What is our Message

[horatius]

RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.

Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.

Seeking out and destroying the insurgent is not a prime ingredient in the counter insurgent's methods. This did not work in Vietnam, Algeria or any where else.
The mission is to secure the population. After they feel safe, the fish will have been separated from the water. It is when the bad guys seek us out because we are separating from the population that we can measure our success. Ambush patrols and the like in hopes of "generating and maintaing contact" is absurd and does not work.

How do you know AMZ's traffic was not a deception? How do you know it was in response to us and not local Iraqis pressuring him to move to another place? We are not winning in Iraq. Attacks are through the roof.

[horatius]

Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.

I didn't answer the question because it is moot to the point you want to make. Our ideology does not have to balance with the Iraqi population. Don't we want the Iraqis to choose their own destiny? Isn't that ideology universal and not limited to the United States of America?

[Maximus]

Great discussion. I'm with Horatius on this one. No one ever explained to me what I was trying to get the Iraqis to buy into. I tried to sell RTK's "free and independent Iraq", but exactly what does this mean? I'd argue it means very different things depending on where you're operating in the country. In Shia areas, "free and independent Iraq" was generally accepted; not the same when I was in Sunni areas. What about up north with the Kurds, who are perfectly content with "free and independent" Kurdistan? What's our message to the Sunni Arabs? Of late I think it has something to do with a message of inclusion: splitting oil revenues, allowing most former Ba'athist back into the government, etc. But for the past 3-4 years, most Sunnis felt that our "cause", if there was one, didn't benefit them in the least bit. Thus we helped create/spread the Sunni insurgency.

WRT Al Qaeda in Iraq having a message and the people buying it... I'd say this was definitely the case in Anbar for a long time. Most either bought Al Qaeda's message or were intimidated enough to let the fish hide amongst them UNTIL 2 things happened: 1) Al Qaeda in Iraq misjudged the family/tribal system and killed the wrong people; 2) we stopped playing "whack a mole" and instead began moving in with the people (starting w/ Al Qaim and now just about everywhere in Anbar) with a primary focus of controlling/securing the populace in a way that would make Galula, Trinquier, Krepinevich, Komer, Colby and others proud.

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

[jcustis]

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Exactly one of my frustrations too, even though I'm a couple of years removed from my second rotation over there. I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street. It is getting a bit more balanced, but when you stop and take a serious look at a few trends, it's ridiculous in some ways.

Take for example the so-called "morale patches" that can be found and discussed at certain tactical forums. One of the recent ones is Arabic lettering stitched in a variety of colors to represent the phrase/word "Infidel". There are contractors and servicemembers who think it's chic to wear the patch in full view, and I saw a post from one Soldier who stated that he only moved the patch when some LNs became agitated. It is beyond me that it even came to that, so yes, we are failing at the single narrative and certainly failing to educate the troops that we are doing something not just because the general/special orders say so, but because it is elemental to success in the fight.

I also think that there is a certain divide that arisen between the various ranks (although I can't point to the exact level of the schism) and echelons of troops. REMF and Fobbits are despised now in much the same way they were in Vietnam, and higher headquarters are equally villified when they generate new fragos. I think it began with the lack of armor for vehicles and Rumsfeld's "Go to war with what you have," comment.

I concur totally that the bottom line may be security and stability, but to many at the tip it might hold the same degree of clarity that 4GW holds for me (absolutely none). Let's add a twist to the line of thought...how much does it matter?

Does a single narrative ensure that the troops take their eyepro off when talking to an Iraqi, and that they hand out sweets rather than throw it to the ground for children to pounce on? Regardless of the single narrative that might try to exploit, is the average Iraqi buying what we are selling?

[Ender]

I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street.

I was frustrated with this very same subject when I was a Lance Corporal during my first deployment... I felt then and still feel now there are three basic types of Iraqis, the ones who would love us no matter what, those who would hate us no matter what and all of the rest, the majority, who were undecided. We have moved some of the middle to our camp and that is great but we have also pushed a great number away because we can't get our most fundamental messages out.

