19 violations of the ceasefire over the past 24 hours.
No WIA and KIA.... The 2nd day in a row...
16 attacks the day before....
NOW former Russia troops can no longer trust their own government AND those now fighting in eastern Ukraine...will they be forced to pa back as well????
Russian servicemen who fought in Abkhazia in 1993 are now obliged to return millions of rubles paid secretly in USD
http://www.mk.ru/social/2017/01/16/r...y-tochke.html#
Yesterday, Russia's MoD Shoigu inspected the #Kadamovskiy training ground where the new 150th division is deployed, 40 km from #Ukraine.
SBU found Russian army arms at battle scene in Eastern Ukraine
pic.twitter.com/iwZutkT0z5
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/20-janu...ttle-scene-in#
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 01-20-2017 at 04:20 PM.
Pictures: Russian forces planting landmines near #Svitlodarsk pic.twitter.com/q7xG9oFEI0
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/21-janu...andmines-near#
Lower number of attacks reported by ATO HQ last days, 25 yesterday(vs 50+ week before). 1 Ukrainian soldier killed
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/21-janu...ian-positions#
Reference the UAF Cyborgs who fought and died in the Donetsk International Airport...
Today is 2nd anniversary of the end of battle of #Donetsk Airport. It was twice as long as battle of Stalingrad.
Battle of #Donetsk Airport was the battle that showed the World what it means when genuine Nazis win...ie Russian spetsnaz.......
Russian Hybrid Army reinforcements arrived near #Mariupol
http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/na-...edium=twitter#
60 soldiers, 3 BMP-1, and 2 MT-LB.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 01-21-2017 at 01:12 PM.
Hrytsak: SBU prevented assassination of MP in #Kyiv. Russian special services involved in the attempt
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/21-janu...tion-of-mp-in#
In this article LNR/DNR Kremlin puppets want Ukraine to sign new deal with Russia, want to attack Kyiv.
https://m.gazeta.ru/politics/2017/01...0479851.shtml#
We knew this was coming. Putin wants to reinstall Yanukovych during Trump term.
Especially after Yanukovych signed a formal request for Russia to send troops into Maidan....BUT was signed when he was already in Russia....
About 300 advanced radiostations were seized from Akhmetov Fund humanitarian convoy trucks headed to Donbass military personnel....
pic.twitter.com/wOQWEBEmF1
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/22-janu...e-seized-from#
33 attacks on Ukrainian positions by Russian paramilitary troops yesterday, no casualties
Ukrainian military gained new positions near #Stakhanov, comply with Minsk agreements
http://liveuamap.com/en/2017/22-janu...ositions-near#
Ukraine Reports 33 Attacks On Saturday
http://bit.ly/2jf2gnX
All you need to know about Russian Information Warfare from a @NATO point of view.
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/dow...php?icode=506#
Ukraine reports 41 attacks in #Donbas sunday: Mortars, heavy machine guns, snipers
The russian–ukrainian war: Understanding the dust clouds on the battlefield
From West Point's Modern Institute of War: http://mwi.usma.edu/russian-ukrainia...s-battlefield/
The battlefields in Eastern Ukraine represent part of a new era of warfare, or so we are regularly told. Analysts, pundits, and military leaders point to cyber warfare, hybrid warfare, and the gray zone. But look away from these shiny new concepts for a moment, and it becomes clear the Russian–Ukrainian war’s conventional character is far from new. In fact, it looks a lot like the last century’s World Wars. While the new aspects of this war have generated discussion within the defense industry as to the evolving character of war, an acknowledgement of the conflict’s conventional character is largely missing from the discourse.
To be sure, Russia’s actions in Ukraine have revealed several innovations, most notably the employment of the semi-autonomous battalion tactical group, and a reconnaissance-strike model that tightly couples drones to strike assets, hastening the speed at which overwhelming firepower is available to support tactical commanders. However, even these innovations are being used within a form of warfare that looks strikingly like that of a century ago.
