Good news -- the insurgency is over! Now we need a new strategy for the Iraq War.

[Fabius Maximus]

With the permission of the SWC, this thread opens a discussion of an article posted on the Defense and National Interest website.

The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace
By Fabius Maximus.
March 13, 12007

http://www.defense-and-society.org/f...ency_ended.htm

Summary by Chet Richards, Editor of DNI: “The insurgency has indeed ended, but not for the reasons you might imagine.”

This article is the first in a series on a common theme: how America can survive and even prosper in an age in which 4GW is the dominant mode of warfare. It starts with our most pressing problem, Iraq.

It is a brief, hopefully provocative introduction -- recommending a radically different strategy for Coalition forces in Iraq. Following articles discuss these ideas and recommendations in greater detail. Criticism of my work on this site has in the past proved quite helpful in correcting and guiding me, and will prove so again. I thank all those who comment now, in advance.

[Graycap]

I've read the interesting article and I think that you have some good points.

The center of my reasoning is how to reestablish some kind of order in a theater devastated by a 4GW war. This is the only way out of a 4GW disaster. Any kind of order is better than a freefire 4GW scene.

I think about solutions like the Bosnia agreement or the Lebanon after the Taef agreement.

For Europe the Dayton agreement worked well. The same, is true in my opinion, for Israel with the Taef agreement. The israeli error was to mantain an hopeless South Lebanon occupation that fueled the principal 4GW actor: Hizballah.

In my opinion the US should consider a role in Iraq very similar to the role that Syria played in Lebanon after Taef. A substantial control of the state with patronage of Saudi Arabia and Iran and with condition not to menace Israel.
Syria has been the only state to win over a 4GW environment in late '80. They played with every different actor in theater and used only a limited amount of firepower only to avoid victory of any actor, with decisive military actions in 1990-91 only when anyone was so exhausted that its intervention was substantially welcomed.

If the US could influence Israel in finding a workable solution with Syria, about Golan and Lebanon, this two steps, Iraq stabilization and Lebanon stabilization, could be a great success in a pincer manouver against the 4GW master: al-Qaeda.

Thank you for your attention. I'm only a newbie here and I feel a little bit afraid to post in such an informative forum. Sorry for my poor english since it's not my first language.

Graycap

[Fabius Maximus]

Reply to a great question sent off-line ...

When the gov't disappears, losing so many attributes that it is not longer a real gov't in the eyes of its people, *all* the insurgencies end.

Insurgency is a rebellion against a gov't. No gov't, no insurgency.

In some areas, like the northern Kurd-dominated area, there appears to be a winner.

In others areas, such as the ungoverned zone called Baghdad, the fighting may continue or even intensify. There are other forms of civil war than "insurgency." These might be waged by any mix of conventional means, guerilla tactics, terrorism, etc.

The significance of this phase-change is not that we bury the dead differently. The "remedy" must different for each type of civil war. For example, a common COIN ops is suppressing local militias to build up the central govt's authority. Post-insurgency, the first is likely counter-productive -- the second probably impossible.

[Stu-6]

If you defining the insurgency as fighting against a government then was there ever truly an insurgency in Iraq, since the government of Iraq never really controlled the country?

Maybe the time has come to accept a civil war in Iraq, at least for a while. The history of Iraq has been problematic from the start, we where unhappy with the status quo antebellum, a civil war and a fragment Iraq may not be so bad . . . all things considered. Who knows maybe in a ten-twenty years it may look like the Balkans not perfect but at least not a war zone.

[Stratiotes]

Fabius, I have enjoyed your articles at DNI (I admit it, I'm a DNI junkie) for quite some time and this one is another winner. Thanks for posting it here.

As Stu points out, Iraq has always been rather problematic. The various "states" or "centers of culture" were combined in the early 20th century in what can be thought of as little more than a shotgun wedding. Their one uniting factor seems to have always been war - war against the European colonial ambition, war against Iran.... It seems doubtful to me that the various interests can remain united without war. Sad to say, the American occupation may be the one thing that will unite them in common cause eventually - to get rid of the American occupiers. Or, it may continue as civil war until they part ways or one "strongman" like Sadam Hussein rises to the top.

