Profusion of Rebel Groups Helps Them Survive

[Merv Benson]

In the opeing quote the author says:

The current anti-insurgency approach does not appear to be working. To date, it has centred on three core pillars: the enemy’s destruction (elimination of the largest possible number of fighters), decapitation (suppression of insurgent leaders and leadership structures) and dislocation (recovery of their sanctuaries and disruption of their lines of communication).

I think he is ignoring substantial evidence that the enemy had delegitimized itself by attacking non combatants and ruling like the Taliban in areas it did control. As the story in the WaPo on Tal Afar shows US forces are adapting to defeat the enemy. The story leaves out the mayor's letter to McMaster and his earlier letter to Gen. Casey that demonstrate just how successful the US has been in defeating the insurgency in places like Tal Afar where the take and hold policy has been employed. Incidents around Ramadi also demonstrate how the enemy has alienated the Iraqis. In the hearts and minds war, the enemy has been the big loser and my reading of the article does not suggest the author comprehends that.

Of course, I think it is important to study enemy communication. I just think his assertion that the current strategy is not working is not even close to the mark.

[Jedburgh]

...I think he is ignoring substantial evidence that the enemy had delegitimized itself by attacking non combatants and ruling like the Taliban in areas it did control. As the story in the WaPo on Tal Afar shows US forces are adapting to defeat the enemy. The story leaves out the mayor's letter to McMaster and his earlier letter to Gen. Casey that demonstrate just how successful the US has been in defeating the insurgency in places like Tal Afar where the take and hold policy has been employed. Incidents around Ramadi also demonstrate how the enemy has alienated the Iraqis. In the hearts and minds war, the enemy has been the big loser and my reading of the article does not suggest the author comprehends that...

The "enemy" is not monolithic. A blanket statement such as the enemy had delegitimized itself are utterly false, because it only applies to certain factions within the insurgency we are fighting. Elements among the foreign jihadists fighting in Iraq have alienated sectors of the indig Sunni Arab population by some of their recent actions - that is absolutely true (the author does address that in the paper - although only to a limited degree). However, the indig Sunni insurgent groups are not affected and continue to fight on with the general support of their tribes and clans - despite our efforts to integrate Sunni Arabs into the government. In the big picture, we have yet to reach any sort of tipping point or seen any real decisive trend that indicates we are coming out on top of the insurgency. However, the insurgency itself is stagnant at the stragegic level; although tactically it continues to dynamically evolve and adapt. It is far to early to declare anyone the "big loser".

[Merv Benson]

I just do not believe that other enemy factions such as the ones who want to restore Saddam or Baath party rule of some Sunni theocracy have legitimacy with most Sunnis much less most Iraqis. They are a minority of a minority. The elections have pretty well demonstrated that they have been rejected by most Iraqis. If they had legitimacy they would have been more successful in the election. The non al Qaeda groups are made up of the former regime elements and some Sunni supremicist religious bigots who fear rule by the Shia and Kurds. They have all the legitimacy of the Klu Klux Klan. I just do not see the need to elevate them to "legitimacy." Just what is the legitimate greviance of any of these groups?

Any close reading of operations in Iraq over the last year such as Michael Yon's and Bill Roggio would show that US troops are sensitive to the local community and are working with them. I just do not have a lot of patience for reports suggesting that US troops and their leaders are a bunch of dummies or that their strategy is not working when it clearly is.

[Jedburgh]

They have all the legitimacy of the Klu Klux Klan.

If that were true, then we would be rolling up insurgent cells left and right in the final victorious stage of the COIN effort. Unfortunately, that just ain't the case.

Remember, we are discussing legitimacy in the context of the perceptions of their supporters. It doesn't matter one iota what you or I think about their legitimacy. It is clear that, despite successes in many other aspects of the COIN effort, we have yet to significantly degrade support for the insurgents within the communities where they thrive.

I just do not have a lot of patience for reports suggesting that US troops and their leaders are a bunch of dummies or that their strategy is not working when it clearly is.

On reading the paper at the head of this thread, I did feel that the author did not have a complete picture of what we are doing - as I stated, we are implementing aspects of several of his recommendations. However, as one who has spent a significant amount of time in Iraq, I did not take his criticisms as insults.

As for our strategy working...well...the results are not yet final. It is certainly unreasonable to state that it is clearly working, unless you are very selective in your reading and analysis. In certain aspects, we seem to be doing very well. However, the insurgency continues, as we continue to have issues (quietly, quietly...) with the new Iraqi government. Operationally and tactically, we have done a great job of integrating lessons learned - both current and reaching back for those we had forgotten. But we damn sure have not yet reached a point where victory is certain.

[Merv Benson]

Not to be too flip, but it took over a 100 years to roll up the Klan. We clearly have a ways to go in Iraq. I think we are defeating the enemy but he is not yet defeated. He may even have a better chance than the Klan had in achieving his objective, but if you analize his position given his objectives, he is losing.