Siege Warfare in Eastern Ukraine—the Modern Russian Way of War
The July 11, 2014 strike at Zelenopillya is perhaps the most noticeable example to emerge from the war of the combined effects of tactical drones with the battalion tactical group—a task-organized force designed to achieve tactical overmatch against opponents—and its organic fires capabilities. The attack was a preemptive undertaking against Ukrainian brigades, postured in assembly areas, which were preparing to conduct offensive action against Russian and partisan forces. The buzzing of tactical drones and cyber-attacks targeting Ukrainian communications preceded the strike. An onslaught of rockets and artillery fell on the Ukrainian position shortly after the drones arrived, leaving thirty Ukrainian soldiers dead, hundreds more wounded, and over two battalions’ worth of combat vehicles destroyed. This strike created anxiety within the US Army, specifically in relation to the sophistication of Russian cyber capabilities and the effectiveness of the new Russian reconnaissance-strike model. This strike also highlights the disparity in artillery and rocket munitions between Russia and the US Army. Russia still possesses and employs a variety of munitions, to include dual-purpose improved conventional munitions and thermobaric munitions, that the US Army elected to eliminate from its arsenal.
The Battle of Ilovaisk followed on the heels of the strike at Zelenopillya. Ilovaisk, a city on a critical highway linking the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) with Russia, was held by DPR partisans and Russian forces. In early August 2014, Ukrainian forces fed approximately eight battalions into the city, attempting to dislodge Russian and partisan forces from Ilovaisk. Their effort achieved moderate success—enough so that by the end of August, Russia dispatched multiple battalion tactical groups from its Southern Military District in Rostov-on-Don to regain control of the situation. These Russian forces encircled the town, isolating the Ukrainian forces at Ilovaisk, and began to lay siege to the city. Many Ukrainian soldiers reported hearing the distinctive buzz of Russian drones prior to the deluge of rocket and artillery fire—an indicator of Russia’s emerging tactic of using drones, linked directly to battalion tactical groups, to facilitate indirect fire. Ukrainian forces attempted to break out of their beleaguered position several times, but were never successful. By the end of the month, the critical situation forced the Ukrainian government to seek a political solution, which led to the Minsk Protocol on September 5, 2014.
The agreement allowed for a peaceful withdrawal of Ukrainian forces along a corridor back to Ukrainian-held territory. However, Russian forces opened fire on the Ukrainian forces as they withdrew. The carnage from the battle and the shooting gallery along the withdrawal corridor killed over 1,000 Ukrainian soldiers, wounded hundreds more, and destroyed scores of combat vehicles. The Battle of Ilovaisk was the bloodiest battle of the war for the Ukrainian army. The Minsk Protocol did little to inhibit combat operations, and Russian siege operations continued.
The next major Russian siege was at the Second Battle of Donetsk Airport—or “Little Stalingrad” to its Ukrainian defenders—which occurred from September 2014 to January 2015. During this battle, Russian forces sought to capitalize on Ukrainian initiative by allowing them to invest a considerable amount of force at the airport, before deploying multiple battalion tactical groups to encircle the facility. Once isolated, Russian forces and partisans began a slow, concentric squeeze on the Ukrainians controlling the airport, much of which consisted of incessant artillery and rocket bombardment. As their grip grew tighter, Russian and partisan forces entered and cleared terminals, hangers, and other facilities in which Ukrainian forces were located. The combined Russian–partisan team employed tanks in an infantry-support role throughout the clearance operation, providing covered movement from objective to objective and using mobile, protected firepower to achieve local overmatch against Ukrainian infantry. The battle ended with the airport destroyed and Ukrainian forces having suffered approximately 200 killed in action, another 500 wounded, and double-digit losses in tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and other combat vehicles.
The Battle of Debal’tseve was the last major siege of the Russian–Ukrainian War. Like the Battle of Ilovaisk, the two sides fought for strategically important highway links. The city of Debal’tseve, with 25,000 inhabitants, was the furthest east piece of Ukrainian-controlled territory. The city formed a salient into Russian- and partisan-controlled territory, which offered Russia an enticing opportunity to shore up its front lines. On January 14, 2015, Russian and partisan forces attacked, aiming to collapse the shoulders of the salient and cut off the Ukrainians in the city—a pincer movement reminiscent of the Battle of the Bulge. Once isolated, Russian forces launched massive salvos of rocket and artillery fire at Ukrainian forces and on the city’s infrastructure. They also cut power and utilities in the city, creating a humanitarian crisis within Debal’tseve. By the end of January, Russian offensive action, coupled with the harsh Ukrainian winter, led to the death of 6,000 civilians. Another 8,000 fled Debal’tseve. The battle triggered the Minsk II agreement on February 11, but fighting continued until February 20, when the city fell to Russian and partisan forces. All told, the battle saw approximately 8,000 Ukrainian soldiers defeated by over 10,000 Russian and partisan forces. The Ukrainians suffered close to 200 killed in action, over 500 wounded, and hundreds missing or captured.