Sometime ago, the author, Steven Pressfield, did a column that was reprinted at DNI - "It's the Tribes Stupid." It is very enlightening I think on the idea of creating a democracy in our image there. The strongman always seems to be the only type of leader that "succeeds" at making something that resembles a government in such places.

[dusty]

Fabius, I have to disagree with several of your statements:
Iraq has no Army, probably by our design to maximize their dependence on us.
In several cases, you cite the Iraqi Army as a non-entity, or at best, a puppet unable to move without CF approval. The Mahmoudiya and Sadr al Yousifiya areas were turned over to the Iraqis several months ago, and as an observer of that particular area, the effect the IA has had on the area is impressive.

How can we help in the brief period before we leave? I think setting a date for our departure has two detrimental effects. Whatever we try to accomplish will become that much more difficult, as we have lost credibility. And second, the high value bad guys just may go to ground, wait for us to leave, instead of us catching them now.

One last thing: The ideal of becoming neutral guardians is simply unfeasible. Armed infidels living on Islamic soil will always attract jihadists and the like. Offering monetary support, infrastructure or legitimacy in the eyes of the world are nothing but insults to a man who is driven by an ideology that is inherently opposed to you inhabiting his land.

[Fabius Maximus]

Dusty, thank you for your comments.

One of the many ways in which war is a unique field of study is that (contra to Senator Moynihan) everyone can have not only their own opinion, but also their own facts. Amidst the fog, who knows? (Except for the folks at the front, who do not have this luxury)

As many folks have written, there is a strong basis for belief that there is no “Iraq” army as a combat force in being. There are Iraq army units that can provide security, in effect light duty occupation forces. These tend to desert or collapse when called to serious action.

Most of the effective forces wearing Iraq uniforms are regional/ethnic militia OR de facto private armies. The Kurdish Peshmerga is the best-known example.

On a deeper level, senior Iraq officials have repeated claimed that the Coalition commands the Iraq Army irrespective of their wishes. Such a force is more of a colonial militia than a national army.

I strongly agree with your next two points. I suspect we differ on the implications of these grim facts. We might never know who is correct, or what course we should take at this time.

This series of articles attempts to sketch a long-term geo-political strategy for America. If nothing else, in a small way they might help to stimulate a re-thinking of our goals and methods. Continuing on our present course seems destined, IMHO, for certain disaster. Sooner or later.

[RTK]

With the permission of the SWC, this thread opens a discussion of an article posted on the Defense and National Interest website.

The Iraq insurgency has ended, which opens a path to peace
By Fabius Maximus.
March 13, 12007

http://www.defense-and-society.org/f...ency_ended.htm

Summary by Chet Richards, Editor of DNI: “The insurgency has indeed ended, but not for the reasons you might imagine.”

This article is the first in a series on a common theme: how America can survive and even prosper in an age in which 4GW is the dominant mode of warfare. It starts with our most pressing problem, Iraq.

It is a brief, hopefully provocative introduction -- recommending a radically different strategy for Coalition forces in Iraq. Following articles discuss these ideas and recommendations in greater detail. Criticism of my work on this site has in the past proved quite helpful in correcting and guiding me, and will prove so again. I thank all those who comment now, in advance.

It is what it is; why call it an article and not call it an OP-ED? You don't site resources, other than for filler quotes. It's a mixture rich in opinion and bubbling with exaggeration.

After 4 months of reading this stuff I still don't know where you get your "fact."

[Fabius Maximus]

RTK,

As for how to label these, whatever. I'll accept "op-ed."

As for "facts", this op-ed builds on the previous ones. Please question any specifics, and I'll attempt to show the supporting evidence.

Of course, as mentioned previously, "facts" in a war zone are usually open to debate.

Like most folks looking at Iraq, we rely on the real analysts who collect from primary sources. Like Anthony Cordesman of CSIS. Have you seen his latest? It's worth a look.

The New Strategy in Iraq: Uncertain Progress Towards Unknown Goal
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 14, 2007
7 pages

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...rat_update.pdf

[RTK]

RTK,

As for how to label these, whatever. I'll accept "op-ed."

As for "facts", this op-ed builds on the previous ones. Please question any specifics, and I'll attempt to show the supporting evidence.

Of course, as mentioned previously, "facts" in a war zone are usually open to debate.