Every day the lower enlisted ranks are being asked some very hard questions about intentions and policy, by the Iraqis themselves, and it is assured that if we don't have a unified message at the top, the bottom will not all be singing the same tune. That can't be good for anyone when you are getting Message A in Baghdad but your brother-in-law is getting Plan B in Ramadi. In essence this is exactly what is happening.

[Maximus]

You hit the nail on the head, Ender. I couldn't agree more on your breakdown of the Iraqi people, regardless of AO. The same probably holds true in any COIN fight.

This whole discussion brings to mind a video from the NY Times that I watched a few months back: http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html...E/blocker.html (click on the "politics" icon 3rd from right). We talk about "strategic" Cpls, Sgts, Lts, etc., yet too often fail to provide these warriors with the training and information they need to truly be "strategic" Marines. In the video, the Sgt doesn't talk at all about a unifying message or "cause" to the Iraqi man. In fact, just the opposite: the Iraqi asks the Sgt about how he feels on most likely being sent home after the mid-term elections.

What message is this sending to the Iraqi people? Back to the initial question in this thread: what's our message?

[Maximus]

Culpeper,

No problem at all.

Concur on your basic theme during patrols. And also agree that a lot of this ultimately should involve some variation of combined action companies/platoons. I think we're moving rapidly in this direction now, although I know of a few units that are still operating without Iraqis.

The bigger issue for me though comes back to the Sgt in the NY Times video and for my Marines on our patrols. Aside from saying we're here to provide security (which I agree is essential), what else are we saying? What are our jabs and knock-out punches in the war of ideas that our junior Marines, by this I mean everyone at the company level and below, should try and exploit? In Vietnam, the pacification program eventually had an IO campaign that consisted of security, and also land, rice, local leadership, local elections, etc. Seems like our IO campaign in Iraq only goes as far as security.

I posted something on the Gazette forum (http://www.mca-marines.org/forum/showthread.php?t=34) that addresses this subject. From my perspective it seems like we're handing the IO component of the war to the enemy without putting up much of a fight. I know we can do better.

[marct]

Every day the lower enlisted ranks are being asked some very hard questions about intentions and policy, by the Iraqis themselves, and it is assured that if we don't have a unified message at the top, the bottom will not all be singing the same tune. That can't be good for anyone when you are getting Message A in Baghdad but your brother-in-law is getting Plan B in Ramadi. In essence this is exactly what is happening.

And the situation is exacerbated by the global media as well, so it's not only what is said in Baghdad and Ramadi, but also New York, Washington and London. I do have to agree with Horatius' original point that there isn't a coherent message; at least one that isn't 99% rhetoric . I think we saw a slightly different situation in Afghanistan, although the behind the scenes maneuverings to stop the restoration of the monarchy in the 2003 Loya Jurga made that questionable. The "message" needs to be spelled out in a series of "We are here to do X" and "We will know that X is done when Y happens".

On a related note, is anyone collating the questions that are asked about intentions and policies? There was a tactic worked out in the late 1970's for elections where these questions would be funneled to a local office and, if they matched prepared policy statements, copies of those statements would be hand delivered the next day. If there wasn't such a statement, the person who received the question would still go back the next day and say something like "We take your question seriously and it has been sent off to our policy committee to try and get an answer for you". Even when there was no policy and no one wanted to make one, within the week the person would be contacted again and told that no such policy can be developed until X, Y or Z happens. It strikes me that his type of tactic would work equally well in raq.

Marc

[Ender]

And the situation is exacerbated by the global media as well, so it's not only what is said in Baghdad and Ramadi, but also New York, Washington and London.

Amen, I couldn't agree more and feel that this factor unnecessarily compounds an already difficult situation. The rub is that there is very little that can be done by the squad leader in relation to New York, Washington and or London's spin campaign, but he has absolute control over the product he is delivering in Karmah, Fallujah and Baghdad.