Minimizing Dust Clouds: Understanding the Purpose of Modern Siege Warfare
What explains Russia’s evident preference for the siege? Would it not make more sense to quickly annihilate the Ukrainians? Perhaps. However, the siege’s benefit is its ability to transfer military power into political progress, while obfuscating the associated costs. A rapid, violent, decisive victory in which hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers are killed in a matter of days is counterproductive to Russia’s political goals, whereas the incremental use of violence over time accomplishes the same objectives with less disturbance to the international community. Imagine a formation of tanks driving through the desert. They can quickly get to an objective by driving full-throttle, but in doing so they kick up a large amount of dust, making the formation and its direction of travel observable to any onlooker. However, a formation of tanks moving slowly through the desert produces a much smaller dust signature, making its presence less noticeable and its intentions less discernible. “Dust clouds” on the battlefield are inevitable, but how they are managed in pursuit of political objectives is the essence of good strategy. This is a key consideration in understanding Russia’s proclivity for the siege.
As the Russian–Ukrainian War illustrates, the battalion tactical group has proven to be a uniquely responsive and effective tool for conducting siege warfare. The formation’s versatility and success led Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, to announce in September 2016 the Russian army would increase the number of battalion tactical groups from sixty-six to 125 by 2018. Additionally, professional soldiers will staff the formation, whereas conscripts will be assigned to rear-echelon formations—which will likely yield more effective battalion tactical groups. As a result, the US Army can expect to find Russian battalion tactical group continuing to emerge in areas in which Russia employs ground forces to achieve political objectives.
The Russian Threat Beyond Eastern Europe
Looking beyond Eastern Europe, Russia is employing a similar approach to war in Syria, specifically in Aleppo. Russian armed forces, in conjunction with Syrian allies, have encircled the city, cut all ingress and egress routes, and ruthlessly assaulted the city. So Russia’s fondness for the siege is evidently not unique to Ukraine. The methods Russian forces employ in Syria are different than those in Ukraine; for example, in Syria they use airpower in lieu of the rocket and artillery fire in Ukraine. But the approach—use of the siege to achieve political ends—is the same in both...
Donetsk Airport was a light skirmish by Eastern Front standards. The Ukrainians fell into yet another Russian trap and refused to extricate their besieged men or reinforce them sufficiently. Strategically, why bother when a few dozen mortar and artillery teams could have rendered the runway unusable to aircraft? Better to shoot down a Russian transport with 40 men than lose 200 defending wasteland...Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
BUT here is the critical missing piece that is often overlooked....in 2014 and we are talking about 2014...the UAF was undermanned......poorly trained and equally poorly equipped....the fighting of the Cyborgs against largely Russian active duty forces ie Spetsnaz gave the UAF a massive morale boost and gave the UAF time to reorg and requip as the Russian military was busy trying to take the airport as a prestige win...actually very similar to the Texas Alamo fight that gave the Texans a chance to reorg under Gen Sam Houston and attack Mexican Gen Santa Anna winning Texas independence...
Cyborgs knew that it was a lost fight but holding out every single day gave the UAF one more day o the battlefield..
If we look at the Debaltseve encirclement....taken by truly Russian forces after repeated failures by Cossacks to take the town.....Debaltseve was in fact ceded to Ukraine in Minsk 2 YET Putin demanded it be taken and thus kept the Minsk 2 negotiations ongoing as long as possible to ensure his troops won Debaltseve.....
Take a reread of the Merkel comments and then Putin's crowing in his Norway visit that UAF had been surrounded and beaten by truck drivers and miners...BUT then was totally surprised when told by reporters UAF was able to fully pull out all troops and most of their heavy weapons....his comment was he did not believe it......
Actually pulling 3500 and weapons out of a Russian encirclement is a major feat....while fighting all the way out....
This sudden and unannounced Russian army snap exercise needs to be seriously monitored.....
Moscow region tank units readiness exercise. Live fire and loading up to railway cars.
T-72s, T-80s and T-90s involved, so multiple units.
