Originally Posted by
Azor
Lukashenko has been adept at playing both sides. He is well aware that the EU would be less critical of a Russian incursion into Belarus than it was over Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Belarus is more integrated into the Russian-led economic and security architecture than Ukraine was (CSTO, EEU), and Belarus' role in Russia's aerospace defense is even more vital than Crimea. Nevertheless, we have seen increasing attempts by Lukashenko to garner Western interest in the hope of counter-balancing Russia and maintaining as much independence as possible. As long as Putin is invested in Ukraine and Syria, and as long as the Kazakhs are agitating more, Lukashenko can slacken the leash.
Putin has probably concluded from the Ukrainian situation that proximity, economic integration, political and intelligence infiltration and forward deployment of forces is not enough to guarantee "loyalty". He secured Crimea but lost most of Ukraine and was dealt a severe intelligence (technology secrets) and military (industrial capacity) blow, all because Yanukovych did not "obey orders". Putin won't make the same mistake in Belarus.
Defense in depth, no? In practice, the Soviets' notion of defense was to keep attacking by way of counter-offensives, and even their planned response to a NATO invasion was to march west...
So Kaliningrad is the staging area for the first line to prevent NATO from reaching the second line in Belarus?
Belarus is as integral to Russian security as Canada is to the United States, and I would go so far as to say that while the loss of Kaliningrad might not warrant "nuclear de-escalation", a NATO drive into Belarus certainly would.
I read the Bloomberg article, but it doesn't add anything new to the debate, other than some more detail on Russia's opposition to NATO BMD in East-Central Europe, which I surprisingly agree with. Of course, Bloomberg's reporting is very political and I imagine that the billionaire opposes BMD in Europe and the more conciliatory EPAA.
The impetus for BMD was to protect the United States against blackmail or a small strike from a rogue state (such as North Korea, Iran or Syria), an accidental launch (e.g. Black Brant) or one by a rogue local commander. NATO BMD is supposedly intended to protect NATO from Iran, even though Iran's likely targets are Israel, the Gulf Arab states and US bases in CENTCOM.
Nuclear warfare experts (CSIS) conclude that BMD today, while hardly capable of stopping a full strategic exchange, could whittle down a second strike. And unless Russian officers are granted access to Aegis Ashore sites, along the lines of Nunn-Lugar, they may very well assume that the sites can also be used for offensive purposes.
From what I can see, Russia will have a very slow recovery to stagnation or slow growth and only exclusion from SWIFT or another serious financial measure will force Putin to choose between guns and butter.
From Donbas to Belarus?
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