Edward Luttwak - Counterinsurgency as Military Malpractice

[tequila]

To take one simple, and current, example, let us consider the current situation in Al Anbar. In Islam, "wisdom" resides in certain lineages and people within those lineages (loosely the sheiks) and also within a certain non-lineage based class of "teachers" (imams, etc.; actually, this is a case of para-kinship where "students" take on their teachers' "lineage"). The "reality" of this is grounded in centuries (millenia in some cases!) of experience. Take advantage of it by working with it and you prosper. Spreading a totally alien ideology of absolute individual equality, something that is "proven" to be "false", and you will fail. I think that today's example of Al Anbar is a good example of how to succeed, in part because AQ started targeting sheiks while the coalition started supporting them.

Is this "religious"? Yes,it is. Look deeply enough into the culture and you will find that sheiks and Imams have certain "powers" and "abilities" that are sanctioned and interpreted by the religious tradition.

A couple of things to point out here. First, the "office" of shaykh is a purely tribal one with no religious basis. It is based instead on family connections, lineage, and to a certain extent personal charisma/expertise/merit/consensus, however one judges merit in this context. Shaykhs were around before Islam. Some shaykhs are powerful, some are not, and a shaykh's following can change over time as his power waxes or wanes.

Imams, OTOH, are religiously based, but their appeal is similarly based on a consensus judgment of the community, not on any inherent powers granted to them. No one appoints Sunni imams --- they are little different from Protestant preachers. Anyone who can afford a storefront can be a preacher with a church --- the same goes for an imam in Sunni Islam.

The Marines in Anbar always sought to work with both shaykhs and imams --- they just had an enormously difficult time sorting out which ones was powerful enough or trustworthy enough to deal with at any particular time. AQI, representing another foreign body with an appeal based on religion and revenge rather than tribal roots, has had to navigate the same tricky waters.

[John T. Fishel]

Well said, Marc, and a particularly good example. One problem that I have with this formulation is the complexity of the world in Iraq. The classic by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, was clearly overly hopeful(?) but, nevertheless, pointed in a direction that we have seen throughout what used to be called - still is - the Third world. That is the compelling desire of many, perhaps most, people to modernize, not without a lot of pulling and hauling and backsliding but still movement in a more modern and usually secular democratic direction. So, among other things we find in Iraq is a traditional politico-religious power structure in Al Anbar along side modern secular politicians, businessmen, and professionals throughout the country. We won't win over both by the same appeals...

Gotta go teach class

Cheers

John

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

A couple of things to point out here. First, the "office" of shaykh is a purely tribal one with no religious basis. .....

If we look at the category of "religion" as separate from "society", you are quite correct. However, I would like to point out, that I was looking at it i the viewpoint that the distinction is invalid. Islam, as a religion, validates and upholds the role of sheik. As such, it is positioned within the religion in much the same way the Christianity used to validate, uphold and define the role of "father" or "mother", neither of which it "created".

Imams, OTOH, are religiously based, but their appeal is similarly based on a consensus judgment of the community, not on any inherent powers granted to them. No one appoints Sunni imams --- they are little different from Protestant preachers. Anyone who can afford a storefront can be a preacher with a church --- the same goes for an imam in Sunni Islam.

Sure, and how do membes of the culture react to a storefront preacher? The shear act of setting themselves up establishes them within a broad religious tradition and conveys a certain type of legitimacy. Again, this is a case where the office, however a person comes to fulfill it, has a particular form of legitimacy and "access" to the "esoteric" (or "sacred" if you prefer).

The Marines in Anbar always sought to work with both shaykhs and imams --- they just had an enormously difficult time sorting out which ones was powerful enough or trustworthy enough to deal with at any particular time. AQI, representing another foreign body with an appeal based on religion and revenge rather than tribal roots, has had to navigate the same tricky waters.

Yup, and they blew it badly by their actions.

BTW, I'm really glad you responded the way you did . I think that one of the key problems with trying to work in material on "religion" into the new FM is the very different conceptualizations that are running around: "individual believer" (the North American "standard"), "social believer" (for want of a better term; the standard in most of the Muslim world), and academic.