Russian #Maskirovka mobilizations continue. All VDV paratroops and 1st Guards Tank Army are out on combat readiness. Tanks loaded to trains
Anytime the entire VDV Airborne is mobilized..watch it intently....
Russia's young men sent to die in #Ukraine. The story of Anton Savelyev - 16th separate Spetsnaz brigade. #Donbass
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-a...three-graves/#
Russian staging troops near in Ukraine
https://www.aldrimer.no/russia-stagi...near-ukraine/#
Russian servicemen fired Grads at a Ukrainian army position near Amvrosiivka from this field. #MinskMonitor
https://medium.com/@DFRLab/a-brief-h...-381d229018af#
Russia:Tank Formations of the Western Military District have been put on the highest level of combat readiness today,district wide training
New #MinskMonitor from @DFRLab with a pre-Minsk history of the Donbas War, with some new satellite imagery.
https://medium.com/@DFRLab/a-brief-h...af#.6jo7bog4d#
Azor...again the Donetsk Airport...far more important than many think....
@AricToler We have ~ 5 GB of secret videos at Donetsk Airport
http://bit.ly/2iX57nb
Including with Russian soldiers, as on my screenshot.
The Russian hacking and the Russian ties to Team Tramp are getting a tad harder and firmer in the last week....
THIS is a serious warning to all users of Kaspersky Internet Security software...for the last several years Kaspersky was privy to a number of types of free in the wild malware that they had known about but had not informed the rest of the global internet security companies about allowing them to upgrade their own security tools...many accused Kaspersky of unfair competition....
SOME of us have questioned who Kaspersky in the end answers to as they reside in Russia and their CEO is close personal friends to the FSB General...Kasperskly CEO fluffed off those worries stating his customer database is secure and protected and has no connections to the FSB.
BUT with events in Russia over the last two years and the tightening of Russian FSB control since Ukraine...that fluff off excuse can no longer hold water..
REMEMBER the ultra secret NSA internet company "The Equation Company" that worked for 15 or so years undetected on the internet was "discovered" by Kaspersky Labs...when even US companies had not discovered them.
NOW through this arrest for treason being charged against a FSB Major...actually being publicly made is first of all amazing and secondly the assumption is it is tied to the Russian hacking and Russian influence operations during the Trump campaign....hence the massive overreaction of the FSB....
It is interesting that via Russia news media it comes out that Kaspersky has a Major Crimes Lab run by a cyber expert who is a MAJ in the FSB when all along Kaspersky CEO has said they have no connections to the Russian FSB outside of his being friends with the FSB General...now we see FSB cyber personnel employed by Kaspersky...
Kaspersky confirmed arrest of its cyber-crime chief on charges for treason, He access to state secret due to co's collaboration with FSB.
Maj. Ruslan Stoyanov, Chief of Cyber Crime at Kaspersky, arrested along with FSB Cyber Security Deputy Chief Ser. MIhailov since December.
There is possible tie in back to the top former FSB General who was found also in DEC dead (killed was the first report but a week later changed to heart attack) in the backseat of his car in Moscow.
THIS story will keep getting deeper over the coming weeks as some are now tying this to the Russian hacking in the US...the Russian top hackers arrested in Prague and Spain and links now to certain Russian mafia types in the US who had ties to Trump.....
HERE is what is known as of today....
1. Sergey Mihailov was arguably the top internet authority at FSB, holding huge sway over the internet business in RU. It seems Mihailov
2. is charged with treason for "passing information to foreign information for money brokered by top cyber security company officer (=Stoyanov)
3. So the story is taking shape. Kaspersky's Stoyanov convinced (bribed) FSB top internet sec officer to share data on RU hacking. With whom?
4. Clearly "Steele" is one poss. answer. But it might be directly to CIA. Remember what Clapper said on FoxNews last week?
BTW....
Reference a Fox News story from 2013 that is interesting now to the five US national security agency investigating Russian hacking and Russian ties to Team Trump.....
The indicted gambling shark mentioned in this story - in hiding from US in Russia - was in the VIP section with @POTUS at Miss Universe 2013
RAN his illegal gambling network out of Trump Tower....
Two Defendants Sentenced For Participating In Racketeering Conspiracy With Russian-American Organized Crime Enterprise Operating International Sportsbook That Laundered Over $100 Million via the internet
APRIL 30 2014
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 01-25-2017 at 10:20 AM.
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