Good news -- the insurgency is over! Now we need a new strategy for the Iraq War.

[Steve Blair]

Actually, this has been a trend that has been around for ages in the US political system. Go back and look at the Indian Wars and you'll see the same thing from Congress. It's something of a constant in the political cycle.

But the link to this is that Congress' actions (or lack thereof, depending on the situation) should not come as a surprise to ANYONE. Ignoring that reality in the planning process is part of the problem. The only way around it is to mobilize the public, or at least get them educated and involved. Congress doesn't like that, but at the end of the day it's the only sort of pressure that they will respond to.

[Jones_RE]

The recent house measure is nothing but political theater. Democrats were elected, in part, to do something about the war. Because congress is by design a debating society they have responded with classic meaningless legislation. The measure won't reconcile with the Senate version of the same bill (so it won't even get to the oval office to be vetoed), but it will drag out negotiations.

As an aside, one thing most people forget when watching our two parties tear into each other is that U.S. foreign policy is generally stable regardless of who happens to be in charge of it. The words change, but the music stays the same. We can talk about democrats not supporting the troops, but if the roles were reversed an John Kerry was in the White House with a republican congress you'd see much the same action: democrats demanding that we support a wartime president and republicans calling for accountability.
As support for this position I could cite Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Desert Fox, etc. The party out of power (i.e. that doesn't hold the White House) opposes everything the President does - they're just harder to deal with when they control the legislative branch.

In any event, Congress has tried to manage every war the nation has ever fought, from the Revolution on, and we've mostly muddled through all right.

------------------
Ed. by SWC Admin -- post copied to new thread in Politics in the Rear forum. If your comments are on that branch, follow it there.

[Culpeper]

Last two posts are right on the mark.

My favorite story of Congress getting too involved is more on a personal level. David Crockett's political career was suffering so he thought he would go to Texas and get some headlines. He traveled to a place called The Alamo. News didn't travel very fast back then. He didn't even know they were completely surrounded until he was within the walls. Fate.

[RTK]

Not that I'm complaining, but we haven't heard from FM for a while.

Wasn't he drafting a post to tell us how to win the war?

[Fabius Maximus]

Now that would be something, to show how to do this. "Mission Impossible, the New Series."

My scribbling have more modest ambitions. The article that initiated this thread said two things.

1. Our strategic goals, as defined by President Bush, were no longer possible to achieve.
a. Building a pro-American Iraq government was almost impossible.
b. Building a strong national Iraq government was unlikely.
c. A stable “federal/state” structure was the best we could hope for.

The responses to this article indicated that this was a controversial view in March. Today it seems to be the common wisdom. That we’re arming the Sunni Arabs suggests that the US government agrees.

2. “No matter what we do, the Expedition to Iraq has failed. Only the scope of the failure, the price to be paid by the Iraq people and by us, remains uncertain. The long-term result of the Iraq War will depend on our reaction to this failure. That will tell us much about ourselves, and help determine what kind of America we leave for our children.” This, of course, remains controversial.

I have several articles in the pipeline expanding on #2. I am, however, guided by the emails I get. The series on development of the “insurgent handbook” received so many that I am writing one or two more on that subject.

Even that must wait. Killcullen’s recent article might be the most important geo-political article written this year. Perhaps this decade. Too early to say, but it might be this generation’s equivalent of Kennan’s Long Telegram. I hope to have something – rough thoughts at least – out next week.

New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-21st-century/

[SteveMetz]

“No matter what we do, the Expedition to Iraq has failed. Only the scope of the failure, the price to be paid by the Iraq people and by us, remains uncertain. http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/200...-21st-century/

For what it's worth, let's keep in mind what the strategic objectives were when we intervened: An intact Iraqi state which is not a state supporters of terrorism, does not threaten its neighbors and does not possess WMD.

[slapout9]

Fabius, you mentioned something on the DNI website just a short time ago about a new Infantry manual that was written in secret for the DOD or something of that sort. I think you mentioned it would be published shortly. Do have any more updates on this?

[Fabius Maximus]

Could we have exited at some point in the past and achieved these goals? If we returned to those modest goals, could we leave now?

Or have our goals grown -- as is so often the case during wars -- to justify our expenditure of blood and money? If so, where does this process end?

Consider the intital goals of the various european states in August 1914, a war which grew into the "war to end all wars." After the deaths of millions, nothing less would do.

