Good news -- the insurgency is over! Now we need a new strategy for the Iraq War.

[Stratiotes]

Fabius, I have enjoyed your articles at DNI (I admit it, I'm a DNI junkie) for quite some time and this one is another winner. Thanks for posting it here.

As Stu points out, Iraq has always been rather problematic. The various "states" or "centers of culture" were combined in the early 20th century in what can be thought of as little more than a shotgun wedding. Their one uniting factor seems to have always been war - war against the European colonial ambition, war against Iran.... It seems doubtful to me that the various interests can remain united without war. Sad to say, the American occupation may be the one thing that will unite them in common cause eventually - to get rid of the American occupiers. Or, it may continue as civil war until they part ways or one "strongman" like Sadam Hussein rises to the top.

Sometime ago, the author, Steven Pressfield, did a column that was reprinted at DNI - "It's the Tribes Stupid." It is very enlightening I think on the idea of creating a democracy in our image there. The strongman always seems to be the only type of leader that "succeeds" at making something that resembles a government in such places.

[dusty]

Fabius, I have to disagree with several of your statements:
Iraq has no Army, probably by our design to maximize their dependence on us.
In several cases, you cite the Iraqi Army as a non-entity, or at best, a puppet unable to move without CF approval. The Mahmoudiya and Sadr al Yousifiya areas were turned over to the Iraqis several months ago, and as an observer of that particular area, the effect the IA has had on the area is impressive.

How can we help in the brief period before we leave? I think setting a date for our departure has two detrimental effects. Whatever we try to accomplish will become that much more difficult, as we have lost credibility. And second, the high value bad guys just may go to ground, wait for us to leave, instead of us catching them now.

One last thing: The ideal of becoming neutral guardians is simply unfeasible. Armed infidels living on Islamic soil will always attract jihadists and the like. Offering monetary support, infrastructure or legitimacy in the eyes of the world are nothing but insults to a man who is driven by an ideology that is inherently opposed to you inhabiting his land.

[Fabius Maximus]

Dusty, thank you for your comments.

One of the many ways in which war is a unique field of study is that (contra to Senator Moynihan) everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts. Amidst the fog, who knows? (Except for the folks at the front, who do not have this luxury)

As many folks have written, there is a strong basis for belief that there is no “Iraq” army as a combat force in being. There are Iraq army units that can provide security, in effect light duty occupation forces. These tend to desert or collapse when called to serious action.

Most of the effective forces wearing Iraq uniforms are regional/ethnic militia OR de facto private armies. The Kurdish Peshmerga is the best-known example.

On a deeper level, senior Iraq officials have repeated claimed that the Coalition commands the Iraq Army irrespective of their wishes. Such a force is more of a colonial militia than a national army.

I strongly agree with your next two points. I suspect we differ on the implications of these grim facts. We might never know who is correct, or what course we should take at this time.

This series of articles attempts to sketch a long-term geo-political strategy for America. If nothing else, in a small way they might help to stimulate a re-thinking of our goals and methods. Continuing on our present course seems destined, IMHO, for certain disaster. Sooner or later.

[RTK]

One of the many ways in which war is a unique field of study is that (contra to Senator Moynihan) everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts. Amidst the fog, who knows? (Except for the folks at the front, who do not have this luxury).

Not sure your source for this, but I ask you again (as I have in previous threads) What are your qualifications and experience for making such a statement? Further, what exacty do you mean?

Most of the effective forces wearing Iraq uniforms are regional/ethnic militia OR de facto private armies. The Kurdish Peshmerga is the best-known example.

The Pesh have their own uniform, seperate from the Iraqi forces, with a green, white and red flag with a starburst in the middle. It looks nothing like an Iraqi uniform.

Additionally, I re-ask a question that I last asked on 30DEC2006 that you wouldn't answer: "what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?" I'm dying to hear the answer to that one. Further, if you're convinced you're right, why the psedonym?

[Mark O'Neill]

Not sure your source for this, but I ask you again (as I have in previous threads) What are your qualifications and experience for making such a statement? Further, what exacty do you mean?

The Pesh have their own uniform, seperate from the Iraqi forces, with a green, white and red flag with a starburst in the middle. It looks nothing like an Iraqi uniform.