Maximus posted two links on here that help make my point. In the NY Times link http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html...E/blocker.html reporter C.J. Chivers highlights a reality in which the squad he was with had little or no understanding of the macro level, the big picture or even of their own chain of command. I contend that the Lcpls, Cpls and Sgts in his squad could never be trained to talk intelligently about geo politics or a potential shift in our foreign policy without sounding like and coming off as complete fakes and frauds. You could give them all the lines and provide all of the answers but there will always be a part of him or her that does not see it as relevant to them, so they will never be as effective as if their heart were in what they were asked to talk about while on patrol.

So what do we do when a very LARGE percentage of our lower enlisted ranks (often some of the loudest and most frequent mouthpieces) are ambivalent about WHY we are doing what we are doing? I think part of the problem can be and is currently being solved by training, (cultural awareness and current events school circles that require participation etc... ) but that the rest of the enlisted level's problems will be solved by shifting the product we are sending our teams and squads out with.

We are looking for big solutions and I think the discussion here is some of the very best thinking I have heard about the subject but there are steps that can be taken RIGHT NOW to change our message. While few Sgts know the line of succession for our presidency or can recite the Preamble they do have someone or something back home that they love or are proud of. Forget "THE MESSAGE", just get them out there talking about the things they know and love here at home. Safety, security, education, opportunity and economic stability are universal concerns that matter almost everywhere and they can be expressed more clearly and in more human terms than "policy and procedure." We could lay down some baseline rules about what not to talk about (I can not speak for the Army, but the LAST thing we need is a bunch of Marines on open mic in Iraq ) such as sex, drugs and rock and roll or their preference for the Israeli's, and the rest I think could be safely considered fair game. Many Marines, Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen do not even attempt to converse with the Iraqis beyond where they can find the nearest insurgent. This is due in large part to the belief that we have nothing in common with them. "They don't even use toilet paper" was what I heard from my guys at the beginning of their first deployment. (Their tune changed) Get your troops out there and just get them talking, not just about missions and policies but as service members who are also human(e) and you MIGHT be surprised to see attacks drop in your area. Once we figured out how to approach a home, deal with a homeowner etc... and became more culturally aware we noticed that our attacks dropped and our usable intel rose. This I believe has a great deal to do with the fact that we were not, out of ignorance or ambivalence, creating new enemies.

The second link http://www.mca-marines.org/forum/showthread.php?t=34 is where its at. The key to Iraq's future is in its children. Win them and you win the parents easier than you would without the kids. Win them and their future is assured. I made a point (and I was not the only one) to befriend (I mean genuinely BEFRIEND) the young boys and girls over there and I know we made a difference. Let me tell you if you have never seen a 210lb former linebacker, (my ATL) get schooled by a six year old in soccer, then you haven't lived!

[Culpeper]

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Please don't tell me you are assuming that the most important elements of military leadership that you pointed your finger at above are inept of situation awareness both strategic and tactical? Oh, no. You didn't write that by mistake. A vast chunk of the Small Wars Council are currently holding these positions or have held them in the past.

Also, we have always shown bravado. The balance is a two way street. They saw off heads. We paint crap on walls. Why shouldn't the average Iraqi understand this as well. Or are they too inept or sensitive to understand?

[Maximus]

Culpeper,

Not sure what you're trying to say.

My simple point is this: My Marines and I conducted some 500 patrols in Iraq. No one ever explained to me exactly what message we were trying to transmit. In fact, my mission statements were normally something to the effect of: "you have to conduct 4 patrols tomorrow." Rarely was I given specifics on where, why, who I was trying to influence, what I was supposed to say ("beyond don't promise anything"), etc. The best I got was normally just to show a "presence."

Reflecting on my experiences now, I think every time I went on patrol, I should have been trying to sell a "cause" whether this being strictly that of the coalition or that combined with the Iraqi government, depending on the timeframe. Unfortunately, all too often patrols consisted of me asking Iraqis what they needed, their response being clean water, electricity, and security, my writing it in a book, continuing on the patrol, and "higher" telling me to tell the Iraqis to be patient.

I talk to Capts, Lts, Sgts, etc. frequently that are about to leave on deployment or just returning. It's rare that they can explain tribal breakdown, who their enemy really is, and any decent history of their specific AO. This isn't their fault. The info often isn't provided. As a result, most Marines/Soldiers conducting patrols don't know the "cause" they should be promoting nor do they know enough about the history of their AO so that they can say things that the people might rally behind. Simply saying I bring you freedom and democracy just doesn't cut it.

