I am reviewing "The Fleet at Flood Tide" by James Hornfischer.
This is a book that does some things really well, but omits others for no rhyme or reason and is also taken down a notch by the author's tendency towards grandiloquence and flowery worldplay (an urge to try and describe what he considers heroic and awe-inspiring events, in language that is equally heroic and awe-inspiring).
First, the things he does well. This is a really comprehensive account of the Marianas campaign, including the preparation that went into making such a campaign possible. The creation of the greatest battle fleet the world has ever seen is relatively well known, but many books ignore the truly massive (and entirely new) infrastructure that made these amphibious operations, conducted thousands of miles from home, look so easy. The transports, supply ships, landing craft, amtracs, floating artillery (old battleships pressed into service in this role, as well as many other innovations), fire control teams, construction battalions and underwater demolition teams (the first SEALS), all these are covered in great detail. Innovators and leaders who made this gigantic (and completely unprecedented) effort possible are brought to life.
There is also an effort to describe how things looked and felt from the Japanese side. Their leaders as well as ordinary soldiers and civilians (who were soon to become trapped in the midst of this meat-grinder) are quoted at some length and their world is also brought to life.
He then jumps almost directly to the strategic bombing offensive, describing in some detail the life and work of everyone from Curtis Lemay to Paul Tibbet (who dropped the A-bomb, from a plane named after his mom). Some things were completely new to me, for example, the fact that while there are hundreds of islands in the Pacific, the ones with airfields that have runways facing the wind the right way are not that common, and this prosaic fact had a lot to do with what islands got chosen for conquest. Again, the experience is also described from the (frequently horrifying) Japanese end, using Japanese sources.
He argues that the experience of these operations (especially the extraordinary Japanese willingness to fight to the last man, with even the women and children jumping off cliffs in Saipan, rather than surrender) was a major (or THE major) cause of the gradual slide towards total war; with its expectation that America may have to kill every Japanese solider and most Japanese civilians before they accept defeat (if at all). He thinks this experience led directly to the complete indifference (and later, even active desire) towards high civilian casualties that reached its climax in the firebombings of Tokyo and the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This argument is not going to convince everyone and is likely overdone (pre-existing racism, technology, human nature; all played a role), though it is hard to deny that it must have played SOME role in the way the conduct of the war proceeded.
There is a persistent effort to justify every American action and to proudly and aggressively use rather "old fashioned" memes of American exceptionalism and greatness. This may turn some readers off (it will no doubt turn others on as well).
The book does not end with the Japanese surrender, like most such books do. It describes the mechanics of the surrender and its aftermath in a good deal of detail, which really adds to the value of the book. This section includes such interesting nuggets as the fact that the Japanese authorities themselves set up (or helped to set up) whorehouses to service the occupation troops, in the (correct) belief that this would reduce the chances of general rape and molestation of Japanese women. As you may expect by now, Hornfischer wants to present this whole exercise as yet another example of American greatness, but as you may also expect, not everyone will agree with the spin he puts on the story. Anyway, this is a section of the book that I found really useful, since most war histories tend to end with the emperor emerging from his divine status to inform his people that the war is over, with very little said about the aftermath.
Biggest omission: the battle of Leyte Gulf, passed over in 2 pages, literally. (though the same author has written a famous account of the heroics of the destroyers and destroyer escorts of Taffy 3, so I guess he wants you to buy that other book). MacArthur's entire effort takes place off stage and is rarely mentioned. The Chinese war is not mentioned (except in relation to strategic bombing). The allies play no role at all in events. Okinawa and Iwo Jima are passed over perfunctorily. And last but not the least, the attention to detail and depth of analysis is limited to just two (admittedly big) topics: the Marianas and the strategic bombing campaign. This is NOT a book that gives you the overall picture, with everything assessed as a whole, with facts and figures about the money spent, the numbers of everything used and wasted, the trade-offs involved and so on. The author has some organizing principle in his head, but it is not clear that this is the best way to do it.
He highlights many personalities (this is a big book), but the man who gets more credit and praise than anyone else in this book is Admiral Spruance. He is the biggest and brightest hero in this book. He surely deserves a lot of credit, but the praise can get a bit too fulsome (in a book which is also not shy about declaring every other American a great hero of some sort).
In short, worth reading, but there are gaps, and there are arguments you may want to have with the author. And yes, if you are "woke" beyond a certain point then you will not be able to stand the "America, of thee I sing" tone.
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