Like most folks looking at Iraq, we rely on the real analysts who collect from primary sources. Like Anthony Cordesman of CSIS. Have you seen his latest? It's worth a look.

The New Strategy in Iraq: Uncertain Progress Towards Unknown Goal
Center for Strategic and International Studies
March 14, 2007
7 pages

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/...rat_update.pdf

Fabius,

I'm not going to question anything you write anymore. Obviously, as evidenced in this thread and a number of others I've called you out on, you haven't ever answered any of my questions anyway, nor have you ever been able to explain your operational relevance or insight (I've only been asking for almost three months [recall the Kilcullen Thread, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=1649&page=5 ]). Until you can, I'll count you as one of the multitude of so-called "experts" who continue to exploit the events in Iraq for personal name recognition or notarieity

[Culpeper]

Fabius,

I'm not going to question anything you write anymore. Obviously, as evidenced in this thread and a number of others I've called you out on, you haven't ever answered any of my questions anyway, nor have you ever been able to explain your operational relevance or insight (I've only been asking for almost three months [recall the Kilcullen Thread, http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...?t=1649&page=5 ]). Until you can, I'll count you as one of the multitude of so-called "experts" who continue to exploit the events in Iraq for personal name recognition or notarieity

Been there. Done that. It seems to work.

[Fabius Maximus]

Nice discussion of situation in Iraq in another thread in this forum. Makes many of the same points as in my op-ed. In more detail, of course.

Note the trend since the first report posted, the March 2006 "quarterly report to Congress." Toward unfulfilled promise, greater disorder and chaos.

The trend might be more important than any of the specifics.

US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=839

[RTK]

Nice discussion of situation in Iraq in another thread in this forum. Makes many of the same points as in my op-ed. In more detail, of course.

Note the trend since the first report posted, the March 2006 "quarterly report to Congress." Toward unfulfilled promise, greater disorder and chaos.

The trend might be more important than any of the specifics.

US Policy, Interest, and Endgame
Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...read.php?t=839

As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

[Fabius Maximus]

As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

I am happy to answer any questions about Iraq that I discussed in my op-ed. Please assume I am slow and repeat your question.

The only thing in your post with a question mark was about the label "article" or "op-ed". And I accepted your term.

{My post about the other thread was not a response to your post.}

[Fabius Maximus]

As usual, you ask for questions, then don't address them. I'm not really sure why you keep coming back here....

I write only by invitation. Hence the articles (or op-ed’s, if you prefer) on DNI. Hence this thread. Perhaps you should address your complaints to the SWC.

However, I said I would attempt to answer your questions.

First, I post here in order to receive useful feedback and criticism. That allows me to correct errors and do better in the future.

Second, why should anyone read my articles? What authority do I claim?

Everyone chooses what they regard as a legitimate source of authority. Max Weber classifies authority as charismatic (religious), traditional, or legal (bureaucratic rank, credentials). Perhaps one of those works for you. None of them works for me. I prefer to seek a different basis for belief: what works, what makes sense, what has supporting data. I care little for the source -- whether lord, priest, or serf.

I can only guess why people read my work. Perhaps it is best that I do not know!

1. My record as a forecaster is pretty good. (Not perfect, of course. I wish I was correct and that the US started withdrawing troops from Iraq in late 2006).

2. Perhaps they present interesting ideas or new perspectives.

3. Perhaps they provide some useful information.

Certainly not for entertainment. They are humorless and long (by web standards). Worse, they have been pretty grim (although this series is different).

I am sure we all agree that no style should or does work for everyone, as everyone seeks the truth in their own way.

[Fabius Maximus]

No time to deal with all of this now. Too much good material to look at here, and some requires a bit of thought. But this is too good to let pass ...

Weber called an appeal to Traditional Authority, gets you absolutely nothing in an article when all you do is mention their names without invoking their arguments.

You say "appeal to authority" like it's a bad thing. OK, what's the length of the Nile River? No appeals to authority, please.

That's an extreme example, of course. But not that different from what I did when challenged on my statement that modern science is generally reductionist. I quote some authorities. The alt is to whip out a quick 200 page PhD thesis.

Nor was my comment exactly an appeal to authority. I said that this was the consensus opinion, but I specifically cited a major figure taking the opposite side of the debate.