Marc

[marct]

Hi John,

Well said, Marc, and a particularly good example. One problem that I have with this formulation is the complexity of the world in Iraq. The classic by Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, was clearly overly hopeful(?) but, nevertheless, pointed in a direction that we have seen throughout what used to be called - still is - the Third world. That is the compelling desire of many, perhaps most, people to modernize, not without a lot of pulling and hauling and backsliding but still movement in a more modern and usually secular democratic direction. So, among other things we find in Iraq is a traditional politico-religious power structure in Al Anbar along side modern secular politicians, businessmen, and professionals throughout the country. We won't win over both by the same appeals...

Thanks. And you're absolutely right that it is an incredibly messy situation. One of the examples I sometimes use with my students is the Sultinate of Brunei. They are trying to steer an interesting course between tradition and modernization. Admittedly, the oil revenues help a lot ! Still and all, there are many models for "modern", not just the liberal-democracy that we now hae in the West.

The issue of "secularization" is, in and of itself, a fascinating one. Certainly the image of a "secular society" that is being portrayed by AQ is at odds with the reality of most actual secular societies. In reality, most Western nations are "secular" at the social level, but allow for individual "sacrality", all the while imposing broad constraints on the inter-social forms of that sacrality. The "classic" measures of a secular society that come out of te sociology of religion are, to my mind, pretty useless; e.g. Church attendance, which is only a valid indicator of church attendance (it says nothing about purpose of attendance or strength of belief)! I think that Andrew Greeley's attempts at reformulating the basic survey instruments are very much needed - too bad most haven't been adopted .

Have fun with the class!

Marc

[tequila]

If we look at the category of "religion" as separate from "society", you are quite correct. However, I would like to point out, that I was looking at it i the viewpoint that the distinction is invalid. Islam, as a religion, validates and upholds the role of sheik. As such, it is positioned within the religion in much the same way the Christianity used to validate, uphold and define the role of "father" or "mother", neither of which it "created".

This sort of depends. I would argue that this greatly depends on context. Islam has an explicitly anti-tribal emphasis in that it posits the community of believers as having far greater weight than blood ties. Numerous examples abound in the early Islamic texts of believers forswearing tribal or familial ties to follow the Prophet. We can see this in a more modernized context in the clash of values between tribal elders in the Pushtun south who endorsed traditional values of Pushtunwali vs. school-educated Taliban who pushed a semi-Deobandi sharia that explicitly clashed with it.

A similar clash often occurs within Christianity, for instance when "social" Christians become much more ardent or much less ardent than, to follow your example, their parents. Matthew 10:37 and all that.

Sure, and how do membes of the culture react to a storefront preacher? The shear act of setting themselves up establishes them within a broad religious tradition and conveys a certain type of legitimacy. Again, this is a case where the office, however a person comes to fulfill it, has a particular form of legitimacy and "access" to the "esoteric" (or "sacred" if you prefer).

Obviously when one assumes a religious mantle, one puts oneself into a societal idea of what a religious leader should be. However, these leaders do not automatically garner a following simply by setting up shop, especially in the context where there is competition for believers. They must at the same time fit within the prevailing social context for belief while also setting themselves apart.

[Merv Benson]

Marc's insights are always interesting.

Another way of explaining the rise of the Sheiks is the attempt to impose al Qaeda's weird religious beliefs on a population that rejects them. Al Qaeda's strategy draws a great deal on Shari'a law in that both rely on brutally cruel and unusual punishment for those who do not obey. As resistance increases the level of punishment increases. When you start punishing those who do not think they are deserving and that have the means to resist, you have a problem.

I think you also have to be concerned about the cynical manipulation of religion. The communist infiltration of the militant Buddhist movement in Vietnam in the early 60's did much more damage to the government than their military did during the same time period. What is more is that the US diplomatic corps and media unwittingly aided them by pushing the South Vietnamese to "political reconciliation" with a group that was acting in bad faith and kept moving the goal post with each compromise by the government.

[marct]

Hi Tequila,

This sort of depends. I would argue that this greatly depends on context. Islam has an explicitly anti-tribal emphasis in that it posits the community of believers as having far greater weight than blood ties. Numerous examples abound in the early Islamic texts of believers forswearing tribal or familial ties to follow the Prophet. We can see this in a more modernized context in the clash of values between tribal elders in the Pushtun south who endorsed traditional values of Pushtunwali vs. school-educated Taliban who pushed a semi-Deobandi sharia that explicitly clashed with it.