You seem like you might have a good handle on the subject. If you were patrolling the streets in the Shia south in 2 hours and stopped to talk to an Iraqi, what "cause" would you try to promote? If in Sadr City, how would you try and explain that your patrol offers more security than the Mahdi Army? What about if you were in Anbar or in Tikrit? What if you were in Irbil? When you're interacting with the Iraqis how would you make the patrol more than simply a "presence" patrol? What "cause" would you push so that they eventually would tell you who the insurgents or terrorists are?

[Culpeper]

There is this "Maximus Biguss Dickus" that I confused you with. I thought he just shortened his screen name and was carrying on as usual. I didn't bother to see you were new to SWC and in fact a part of the leadership you described. Welcome aboard.

You seem like you might have a good handle on the subject. If you were patrolling the streets in the Shia south in 2 hours and stopped to talk to an Iraqi, what "cause" would you try to promote? If in Sadr City, how would you try and explain that your patrol offers more security than the Mahdi Army? What about if you were in Anbar or in Tikrit? What if you were in Irbil? When you're interacting with the Iraqis how would you make the patrol more than simply a "presence" patrol? What "cause" would you push so that they eventually would tell you who the insurgents or terrorists are?

By improvising and barring any outright insubordination of orders:

#1. Security

#2 By example. It won't happen in one patrol.

#3 Same thing in Anbar, Tikrit, or Irbil.

#4 This would go, as you described beyond a presence patrol, and would have to employ improvised classic Combined Action Company techniques, which I won't go into detail since you are a Marine and already know this subject.

[Jedburgh]

...My simple point is this: My Marines and I conducted some 500 patrols in Iraq. No one ever explained to me exactly what message we were trying to transmit. In fact, my mission statements were normally something to the effect of: "you have to conduct 4 patrols tomorrow." Rarely was I given specifics on where, why, who I was trying to influence, what I was supposed to say ("beyond don't promise anything"), etc. The best I got was normally just to show a "presence."...

Presence Patrols aren’t so much delivering a serious ideological “message”, as they are primarily intended as a low-level tactical show of force with our physical presence a psychological reinforcement of existing security. Of course, if the security situation is in the crapper, and the members of the patrol are in full turtle gear and continually on armed alert while palavering with the locals, the only message being reinforced is the total lack of security.

On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words.

Anyway, getting to my point sideways, a critical and truly valuable aspect of such patrols is collection - both passive and active. If the patrols are not being pre-briefed and debriefed every time they go out, something ain’t right. Max's summary of his mission brief indicates piss-poor leadership (Not on your part Maximus, on the part of those giving you your orders).

In an ideal world, such collection would be linked to the full spectrum of military-interagency cooperation, which, if effectively implemented, would do far more good than trying to have a bunch of Joes spread an ideological “message”.

Leveraging collection to roll up and kill bad guys is something everyone understands - or at least is cognizant of the possibility. Using patrol reporting to target infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid, veterinary assistance, ol’fashioned MEDCAPs, etc. - even relatively minor (but more personal) assistance like returning with needed repair parts, school supplies, or bringing along a specifically requested tech/specialist the next time provides clear evidence that the troops were listening when the indig were talking – if the follow-up is timely. Listening – and responding – when they need something is the best way to set it up so that you will be able to listen to info needed to roll up and kill bad guys. But in order to listen to needs, you gotta get there. We're the big guys, we control the conversation - ignore the political and ideological (unless you have an IR that points that way) and go direct to their problems.

In sum, Joe shouldn’t be worrying about what “message” to send. He should have a crystal clear mission each time he goes out, covering both aspects: Be fully briefed on what he’s supposed to be looking for and reporting back on, as per indicators pointing to bad guys. And be fully briefed on what non-kinetic capabilities can be brought to bear so he understands what to look for to help put a boot in USAID, NGOs and the other sunshine-and-butterflies folks to render needed assistance. As regards “relatively minor” assistance, our guys have shown themselves on innumerable occasions to be empathetic to the plight of ordinary Iraqis and have lent of their own belongings and resources to help them out. This needs to be more formalized, so it can be properly exploited.

