" corps that other elements can take potshots at, undermine, and otherwise short-staff or short-fund. Better yet as T suggested to take what we already have and refine it so that it can accomplish the mission this "special corps" is intended for.

[Dr Jack]

Giuliani's description sounds a lot like Thomas P. M. Barnett's "SysAdmin."

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary.htm

System Administrators (SysAdmin) The "second half" blended force that wages the peace after the Leviathan force has successfully waged war. Therefore, it is a force optimized for such categories of operations as "stability and support operations" (SASO), postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, "military operations other than war" (MOOTW), "humanitarian assistance/disaster relief" (HA/DR), and any and all operations associated with low-intensity conflict (LIC), counterinsurgency operations, and small-scale crisis response. Beyond such military-intensive activities, the SysAdmin force likewise provides civil security with its police component, as well as civilian personnel with expertise in rebuilding networks, infrastructure, and social and political institutions. While the core security and logistical capabilities are derived from uniformed military components, the SysAdmin force is fundamentally envisioned as a standing capacity for interagency (i.e., among various U.S. federal agencies) and international collaboration in nation building.

This isn't all that surprising; from an article by Barnett on April 22, 2007:

http://www.knoxnews.com/kns/opinion_...493473,00.html

With former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani consistently leading early polls for the Republican presidential nomination, pundits have spilled an ocean of ink concerning his electability.

Having recently sat down with the man, let me tell you why I consider Giuliani a candidate wholly appropriate for our times.

As someone who spends a lot of time thinking and writing about globalization and security, I was brought in recently by the Giuliani campaign to discuss these topics with the mayor.

This is standard practice as presidential candidates gear up, and Giuliani's camp is the fourth I've visited in the last year.

I'll make no attempt to describe the mayor's positions on anything we discussed because that's his job as candidate. Let me instead give you a sense of what it was like to engage him over a couple of hours on my areas of expertise. I've interacted with numerous government, military and corporate leaders over the past couple decades, so I'm able to draw some comparisons.

First off, Giuliani is a serious and wide-ranging reader, not just a skimmer of "bullets" prepared by his staff.

When he reads your stuff, you better remember what you wrote because this guy really absorbs material...

[Ski]

Everytime I hear politicians wanting to increase the size of the Army, I wonder how exactly this will occur. As stated above, increasing a volunteer force in the middle of two+ wars is going to be tough to say the least.

With the numbers of NCO's and West Point grads leaving in larger amounts, where will the experience and expertise come from? You are going to need to expand the training base accordingly to meet demands for new instructors, Drills, cadre, etc... and TRADOC has been manned at 50% or less since Shinseki was Chief of Staff.

So if you were in charge, how do you it? Compensation through money and benefits is one thing, but that eats up a defense budget quickly, and it might not be the answer in the first place. Retention is going to be a tough battle over the next few years for all components of the Army, and increasing the force means you also need to retain the soldiers who are already in it.

[Rob Thornton]

Ski,

So if you were in charge, how do you it? Compensation through money and benefits is one thing, but that eats up a defense budget quickly, and it might not be the answer in the first place.

I think that is the answer a candidate owes us when waxing about increases and GFIs. The first place I'd say is increase the ammount of GDP spent on security /defense. This is not something for nothing - assuning there are no savings to be had without taking away from something else - there are two COAs - both are unpopular when trying to sell yourself to somebody who may not feel they are threatened, need protection or willing to sacrifice anything on the behalf of their country ( meet the average, uninformed guy/gal) - the first is to take from some other worthwhile thing/program which generally means domestic spending - argualbly much of this is tied to domestic security and tranquility - not my preferred COA.

The second would be to raise taxes and take the increase in revenu and spend it the military.

A potential third would be to consider how much money we pay the military industrial complex - but that gets tricky and you open the whole can of worms as to why we pay so much of their developmental costs for technologies that eventually will come back with more $$$ for civilian applications -makes you wonder if when we pay their development costs if the military should not get the profits - or at least royalties as the chief investor. Again - probably not going to happen given who they hire as lobbyists.

Good militaires are due to good people - and good people are getting expensive. These days when there seems to be only a small majority willing to sacrifice, I think they are fully cognizant they are absorbing the burden while most of their fellow citizens go to the shopping mall.

