Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths

[Stratiotes]

I read Dr. Echevarria's paper sometime ago and I can't recall particular points with which I disagreed at the time. I do remember it was a decent paper for the most part and I did not have too much heartburn with it. If memory serves, however, it seems to me he did what a lot of people do - clouded the differentiators in the definition of 4GW as opposed to guerrilla or irregular warfare. In that sense, I believe he missed the point and did not do much to discredit the 4GW side. I'll try to find some time to re-read it so I can be more specific. I believe Bill Lind did a response to it though and I'm pretty sure that's available at the DNI site.

As for the "new" side of 4GW - I don't think its really anything new and I don't believe others really think it is either. I think that what they are considering "new" is the fact that it has been given a label where it had none before. In fact, Bill Lind, one of the main proponents of 4GW theory, recommends Barb Tuchman's book on the 14th century as a tool for understanding 4GW better.

[Bill Moore]

I have been a supporter of 4th GW concepts up to a limit, but have grown more critical of the 4th GW mafia over time based on the identified petty ego problems. I also don't like categorizing wars by generation, to include the 1st through 3rd generation wars.

Whatever we call it in the end, I think our social, economic, information, and political environment has changed considerably since the end of WWII, which in itself changes the nature of war significantly. You'll see various comments throughout the site on so called 4th GW and little on 5GW.

I loved Wolfberger's comment that 4GW is a phrase searching for concept.

I think anytime you apply a label to war, you'll quickly find out that are being aspects of the conflict that don't fit into your definition or concept, so the label serves little purpose. For the long time SWC members, believe it or not, I'm actually a closet Clausewitz fan (hard for some to believe after my many rants against our officers who know nothing but Clausewitz), and his guidance was that the most important thing a political leader must do prior to commiting forces to war, is to understand the nature of the war he is going to fight (note this is very loosely paraphrased). 2d, 3d, and 4th GW constructs do not describe the nature of the war one is about to undertake in my opinion.

In short, I concur with many of the scattered ideas found in 4th and 5th GW articles and books, and think we would all be better off if we studied them, but they are far, far from complete theories.

[selil]

This may have been covered before, but I'm coming to a realization that generational taxonomies of warfare do not supersede a fundamental idea. As war has increased in scope and changed in techniques the precedeing techniques have not fallen away. Where stick and sword might have been tools long ago that doesn't mean a soldier sitting in a hole in Iraq won't use his k-bar should the need arise. Even using fourth generation assets like sattelite or imaging technologies to choose when to implement that weapon. In many cases it appears that people think of each geneartion suplanting the prior generation which is a voilaton of the analogy of generations. Generations build upon each other and are supported by each other much like grandpa helps, the father, who helps the son. Artifiical taxonomical derivitation creates silo's whereas in reality we're likely talking abotu a layer cake.

[wm]

This may have been covered before, but I'm coming to a realization that generational taxonomies of warfare do not supersede a fundamental idea. As war has increased in scope and changed in techniques the precedeing techniques have not fallen away. Where stick and sword might have been tools long ago that doesn't mean a soldier sitting in a hole in Iraq won't use his k-bar should the need arise. Even using fourth generation assets like sattelite or imaging technologies to choose when to implement that weapon. In many cases it appears that people think of each geneartion suplanting the prior generation which is a voilaton of the analogy of generations. Generations build upon each other and are supported by each other much like grandpa helps, the father, who helps the son. Artifiical taxonomical derivitation creates silo's whereas in reality we're likely talking abotu a layer cake.