The hard part, as always, is not with Joe – but with the leadership and getting all the players to cooperate, and to do so in a seamless and timely fashion. But when it works, it works. Really.

[RTK]

A quick aside on presence patrols: If you assign a task and purpose, they're more than just "providing presence." They're gaining intelligence, providing reconnaissance, or adding to security operations. Presence patrol, as I've said before, translates in my mind to "trolling for RPG."


Let's look at this on the larger scale and widdle it down.

If you look in terms of Lines of Operations (LOOs), which should all inter-relate;

and ...

If you take the big 5 LOOs...
a. Combat Operations
b. Information Operations
c. Civil-military Operations
d. ISF Operations
e. Economic Development

A smart unit is going to have a plan of action for each of the LOOs and how they are going to improve in their specific AO. Now understanding what I do tactically in the "Combat Operations" LOO is going to have some potential blowback in the "Civil-Military" realm, potentially all the way up to the operational and possible even the strategic level, then it so follows that if I don't go into the fight taking all 5 of the LOOs into consideration and factor in the second and third order effects of each then I'm probably in for a rather unproductive year. Let's take a quick look at a skeleton hypothetical endstate for each for a BN's year tour (long range goals from the day after RIP/TOA):

a. Combat Operations: Cut IEDs in half on specific lines of communication in my AO; Cut mortar attacks by 1/3; Capture or kill 10 high value targets (HVTs) on my unit's "black list;" Incorporate IA/IP into all operations, making all operations combined coalition force patrols.

Summary: I have to make my goals attainable and quantifiable. Quantitative and tangible goals are easier to assess, so it's easier to mark progress.

b. Information Operations: Issue 2 good products (leaflets, posters) a month denouncing attacks on civilians; reinforcement of civil-military projects through education of what improvements are made; televised city council meetings once a month; televised sheik/tribal leader meetings once a quarter; An "Iraq's Most Wanted" type show, much like 1/25IN maintained in Mosul; Unit talking points each month talking about where the AO has been and where it's going; IA/IP recruiting posters; Traffic Control Point (TCP) awareness handouts (what do I do if I come upon a CF checkpoint, what is expected of me, etc); Tiplines

Summary: The big one here, obviously, is the bold point. I know for a fact that they're out there. I remember each month getting the Regimental talking points in a FRAGO. They were based upon whatever MNF-I Effects was putting out that month. It's like Ragu; It's in there. Sometimes we need to put our nuggets together and put it into something usable at our level.

c. Civil-Military Operations: School improvements in 80% of AO's gradeschools (chalkboards, new books, writing utencils, etc); 18 hours electricity a day; Trash removal services twice a week; Unemployment cut by 25%; No breaks in potable water service (whether bottled or piped); medical supply enhancement at rural clinics; new x-ray machine for local hospital; road/bridge improvements

Summary: Some fairly ambitious endstates here. Improving quality of life is the overarching goal. In some cases, restoring things to "the way things used to be" is success and will be seen as success by the locals. Improving anything in the SWEAT-MS realms will go a long way. It's like we talked about with Dr. Kilcullen's 28 Articles - proliferation of small projects is beautiful, quantifiable, and cheap. But it's still improvement nontheless.

d. ISF Operations: Turn over no less than 50% of the AO to ISF at the end of the year; fully equip and man the IA BDE my unit partners with; fully man and equip the IPs in the towns I work; All IPs are graduates of IP Academy; IP vehicles have ballistic glass; All American patrols are combined with IA/IP, though IA/IPs will patrol independently with an American QRF; Integreate MiTT and IA leadership into MDMP; Conduct combined targeting and effects meetings with IA leadership

Summary: The goal here has to be getting the IA/IPs into the independent operating mode - otherwise, what's the point? If when you enter your AO your unit conducts 25% of your patrols with IA, by the end of the year, you should be operating without the IA or IPs 0%. Certain covert exceptions are made - chances are you're not in that kind of a unit. Equipping is a huge part of this LOO. How can they fight if they have nothing to fight with or protect themselves with? It's your job to figure out how to breakdown the bureaucracy and get them what they need.

e. Economic Development: Reopening of town's glass plant which employed 30% of the town before the war; Cut unemployment by 25% through project employment (trash removal, construction, etc); force protection measures around market areas;

Summary: A good area to put the resident economist in a staff position looking for a way to contribute. For all intents and purposes, we need to find a way to pour money back into the community to jumpstart economic development. Buy some chi, have a goat for dinner, haggle for a new rug.