Also, this does not seem to me a significant point to debate. Reductionish/holistic was introducted just to distinguish the approach of my "brief, hopefully provocative introduction” from Krepinevich’s overview.

[MountainRunner]

Going back to basics quickly, FM you wrote to offline queries at the beginning of this thread:

Insurgency is a rebellion against a gov't. No gov't, no insurgency.

From Chet's article directly

In between lies an ungoverned or disputed zone, a diverse ethnic and religious mixture. Since there is no longer a national government for Iraq (the Coalition destroyed it) and no government in the disputed zone, there can be no insurgency.

This is the foundation of Chet and your argument apparently, and the semantic issue many, such as myself, have found wanting. I'm not sure whose definition your using, and I'm interested to know, but a previous (CIA) definition was "a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations."

Requiring some kind of legitimacy really makes the determination of whether it is an insurgency messy and based on a specific POV, either yours or theirs. This is problematic when "they" are numerous groups.

Going back to basics, the foundation of Chet's, and by extension your, possibly makes your assertion true, however it creates so many problems that it is unworkable and unusable.

[Fabius Maximus]

Using technical definitions is problematic when posting on DNI. Due to the magic of the web they are read by people in a wide range of occupations and from many regions.

I use the general meaning of insurgency, as in most dictionaries (quoted earlier in this thread). I should have included this in the text (there basic errors are so obvious in hindsight, yet I overlook them so often).

As for the functional definition of legitimacy, that is explained in the article. Modern pol science has drifted from this (as you point out) vague concept to "attributes of government." While specific lists vary, there is a consensus on the key ones -- which I list. I think you'll agree that at this time the Iraq national or central gov't has few or none of these. The big question is, of course, how much time should we give it before considering "plan B."

As for "unworkable and unusable" you might be right. I'd be a fool would contradict Lawrence and be dogmatic on such swampy ground! I would, however, appreciate more detail as to why and how.

[RTK]

Using technical definitions is problematic when posting on DNI. Due to the magic of the web they are read by people in a wide range of occupations and from many regions.

I use the general meaning of insurgency, as in most dictionaries (quoted earlier in this thread). I should have included this in the text (there basic errors are so obvious in hindsight, yet I overlook them so often).

As for the functional definition of legitimacy, that is explained in the article. Modern pol science has drifted from this (as you point out) vague concept to "attributes of government." While specific lists vary, there is a consensus on the key ones -- which I list. I think you'll agree that at this time the Iraq national or central gov't has few or none of these. The big question is, of course, how much time should we give it before considering "plan B."

As for "unworkable and unusable" you might be right. I'd be a fool would contradict Lawrence and be dogmatic on such swampy ground! I would, however, appreciate more detail as to why and how.

FM's definition from Webster's is the same as JP 1-02.

[Fabius Maximus]

Marct, thank you for introducing this concept to the discussion. It might have many applications to the military arts (that is for another thread, perhaps).

Its relevance here is to the discussion of reductionism. The use of reductionist methods to understand high-level properties of systems is perhaps one of the triumphs of modern science. To use the metaphor in GEB, it has proved most fruitful to study the behavior of ants to understand the intelligence of the anthill.

Consider evolution, “solved’ by the development of mendelian genetics and later biochemistry (DNA, etc).

Economics, where the grand insights of previous generations are being replaced by mathematical modeling of social systems using specific human behaviors. The schools unable to do this, such as the Austrians, have steadily lost influence in this discipline to those viewpoints that work well with reductionism (e.g., neo-Keynesians).

Psychology, where the extreme reductionists of sociobiology and neuroscience increasingly dominate the discussion – and some even deny the existence of high-level phenomena such as intelligence.

The pursuit of artificial intelligence also shows this trend. Until the last few decades the major thrust was directly modeling high-level activities. Now the focus is on tiny behavior. Sight, hearing, movement, speech, decision-making in small domains using a small set of data and rules (expert systems). The evolution of programs to play chess illustrates this trend. As we all know, there are always exceptions to any trend, such as neural networking in AI.

A historical note to illustrate the role of reductionism in this area. One milestone in the modern study of emergent properties was the John Horton Conway’s “game of life.” (Scientific American, October 1970). Only four rules, but capable of displaying highly complex and sophisticated behavior. Got many people thinking how reductionist methods might apply to their fields