I like the Mayor - I think he's got what it takes - but I'd like to see him get some advice that matches the reality of the executable - or at least comes close enough so we can adapt as we go without being so far behind that we spend are time fixing the problems we had two years ago because the information has been so filtered as it gets verified. I think what he needs to do is maybe spend some time talking to the families of deployed service members; catch a sampling of officers and NCOs who are on their break (in a school) from deployments and ask the tough questions about what they are thinking and who do they know that's left and why. Maybe ask them what they think the government, service branches, etc. could do to change their minds. Ask them what they think of their leaders? He could ask the families what their biggest challenges are and what their concerns are. He should ask those questions then go back to the GOs and DoD folks and ask them what their concerns are - he can judge their answers in the context of what he was told in the field.

After he's (or any other candidate vying for the position of Commander in Chief) has done that - he / she can make time for think-tanks and theorists. No people - no military - no theory

[Mark O'Neill]

Giuliani's description sounds a lot like Thomas P. M. Barnett's "SysAdmin."

http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/glossary.htm



This isn't all that surprising; from an article by Barnett on April 22, 2007:

http://www.knoxnews.com/kns/opinion_...493473,00.html

Advocacy of Barnett is sufficient grounds in my book to totally wreck Giuliani's credibility on any security matter.

Perhaps he had better find some more widely read interns in his search to build a national security policy that is even vaguely sensible.

I heard some recent 'classic' nonsense from Barnett at a recent conference, including:

1. China is interested in Africa in order to develop cheap sources of labour. (Since when has there been a shortage of cheap labour in China?)
2. He placed all of SE Asia in his 'gap' construct. The economies of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia... Obviously knows two tenths of nothing about economic matters as well.
3. Was as blood thirsty as only someone who has never served can be.

On top of it all, he 'lost the plot' and started shouting in the middle of a panel discussion at a guy (with serious cred) who has been serving the US since before the time when Barnett was trying to formulate strategy to avoid grade school homework.

All in all, I found Barnett, in person, to be "Tosser" of the ocean going variety. Personally, I would not let him advise a PTA meeting on security policy.

[Ski]

I too am extremely skeptical of Barnett's "vision."

China is looking for resources in Africa, there are 10,000+ Chinese in the Sudan supporting the oil industry there. There is growing Chinese involvement in the Nigerian oil industry as well - I believe one if not the biggest Nigerian oil concern was purchased by the Chinese earlier this year.

Tosser = excellent Aussie slang. Need to use it more often!

Advocacy of Barnett is sufficient grounds in my book to totally wreck Giuliani's credibility on any security matter.

Perhaps he had better find some more widely read interns in his search to build a national security policy that is even vaguely sensible.

I heard some recent 'classic' nonsense from Barnett at a recent conference, including:

1. China is interested in Africa in order to develop cheap sources of labour. (Since when has there been a shortage of cheap labour in China?)
2. He placed all of SE Asia in his 'gap' construct. The economies of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia... Obviously knows two tenths of nothing about economic matters as well.
3. Was as blood thirsty as only someone who has never served can be.

On top of it all, he 'lost the plot' and started shouting in the middle of a panel discussion at a guy (with serious cred) who has been serving the US since before the time when Barnett was trying to formulate strategy to avoid grade school homework.

All in all, I found Barnett, in person, to be "Tosser" of the ocean going variety. Personally, I would not let him advise a PTA meeting on security policy.

[jcustis]

I like the Mayor - I think he's got what it takes - but I'd like to see him get some advice that matches the reality of the executable - or at least comes close enough so we can adapt as we go without being so far behind that we spend are time fixing the problems we had two years ago because the information has been so filtered as it gets verified. I think what he needs to do is maybe spend some time talking to the families of deployed service members; catch a sampling of officers and NCOs who are on their break (in a school) from deployments and ask the tough questions about what they are thinking and who do they know that's left and why. Maybe ask them what they think the government, service branches, etc. could do to change their minds. Ask them what they think of their leaders? He could ask the families what their biggest challenges are and what their concerns are. He should ask those questions then go back to the GOs and DoD folks and ask them what their concerns are - he can judge their answers in the context of what he was told in the field.

I really like this line of reasoning Rob, and I think all of the candidates, regardless of party affiliation, need to do it. Take away all the cameras and media nonsense that obscures the real core issues. Heck, they could even do it in some sort of retreat setting, so folks can feel relaxed and focus on exactly the questions that are asked, and then reply coherently, without some PAO hanging over their shoulder.

The candidates might be surprised at what they hear, and they can balance it against what the general officers brief. It would be a win-win situation, because no matter how good a policy-maker they may be, unless you have those "other means" available, there can be no policy. We cannot afford to have a hollow force...

[Tom Odom]

Tosser = excellent Aussie slang. Need to use it more often!