What does all this mean? Success must be exploited and the successful story should be told. Telling the story of success must be an intricate part of your IO campaign. Let the people see the good being done and then leave it up to them to decide which direction they're going to support. The Overarching aspect of all of this is your ability to provide security to the people. The quicker you are at determining the enemy course of action, the better you will be in keeping him from even getting to the start point (again, it goes back to Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, which works fundamentally in COIN like it does in the tank on tank battle - it's just a different accplication).

[Bill Moore]

Until higher puts out a pub that explains where in the Koran we on the ground can look to bridge these questions, it is not possible to do IO, PsyOps or control the population - the goal of COIN. Therefore, until we actually have an idea, something to sell, we are incapable of winning.

I think you are correct, and many of our citizens and soldiers still think everyone wants to be like us. Some of our folks just can't believe that some folks in the world find our system and our values replusive (not just Al Qaeda). If a democracy in Iraq is not achievable (and I'm not aware of democracy ever being forced on anyone before successfully, except perhaps Japan), then what is it we want to achieve? What are our national interests in Iraq? We have strategic oil interests, we want to deny safe haven to terrorists, we desire to avoid a humanitarian disaster, we want regional stability (suppports the previous three objectives), etc.

During the cold war we took a much more Machivillian approach to achieving our strategic objectives, even if that included putting our bastard in office (our supporting the one already there, like Marcos in the Philippines). In contrast, in Iraq we pursued our interests by attempting to implement a political revolution (not evolution). Outsiders can best generate revolutions by spreading ideas, not trying to impose them with the bayonet. While there are elements in Iraqi society that obviously buy into this dream, we are now at the point where we have done what we can, and now a local leader (a Ghandi like figure capable of mobilizing all Iraqis under an Iraqi identity) must surface, and carry the idea to completion.

Al Qaeda, like us, also wants to impose revolutionary change on Iraq, but their advantage is their political revolution is not totally alien to the Arab culture. Furthermore, when you are living in a terrible state of chaos, then any feasible option that gets you out of it will start looking appealing. Terrorism works for this very reason when it is executed within a band of excellence, but there is a limit, and if it is used in excess it backfires, and that is what we're seeing in parts of Iraq, especially in Al Anbar province now. The Sunni's in Anbar were Al Qaeda's closest allies in Iraq, but they are now turning against them because the AQ uses terrorism in excess and as predicted by AQ's original leadership, AQ would loose if this revolution practiced the excesses of the past. In the end we won't defeat AQ, they'll defeat themeselves.

So we have two competing revolutionary ideas being imposed on the Iraqi people by two different outsiders, and neither are exceptionally attractive or successful at this point. This is the ideal point for an Iraqi leader to stand up with an Iraqi solution and offer the Iraqi people a way out.

I don't think AQ will win if we pull out or stay. I actually think AQ could be defeated quicker if we pull out, because certain rules of warfare will be disregarded. However I think the potential blood bath from civil war like conflict if we pull out will be more than we want to risk. In the end we are still a decent people and ultimately we still want the best for the Iraqi people. Of course that is what makes this war so damn frustrating.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.

I was quoting Galula.

[RTK]

RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.

"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.

[goesh]

"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.

It makes sense to me to tell the Iraqi people just that - 'we are here to try prevent you from getting blown up because you are a Shi'ite or Sunni or because you neighbor is. The Quarn says innocent people are not supposed to be murdered' . I suppose it would help if that could be said in Arabic but then it's easy for me to sit here safe and sound, fat and sassy and offer advice.