If that were true, then we would be rolling up insurgent cells left and right in the final victorious stage of the COIN effort. Unfortunately, that just ain't the case.Originally Posted by Merv Benson
Remember, we are discussing legitimacy in the context of the perceptions of their supporters. It doesn't matter one iota what you or I think about their legitimacy. It is clear that, despite successes in many other aspects of the COIN effort, we have yet to significantly degrade support for the insurgents within the communities where they thrive.
On reading the paper at the head of this thread, I did feel that the author did not have a complete picture of what we are doing - as I stated, we are implementing aspects of several of his recommendations. However, as one who has spent a significant amount of time in Iraq, I did not take his criticisms as insults.Originally Posted by Merv Benson
As for our strategy working...well...the results are not yet final. It is certainly unreasonable to state that it is clearly working, unless you are very selective in your reading and analysis. In certain aspects, we seem to be doing very well. However, the insurgency continues, as we continue to have issues (quietly, quietly...) with the new Iraqi government. Operationally and tactically, we have done a great job of integrating lessons learned - both current and reaching back for those we had forgotten. But we damn sure have not yet reached a point where victory is certain.
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