I believe "wanker" might also apply in this case. I looked at his web site and for bio it has "His Life".

Yes China looks to Africa for "cheap labor" because everyine knows that Africa with the AIDS Pandemic is just the place to look for a low cost work force with low medical costs and a life expectancy making any training investment worthwhile.

Tom

[Ski]

Not to mention anti-biotic resistant malaria, and other fine disease like river blindness and ebola.

I believe "wanker" might also apply in this case. I looked at his web site and for bio it has "His Life".

Yes China looks to Africa for "cheap labor" because everyine knows that Africa with the AIDS Pandemic is just the place to look for a low cost work force with low medical costs and a life expectancy making any training investment worthwhile.

Tom

[Tom Odom]

Not to mention anti-biotic resistant malaria, and other fine disease like river blindness and ebola.

Yep that would be a few more attractions

[Mark O'Neill]

I believe "wanker" might also apply in this case. I looked at his web site and for bio it has "His Life".

Tom

C'Mon Tom, like all Aussies I am a polite and retiring person, not given to profanity or excessive use of slang ...............

[Tom Odom]

C'Mon Tom, like all Aussies I am a polite and retiring person, not given to profanity or excessive use of slang ...............

Mark,

Mea culpa. As a quasi-Cajun raised in SE Texas, a rocks throw from Louisiana, I too was constantly reminded by my red neck elders to watch my mouth...

You Aussies remain a symbol of refinement and sophistication. You came up with that marvelous Foster's can and I remain envious of the creative capacity that went into its design: want more beer? Make the bloody can bigger! Beer gets too wam in that 55-gallon drum? Drink faster, Mate!

Elegant. Simple. Understandable.

Tom

[Jimbo]

It sounds like the desrciption of the current "Civillian reserve Corps" plan, except possibly in uniform. Once againeople money, training, etc. This plan would be very different from anything that has been done in the diferent COCOM's the ARNG/SeaBee missions are run differently and for different reasons.

[Old Eagle]

This topic (not the Cajun/Aussie part) is going to heat up. We definitely need to do a better job with the training/equipping/advising mission on a greater scale than SOF can handle. Secondly, too many folks are focused "post conflict" when in reality, if we do more "pre-conflict" we may be able to avoid the conflict part all together. If we build capability and capacity with the "willing", we can build larger coalitions that actually function.

Now -- do you build units, add tasks (METL, etc.) to existing units, or some hybrid solution? There are advantages and disadvantages of each. It is abundantly clear, however, that the personnel system has to adapt to track additional requirements.

[Tom Odom]

This topic (not the Cajun/Aussie part) is going to heat up. We definitely need to do a better job with the training/equipping/advising mission on a greater scale than SOF can handle. Secondly, too many folks are focused "post conflict" when in reality, if we do more "pre-conflict" we may be able to avoid the conflict part all together. If we build capability and capacity with the "willing", we can build larger coalitions that actually function.

Now -- do you build units, add tasks (METL, etc.) to existing units, or some hybrid solution? There are advantages and disadvantages of each. It is abundantly clear, however, that the personnel system has to adapt to track additional requirements.

Agree on the post conflict recovery versus pre-conflict planning point completely. When we (the US) announced that DoD had lead (and near absolute control) of post-conflict planning for Iraq I was surprised and concerned. That coupled with the go-it-alone stand on coalition buildiing certainly set the conditions for what happened. All of that said, it is not "just history" because it flows into what we are talking about here. How exactly do we organize for this?

And that brings me to your second point, that of how do you build "units" or some hybrid solution? Here I am at once in agreement and in disagreement. I agree we need the capacity. I don't agree that we can begin with existing capacity and just modify it to meet the need. We will probably end up doing that but it will be--once again--a bandaids and bubblegum solution.

Our capacity first has to be mental. We have developed over the years a ying and yang approach to conventional versus unconventional. One was either conventional (meaning "real" Army in my experience) or not. This also goes toward what Paul Yingling was discussing; the capacity to develop adaptive leaders without simply applying labels and continuing as before. You know the method: we are "adaptive" because we say we are.

I am continually amazed at the number of officers I hear discuss GEN Petreaus with either awe or distrust because the man has actually pursued a higher education. I can accept the number of talking heads or politicians who make comments about GEN P's dominant role in formulating COIN doctrine. What I cannot accept is when I hear officers say the same thing because they do not read or study the theory of their profession until it bites them in the butt. This of course goes back to what our council member Goesh refers to as the internecine struggle between COIN and more traditional warfare exponents of the big battalions. I fear the big battalions will win.

Tom