[Fabius Maximus]

Yes, it's in the pipeline. Hopefully after I finish the article about Kilcullen and the long war.

Here's the opening (current draft):

The first two chapters described how this is a poignant moment in history.

First, our foes are about to greatly increase their understanding of 4th generation warfare (4GW). This point in time is like that of conventional military theory after WWI, when the tentative beginnings of infiltration tactics were about to become blitzkrieg (aka maneuver warfare). Or guerilla warfare in the 1930’s, when Mao picked up his pen to write Basic Tactics – the handbook for People’s War. Soon someone will write "The Insurgent's Handbook."

Second, both we and our enemies are becoming aware that America’s governmental institutions appear structurally unable to effectively respond to 4GW threats.

What subjects would an insurgent's handbook cover? That is, what do current 4GW organizations need to become serious threats to us?

[slapout9]

Couple more questions. 1-Do you think we will attack Iran? 2-Do you think Israel will invade Syria? 3- What brought you to Alabama recently?

[Fabius Maximus]

1. I do not believe we will attack Iran. That would require bipartisan support, which I doubt Bush can now obtain.

a. Public support for the Iraq War is draining away, which discourages elected officials' support for what is in effect an expansion of the war.

b. Support by Congressional leaders for an attack on Iran might seriously damage the Democratic Party coalition, which is already stressed by their leading candidates support for the Iraq War

c. Even Republican officials are backing away from President Bush's policies. He has made too many mistakes, both operational and political. I suspect the last straw was the failure of his attempt to force through a "comprehensive solution" to the immigration problem.

2. I suspect Israel will require time to rebuild both its military and political structures. Both were, I suspect, damaged by the victory of Hezbollah in Lebanon. They cannot afford many such losses.

But who can say what might happen? These days there are many desperate people in high places, who might take gambles that calmer folks would avoid.

[Culpeper]

As constructive criticism I think all your points may or could be made easily moot. 911 set the precedence of the way our military will perform in the future. Iraq is an exception and merely a distraction to the overall picture due the demands of the press in a democratic society. The future holds a smaller military footprint, more humanitarian aid, more diversification in special forces, surgically killing bad guys, setting up bases in areas within close proximity of troubled areas of interest, training indigenous such as Yemenis commandos as well as small and large militias depending on demographics, indigenous coast guards, and so forth. All these things are coming to a form of maturity through the inevitable trial and error in places all over the world as a result of 911.

As for Iran, they are already sending troops across the border into Iraq. We are already in a state of war with Iran. It is the day of "brown and black" ops where national security trumps public opinion.

Certain Republicans are not backing away from Bush. They are asking for a change in strategy in Iraq. They have no problem with Afghanistan, Columbia, The Horn of Africa, Mongolia, The Philippines, and other places you may never heard of before. And what is happening in Iraq is nothing new. To quote from the USMC Small Wars Manual actually published in 1940.

During the initial phases of intervention, when the landing and movement may be opposed by comparatively large, well led, organized, and equipped hostile forces, the tactics employed are generally those of a force of similar strength and composition engaged in major warfare. If a crushing defeat can be inflicted upon these forces, the immediate cessation of armed opposition may result. This is seldom the case. Usually the hostile forces will withdraw as a body into the more remote parts of the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which continue to oppose the occupation. Even though the recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide by the terms of the capitulation. Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble the heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents, notorious outlaws and impressed civilians, and, by means of guerrilla warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a whole.

The USMC wasn't looking through a crystal ball in 1940. They merely, "wrote the book" on the subject. And with Iraq they were 100% correct. You may find this hard to believe but the previous Secretary of Defense had a copy of this manual in his office at all times. The biggest mistake this Administration has done is not properly educating the public on the basic aspects on what is being accomplished. Instead, they take a beating by the press that inspires Congress. As a nation we are uneducated concerning the basics on what is happening, what to expect, and what is in the future for national security operations. The public doesn't have a need to know every detail. That would be counterproductive for national security. A rudimentary understanding is all it would take to reverse public opinion polls. This is the fallacy of the Bush Administration.

Israel is generally always in a state of preparedness. We cannot gauge the latest actions of their capability since they violated their own manual of success. They won't do that again. Their politics will not jeopardize their understanding of preparedness and survival.

Iran could be attacked. Not necessarily in the same way we attacked Iraq. By that I mean much worse on one end and surgically on the other end. I'm certain their are several options on the table and Iraq was not or is not the endgame. I don't think this is a gamble of desperate people in high places. That is just too open ended. Nevertheless, it is a gamble of how soon we get down to eliminating bureaucratic roadblocks and take a serious look at what is working for us across the globe.

[Ironhorse]

As a nation we are uneducated concerning the basics on what is happening, what to expect, and what is in the future for national security operations. The public doesn't have a need to know every detail. That would be counterproductive for national security. A rudimentary understanding is all it would take to reverse public opinion polls. This is the fallacy of the Bush Administration.

Yes and no, I think.

I agree that more public education would create more understanding which might create more tolerance for COIN best practices and hopefully less tolerance for the unreasoned opposition of them.

But I believe public opinion is mired in its evaluation of past operations as well as its expectations for the future. The two are not wholly separable in an objective water-under-the-bridge sort of way.

And in that past operations arena, there is a lot for the public and political opponents to question. Unfortunately, having a copy in your office is not the same as reading it and applying its lessons. Either that, or my copy is curiously missing the go light, shock and awe, de-Baathify and disband chapters.

Further education is, therefore, a two edged sword which would further expose those and other decisions, and the legacy they created.

[goesh]

Amidst the rubble Nasrallah declared victory for hizbullah and some assumed in a matter of months their devastated infrastructure would be rebuilt and all their expended missles replaced and all their dead personnel reincarnated ready to go again. I fail to see the KIA count for IDF and the loss of some equipment as a defeat when there was no intent for occupation or even a conceived notion of altering Lebanon's political landscape via the assault. Bad tactics and the meddling of politicians at best makes it a draw. The perception of hizbullah victory certainly emboldened hamas now isolated in Gaza engaged in 2 fronts - IDF and Fatah. It generated an Isreali construction boom visa-via reinforcing homes and building bomb shelters and it resulted in new IDF leadership and political fallout. Those are not symptoms of defeat but lessons learned IMO.

[Fabius Maximus]

Right or wrong, analysis of the political situation must be the first step when determining the likelihood of war. We see that in the literature from Boyd’s trinity of “people-ideas-things” and 4GW writers’ emphasis on the moral basis of war – back thru Clausewitz, Machiavelli, and Sun Tzu.

Discussing politics is guessing, even for professional politicos and their technicians – so my guesses could easily be wrong! Goesh could easily be right and the new IDF leadership ready to go. Although the political leadership looks weak, Culpeper could be right that in Israel this is less important than in other western states – and that President Bush retains sufficient political capital to order an air strike against Iran.

And what is happening in Iraq is nothing new.

How true! That insight is the basis for 4GW analysis of the Iraq War. Since Mao brought “4GW” theory to maturity, almost all foreign occupiers have been defeated and left – unlike internal insurgencies whose record is mixed (there are intermediate cases difficult to classify). There are deep structural reasons for this, beyond the reach of new tactics. Hence the prediction that our expedition to Iraq will end the same way. We all hope that proves to be wrong, but many experts believe that is the way to bet.

It is just a harsh reality, as in Tom Godwin’s story “The Cold Equations”.

It is the day of "brown and black" ops where national security trumps public opinion.

This too is nothing new. SOP during the cold war. That history also suggests that these ops often (usually?) become public knowledge. Today's communication technology probably makes this even more likely than during the 1950's & 1960's. Unfortunatley, many of them damaged domestic and foreign public opinion, more than offsetting their tactical gains.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

I read with interest people's opinions regarding an Iran attack scenario, however, lets not dismiss the possbility of some economic action that would possibly hurt the current regime. I read with interest the following article http://www.iags.org/n050707.htm from the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, and they bring up several good points --

1) "...the debate in the West on how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons should focus less on the risky military option, or the seemingly ineffective diplomatic option, and more on a comprehensive economic warfare strategy that targets Iran's energy sector. With oil exports accounting for half the government's budget and around 80 to 90 percent of total export earnings, the surest strategy to bring down Tehran's Islamic regime is to break its economic backbone...."

2) ..."U.S. sanctions have ensured that Iran's oil sector would not recover. President George W. Bush has renewed sanctions first imposed in 1995 by President Bill Clinton, citing the "unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. national security posed by Iran. These sanctions prohibit U.S. companies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran, while also banning the financing of development of Iranian energy resources...."

