The strategy is focused on shaping the region, and in the book he identifies (and discusses at length) six crucial choices for Asia's future. I'll address three of them here.

1. Hegemony or more toward a balance of power.

2. An open 21st Century operating system, or a return to the spheres of influence model (what we Russia and China pushing in different regions).

3. Economic interdependence and military deterrence pulling the region back to coexistence, or national grievances and mutual mistrust toward heightened tensions.

Asia is at a tipping point, and it is important. Engagement in Asia does not mean withdrawing the rest of the world, but it is a hard sell to Americans as Campbell points out:

Our responses are rooted in the legacies of the past. In the wake of every modern conflict, the public has called upon politicians to return and focus on domestic issues. The US oscillates between periods of maximalist foreign policy and periods of retrenchment. A sharp crisis, such as 9/11 often precipitates a max response and over commitment, when the maximalist president overreaches, the retrencher comes in to pick up the pieces. When retrenchment fails to rebuild American power, meet new challenges, or compete effectively, the maximalist reappears.

We're currently in a retrenchment mindset as a nation, and it is a time that we need to be more engaged. Kurt points out that our largely failed strategy in the Middle East has soured Americans on foreign policy and understandably so, but we need to mobilize the people to support the rebalance, because it is central to our economic interests.

He notes, that Americans are increasingly skeptical of global economic engagement due to fears that increased competition would threaten US jobs, so building public support will be difficult.

Another challenge, the reason to focus on Asia does not come in the context of a clear and present threat to American interests. The history of US engagement with the world has frequently been driven by direct challenges to America’s security or way of life, be they from fascism, totalitarianism, Communism, or Islamic extremism. Based on clear goals and objectives, US foreign policy was relatively easy to understand and support. (the military mindset)

This type of view does not apply to modern Asia, the Pivot is not a reaction to a clear cut and unambiguous threat, but a recognition that the Asia-Pacific will become an increasingly key driver of global politics and economics in the 21st Century.

US foreign policy is out of balance; policy makers have a tendency to elevate the intransigent problems of the ME over the more patient game of strategy that awaits us in Asia.

If you're interested in East Asia, diplomatic history, and a broader view of strategy this book is well worth reading.