I very much agree with your point about focussing on all of the tools of war that are being used. But there is more to the story--we are looking at a continuum instead of a layer cake IMHO.
A few years back, I wrote a response to Echevarria on the notion of Generational Warfare and submitted it to CSI but received no response from the good folks in Carlisle. I agreed with his position that 4GW has no “value-add” to our analysis of warfare. Unfortunately for me, a glitch in technology destroyed my only copy (silly me for not backing up more frequently).
My bottom line was that we ought to view warfare as a continuum (or perhaps a spiral) covering the amount of risk imposed on both combatants and non-combatants by technological changes that have improved weapons’ ranges. In early warfare, risk was greatest to combatants due to weapon range limitations. Sticks, stones, and swords all require combatants to get up close and personal with their opponents. Non-combatants usually are well out of harm’s way in such encounters. As technological changes produced weapons that could be used in indirect fire engagements, the risk to combatants using the weapons decreased but the risk of harm to non-combatants increased, especially as range increases allow for engagement with unobserved fire.
If we want to identify different forms/generations of warfare, we ought to focus on the degrees of risk to which each side is willing to expose both itself and the non-combatants. This idea of the degree of willingness to accept risk covers, in my humble opinion, the three aspects of the Clauswitzian Trinity. We could describe different types of warfare along my continuum by analyzing the ranges of the weapons used by each side, their willingness to risk their combatants, and each side’s willingness to risk injury to non-combatants.
Important things I did not address relate to non-combatants:
1. Whether to distinguish between the combatants ( e.g., those in my country versus those in my opponent’s country), and
2. If 1., above, is required, how to make such distinctions.

Just war theory (justice of war) requires that wars be fought to defend non-combatants. Just war (justice in war) also requires warriors to undertake risks to protect non-combatants. I think that any other way to describe warfare opens the floodgates to excessive carnage. The only value I see to be gained from Echevarria’s discussion about the pre and post-Peace of Westphalia periods is to note that responsibility for accepting risk and identifying who may be at risk changed somewhere about that time (at least in Europe).

[J Wolfsberger]

If we're seriously going to look at generations of warfare or Revolutions in Military Affairs, it seems we ought to begin by identifying those elements of warfare that would, could or should be the drivers. Here's my (strawman) proposal for the factors that have driven RMA in the past:

1. Individual lethality. Stabbing sword to pike/spear to etc.
2. Mobility. Stirrup, chariot, ship, etc.
3. Logistics. Contrast Scipio Africanus' campaigns in Spain and Africa with Henry V's campaign in France.
4. Intelligence/information.
5. Economic capability. What surplus does the social group/nation have available to prepare for and conduct warfare.

As I wrote, it's a strawman. What I would suggest is that any dramatic change in one of these, or other factors that might be added, will lead to an RMA.

The next argument I would make is that we are not, in fact, seeing a new generation of warfare on the part of al Qui'ida. Instead, we re seeing asymmetric warfare (not new) enabled and extended by global economic changes in finance, availability of industrial products, information availability, etc. (And having written this, and reread it, I realize somebody might well argue I've just made the case for a new generation.)

[Jimbo]

Wolf,

Shoot, move, communicate, and log are a construction, but they are mearly tools, they have to be examined in the context of their historical settings. Those are all useful lenses to utilize, but various developments in those areas did not necessarily revolutionize warfare at the time of inception (My head now hurts). The big unknown out there is information. I know what Cebrowski said (Ugh), but the current use of decentralized and globalized information methods might be the new change, who knows.

[dusty]

All interesting thoughts.. I haven't been able to finish the paper (work has demanded too much time) but I don't like Dr. Echevarria's way of thinking from the outset. His first paragraph says that 4GW theory gives him an opportunity to attack 'unfounded' doctrines... The key word, I think, is attack. Defend your current doctrines, but isn't an open mind with a critical thought process the best avenue of approach to refining doctrine? Unless the current doctrines embraced by US forces are perfect.

[wm]

the current use of decentralized and globalized information methods might be the new change, who knows.

If it is, I submit that this so only because it may allow leaders to gain more and better insight into the risks to which they expose their forces and those of their opponents. I submit that analysis of the 9 traditional principles of war--maneuver, mass, offensive, objective, security, simplicity, surprise, unity of command, economy of force--shows that all are ways of minimizing operational risk for one's forces.

Better, faster information flow at all echelons could allow us to stop doing things like dismounted patrolling and "recon by fire." It would also make it much harder for an opponent to catch us unawares while we might be able to inflict some serious hurts on our opposition were our information flow such as to allow us to get inside their decison loops--a construct pushed back in the 80s that still does not seem to have been actualized (at least not as far as I can tell in reading critiques on US operations in the 90's and the current decade).