How to Win in Iraq and How to Lose

[J Wolfsberger]

Reading the article reminded me of an incident Alistair Horne recounts in A Savage War of Peace:

Two FLNA commanders are watching French Paras frisk an Algerian woman at a check point. One points out the expressions on the faces of the Algerian men waiting their turn. "My, God!" he says. "The stupid bastards are winning the war for us!"

The Paras, more specifically the authors of that policy, weren't the only "stupid bastards" winning the war for the FLNA.

(Apologies if I didn't get the story exactly right - the book's in temporary storage.)

John and tequila both point out omissions, but those don't seem to touch on the central issue. The point I took from the article is that, in Iraq today, as in Viet Nam and Algeria, we have our own "stupid bastards" intent on winning the war for AQ. And like Algeria, they aren't on the field of armed conflict, they are on the field of ideological conflict.

It makes absolutely no difference whether the drum beat of defeatism is driven by hatred of the US, greed for ratings, personnel ambitions or any of a host of base motives. The end result is the same: AQ and its allies realize that they "don't have to win, they only have to not lose" and wait us out.

[John T. Fishel]

John, Tom, and all,

Where have I heard this before? The classic lesson of insurgency is that the insurgent does not have to win, only not lose while the COIN side must actually win the war and the peace. My point in saying that Herman does not add much was that there is little that was new either substantively or in how it was presented. But, then, I guess that is true of most discussions of small wars. In the end, the argument is between those who Dave Kilcullen identified as focusing on killing insurgents and those who focus on winning the larger war for legitimacy. Without making these mutually exclusive positions, most of us come down on the side of winning the legitimacy war - as does Herman.

Cheers

John

[goesh]

John, Tom, and all,
.... In the end, the argument is between those who Dave Kilcullen identified as focusing on killing insurgents and those who focus on winning the larger war for legitimacy. Without making these mutually exclusive positions, most of us come down on the side of winning the legitimacy war - as does Herman.

Cheers

John

As this layman sees it, the quandry is this: there is no strong case made, no substance, that convinces large numbers of people on our side that representative government and even the rudiments of participatory democracy can take root in an Islamic culture that is in the gray zone of being neither industrialized or primitive. Further complicating this 'gray zone status' are the ethnic and religious complications we are all too painfully aware of. The premise for legitimacy COIN strives for is a hard sell to say the least. I'm all for giving it more time and resources, don't get me wrong, but time may well show that representative government has no basis for legitimacy, meaning and application in this type of environment. I wonder too if in striving for legitimacy, some energy and focus on external forces that are complicating the situation aren't being diverted to looking solely 'inward' ?