Additionally, I re-ask a question that I last asked on 30DEC2006 that you wouldn't answer: "what are your credentials and research methods to be able to intelligently write 20 articles over 40 months on Iraq?" I'm dying to hear the answer to that one. Further, if you're convinced you're right, why the psedonym?

RTK,

I agree. See my recent post in the TTP thread.

Cheers,

Mark

[Fabius Maximus]

I use "peshmerga" in the long-standing sense of armed Kurdish fighters, whose loyalty is to their ethnic group.

Some are in the uniforms of the Iraq national army; their true loyalty has been the subject of many articles over the past few years. A few quotes follow; more can easily be found on Google.

Perhaps the most famous: "Keeping Iraq Intact", CBS/AP (December 28, 2005)
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/...n1166972.shtml

The soldiers said that while they wore Iraqi army uniforms they still considered themselves members of the Peshmerga - the Kurdish militia - and were awaiting orders from Kurdish leaders to break ranks. Many said they wouldn't hesitate to kill their Iraqi army comrades, especially Arabs, if a fight for an independent Kurdistan erupted.

…Afandi said his group had sent at least 10,000 Peshmerga to the Iraqi army in northern Iraq, a figure substantiated in interviews with officers in two Iraqi army divisions in the region.

"All of them belong to the central government, but inside they are Kurds ... all Peshmerga are under the orders of our leadership," Afandi said.

BBC (March 11, 2005)

Entering and leaving the area where the PKK camp is located is like crossing a border. The peshmerga of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, dressed now in their Iraqi National Guard uniforms, check all the cars coming in and out. There is even a customs official.

From The Scotsman (November 5, 2006)

Hamid Effendi, KDP minister for the peshmerga, has said, "The Arabs in southern Iraq struggle to build a new Iraqi army, but the Kurds already have one. The peshmerga wear Iraqi army uniforms, but they are still Kurds. We have about 60,000 peshmerga. And now they've got big guns"

This discussion is relevant today as Kurhish units of the Iraq national forces move to Baghdad as part of the surge. Much in the news; here is a balanced look:
Voice of America (Feb 16, 2007) "Iraqi Army Soldiers From the Kurdish North Head to Baghdad"
http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-02-16-voa27.cfm

Adding to the confusion;: many news accounts note that the peshmerga often do not wear uniforms.
New York Times (Feb 23, 2007)
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/in...&ex=1174276800

The pesh merga are everywhere in Iraqi Kurdistan - along the highways, atop government buildings, riding in convoys. They wear a hodgepodge of uniforms, from traditional baggy outfits to desert camouflage hand-me-downs from the United States Army. There is one thing that appears to be consistent, though: they think of themselves as Kurds first and Iraqis second.

[J Wolfsberger]

...everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts.

Well, no. It looks that way some times, but only because there are a great many people who cherry pick facts to support their opinions. In those cases, actually collecting data, analyzing it and developing concepts or theories seems too much work.

One of the previous posters referred to the sweeping generalizations and unsupported assertions he found in your article. I'll admit I haven't read this article, and don't intend to. I did read earlier articles, by you and several others, at DNI. The previous poster nailed it dead on. In fact, several I read were so oriented toward attacking US defense policies and programs that they contradicted themselves. I wasn't surprised to find links, ties, what have you with Center for Defense (mis) Information. They have consistently gotten it wrong as well, and always in a way that somehow supports attacking US defense.

Here's a few comments on several of the topics touched on:

1. Kilcullen's 28 point are excellent advice to any soldier or Marine preparing to fight in a counter insurgency. If you think otherwise, invert them and see how much sense the result makes.

2. The value of the concepts of strategic corporal and Three Block War is not prescriptive, it is descriptive. They very accurately describe the situation our troops are in today. Again, if you think otherwise, try inverting them and see if the result makes sense.

3. 4GW strikes me as a phrase in search of a concept. Warfare has, indeed, changed over the millennia. 4GW doesn't explain much, if any, of the change. See my comment above about cherry picking facts.

I also have a suggestion. If you have a concept, insight, innovation, whatever to share. Write it here. Defend it here. I don't like being sent off to your website, then returning here for discussion.