I don’t think that Surkov’s “non-linear warfare” is helpful to our understanding of Ukraine or Syria any more than his “managed democracy”, except perhaps as a polite euphemism.
The true beginning of Putin’s more intelligent use of power was in Chechnya, where he co-opted the Kadyrovs.
Looking at Russia’s various aggressions during Putin’s rule, Crimea is actually an outlier.
In every other operation, Russia extensively relied upon local auxiliaries, including criminals and paramilitary organizations, and in all cases, there is both cooperation and conflict between Russia and these auxiliaries, and among the auxiliaries themselves.
You have reported on the anarchy in Donbas and CrowBat has reported on it in Syria, most recently in WarIsBoring. Yet these conditions also prevailed in Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The assassinations in Donbas are reminiscent of the consolidation of Russian/Kadyrotsi rule in Chechnya. Certainly, Putin’s ideal is Transnistria, but he has no problem dealing with the anarchy in Syria, even if he is the junior partner.
It is interesting that you chose 2002 as the start of Putin’s conflict with the West. It coincides with the NATO summit in Prague, during which the former Soviet republics and Russian imperial subjects of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were invited to join NATO, which would now border Russia, Kaliningrad and Murmansk notwithstanding. In addition, NATO decided to continue to increase membership and to form the Response Force. At the summit, Bush called for a “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq.
Putin clearly arrived at the following conclusions:
- NATO membership would be offered to other countries bordering Russia, which it was later (to 3 of 5 prospective members)
- NATO was taking on the character of an offensive military alliance, given the operations in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, the formation of the Response Force and the call for a “coalition of the willing” of NATO members to invade a country outside of Europe
- NATO was not concerned about Russian preferences in Kosovo or with respect to the expansion of NATO
- NATO was continuing a policy of containment and perhaps even rollback toward Russia, even though Russia was not in conflict with NATO
Nor do I regard the unresolved border conflicts that Putin inherited from Yeltsin as signs of expansion. Putin obviously wants to retain the status quo in order to have outposts in Moldova and Georgia, but his de facto annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not occur until Georgia launched a war (and committed war crimes), until Georgia advanced toward NATO membership and until Kosovo had been recognized as independent of Serbia by the United States and most of NATO.
This is not to say that the conflict between the West and Russia is the fault of the West. In all probability, Russia could never have integrated with the West. Incorporation into the European Union would have meant the destruction of Russia’s mafia state and economic domination by Western Europe in general, and Germany in particular. Incorporation into NATO would have meant that Russia could never engage in aggression against its neighbors and that it could not rely on nuclear saber-rattling to receive special treatment diplomatically. Nevertheless, Clinton and Bush acted stupidly and exacerbated the problem.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the United States did not expect Russia to attack it, and until recently did not consider a deliberate first strike as possible. Similarly, both the UK and France are surrounded by allies and there is no realistic threat of either country being invaded, again excluding recent tensions with Russia. All three are also members of the world’s most powerful military alliance with such conventional power that nuclear weapons are regarded as a last resort. So why then did all three countries maintain and upgrade their nuclear arsenals over the past 25-odd years? Why do both Russia and the United States monitor one another’s compliance with INF and START? See where I’m going?
As you are enlightened as to BMD, can you answer me the following questions:
- Why were these systems located in Central Europe rather than closer to Iran, or in the countries most likely to be targeted by Iran?
- Was there no possibility that these systems could be upgraded so as to intercept Russia’s ICBMs or SLBMs?
- Was there no possibility that these facilities could be upgraded to feature offensive weapons such as SRBMs, or even banned weapons such as GLCMs or IRBMs?
- Were these facilities not permanent and therefore in violation of the CFE Treaty?
There is no treaty on tactical nuclear weapons, so does Russia not have a right to use them for deterrence?
Do you disagree with Clark Murdock on Russia’s concerns over MAD?
Originally Posted by Azor
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