Really good points, and they highlight one of the real problems with talking about any religion in a monolithic way. Another good example of this, in a non-combat setting, is the "role" of FGM in various cultures. The debates surrounding it matches the clash between local culture, religious validation, modernization, etc.

I've been looking at the history of Christianity for anlogues of the Taliban for a while, now, and I think I may have found one: the fraticelli of the 14th century. It's certainly not an exact analogy, but it may be a usefull one in some ways.

A similar clash often occurs within Christianity, for instance when "social" Christians become much more ardent or much less ardent than, to follow your example, their parents. Matthew 10:37 and all that.

Sure, and it occasionally flashes up in various revitalization movements; the Shakers are one example as is the Unification Church and Jones' little cult. On the whole, though, other textual components which usually fit in with the local culture better (e.g. Ephesians 5:21- 6:4).

Obviously when one assumes a religious mantle, one puts oneself into a societal idea of what a religious leader should be. However, these leaders do not automatically garner a following simply by setting up shop, especially in the context where there is competition for believers. They must at the same time fit within the prevailing social context for belief while also setting themselves apart.

Quite true, although I think that it is important to also note that, in times of rapid social upheaval and turbulence, the range of what will fit into the social context is much greater than it is during a period of social stability. Some of this is just going to be people grasping at straws, but it is still a well recognized phenomenon.

The actions of "setting themselves" apart is, as you note, a crucial one. How they do this must also tie in with the "experiences" they offer their followers, and that has to fit into the religio-cultural matrix: the myth structure if you will. The closer the match, the more likely they are to gain a following.

Marc

[marct]

Hi Merv,

I think you also have to be concerned about the cynical manipulation of religion.

Very true, and one of the quintessential dangers of social movements of any form since I have yet to come across a social movement that was not, at some time, manipulated by cynical opportunists to their own advantage . I have, however, noted that most religions contain ways of "testing" and "challenging" any "received wisdom", and IMHO, this is one of the things I think we need to be looking at quite seriously in our current conflict.

Marc

[SWCAdmin]

At the Club Troppo blog - Kilkullen, Luttwak and Why the Troops Should Leave Iraq.

I tried 4 times to comment there, couldn't do it. And twice to contact them through their form, couldn't do it.

I sure hope our site doesn't throw those curve balls to folks.

Here's what I wanted to say:

No insider tip from SWJ to LTC Dave Kilcullen. We heard Dr. Luttwak's portion of Stan Correy's piece at the same time the rest of the world did. Actually, maybe a little later because we're behind all the folks Down Under due to those pesky time zones.

I believe you can take his response at face value as something he dashed off quickly upon hearing the show, in a brief "break" from doing his darn demanding job.

Another blog entry posted recently on our site, this time from Frank Hoffman who we're pleased to have join our consortium of bloggers, further discusses Dr. Luttwak's observations. And we've had a thread discussing the Harper's article running for some time here.

[SWJED]

1 May National Review's The Tank - Does the Middle East Really Matter?.

No, not really, if you follow the provocative argument articulated by Edward Luttwak of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the cover piece of the May 2007 issue of Prospect. Luttwak takes skeptical view of what he calls "'five minutes to midnight' catastrophism" of the sort practiced by the late King Hussein who "would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless…"

May 2007 edition of Prospect - The Middle of Nowhere by Edward Luttwak.

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them...

[Tom Odom]

OK I took my pill...

I swallowed the castor oil...

I got my tetanus shot...

And I had a root canal....


I would do any of those, again. Just don't make me read more tripe like this from Luttwak. We need to get Congress to give him a "writer's subsidy" like peanut farmers. Pay him not to write. We'd be better off,

Tom

[SWJED]

13 May Commentary Magazine blog - Not a Dead End by Max Boot.

I’ve been traveling a lot so have only now gotten around to reading “Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice,” Edward Luttwak’s article in the February issue of Harper’s. As usual with Luttwak, the article is thought-provoking and stylishly written. It’s also almost entirely wrong.

The blog of the Small Wars Journal has already posted two trenchant critiques of the article, by two of the leading counterinsurgency experts in the world: Dave Kilcullen, a former lieutenant colonel in the Australian army now working as an adviser to General David Petraeus in Baghdad, and Frank Hoffman, a retired Marine lieutenant colonel and a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia.

I won’t repeat most of what they have to say, except to note that Kilcullen scores a devastating hit when he observes that Luttwak is critiquing an early draft of FM 3-24, the Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual...