The author of this thesis has finally presented a new model (while it may not be perfect) that actually gives us a way to model and then address the insurgent like activity we’re dealing with Iraq and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism. Perhaps wishful thinking, but I think it will lead to significant and much needed paradigm shifts in our strategy.
...after I read it, I was scratching my head, thinking, "A damned Air Force butterbar wrote this?"
...in short Saddam’s leadership of divide and conquer resulted in less state control and more authority at the local/tribal level...
Charles Tripp wrote this back in 2000: Another important element that has been reinforced during the years of Saddam Hussein's rule has been the social networks of kinship. These have been used by the regime as channels of reward and punishment, sustaining a certain kind of patrimonial system and strengthening the positions of the designated patriarchal leaders vis-a-vis their followers and tenants. So effective has this been in the conditions of the past few decades that, recipricocally, increasing numbers of individuals, far removed from any traditional tribal identity, have sought to affiliate themselves with the recognized shaikhs of certain tribal groups to benefit from the protection and security this is thought to bring. The integration of these networks into the Iraqi state may no longer need Saddam Hussein to maintain it, but may make it harder for more open processes of impersonal coalition building to assert themselves in the future.

Bill, you and I are on the same sheet of music on this, and on other bits you've posted in this context. I'd like to invite you over for a beer to sit down and discuss the model - not only for its potential strategic application, but as regards operational intel collection and analysis supporting the tactical commanders.