Bottom line, the sanctions need to be continued and enforced plus more pressure put on China and India for side-stepping the sanctions and working toward fulfilling their own energy shortcomings by working with Iran. There is currently a nationwide gas rationing program implemented in Iran which is causing riots and protests. I believe I see a recurring theme with the media in this country. As I am doing my daily lunchtime workout today I was treated by Fox News to an hour of LAPD chasing some woman who refused to pull-over for them....not a peep about Iran....shame, shame....

Regards, PT

[Fabius Maximus]

there is so much provocative material in your post. Here are a few comments, just scratching the surface.

Proposing a “comprehensive economic warfare strategy” against Iran takes us back to debates from the beginning of the Cold War. That was Kennan’s vision of how to contain the Soviet Union, and he was not happy as his ideas were hijacked by the military.

It’s a powerful concept. It uses our leverage as the hegemonic power, without arousing the fears – and hence opposition – of other states that result from our use of military force.

Unfortunately, Iran holds much of the world’s remaining oil. That makes containment more difficult. To illustrate, what might be the major story of last month went unnoticed by most geo-political observers. I strongly recommend reading it.

“Top IEA official: without Iraqi oil, we hit the wall in 2015”
http://www.energybulletin.net/31397.html

While striking, this is only the most recent in a series of comments by leading officials of the International Energy Agency and the US’s EIA. They are becoming alarmed by accumulating data suggesting that global oil reserves are less than they anticipated.

Aggressive action against Iran, military and/or economic, will mean that we have taken down the two states with the greatest potential to increase oil production. We all know the implications.

Consider the global alliance to contain Iran as a form of the prisoners’ dilemma. We all gain by hanging together. But if this results in $150 oil, the reward for defecting – leaving the alliance, aiding Iran -- becomes attractive.

[Culpeper]

Yes and no, I think.



Further education is, therefore, a two edged sword which would further expose those and other decisions, and the legacy they created.

There is never anything wrong with further education. Even at the opportunity cost of decision makers. Some people get killed and others get their careers ended as a result. We have already lost one Secretary of Defense. Others will eventually have to follow suit. I have lost most of my interest of political pressure where Iraq is concerned. The company language seems to be careful of stating Iraq must immediately end. I can read between the lines. There is more going on than most of have a need to know. I can accept that. Educating America on what needs to be done and how it needs to done should take precedence over the careers of decision makers. This will result in getting rid of those that have legacy on their minds and bring up those that are positive goal driven leaders. Eventually, those in the field will rise up in the ranks to fill this void. But in order for this to work, the average American needs to have a basic understanding of the situations we face. If the press is running stories that expose mistakes the end result should be improved national security and possibly, if need be, the loss of certain jobs for certain individuals. But it should not be viewed as a victory for one side of the debate. It should be viewed as an improvement to the war effort. No different than a CEO that has turned the organization into a failure and the qualified and motivated replacement bringing the organization back into a going concern. Most people view that as a positive and don't relish on the scandal itself after the positive results become a reality. The old piss poor CEO just becomes a side note at that point. Killing bad guys and civil affairs is just one side of the COIN. Getting rid of poor leaders and replacing them with experienced and respected leaders is the other side for a victory of sorts. Even WWII cannot be viewed as an absolute victory. It actually created the Cold War, which created the Korean and Vietnam Conflicts. As General Franks would put it, the end of WWII was a catastrophic success, just as he did with Iraq after the Saddam Regime quickly fell and we had to deal with what we a dealing with now.

[Fabius Maximus]

Not that I'm complaining, but we haven't heard from FM for a while. Wasn't he drafting a post to tell us how to win the war?

Here it is. But not exactly, as you say, "how to win the war." (I wish we knew how to do that.) It describes one scenario for the war's end. I consider this the most likely end, but we all know the odds of correctly forecasting that.

After gathering dust on my desk for several months, now seems the approriate time to launch it.

By "the war" I mean the war in Iraq. The "Long War" is a larger issue, in which Iraq just one front of one theater. This is part 4 in a series of articles about the Long War. It is a sequel to or expansion of the article discussed on this thread.

Beyond Insurgency: An End to Our War in Iraq

[skiguy]

I wish we knew how to do that

Now we do