Quote Originally Posted by Maximus
...My simple point is this: My Marines and I conducted some 500 patrols in Iraq. No one ever explained to me exactly what message we were trying to transmit. In fact, my mission statements were normally something to the effect of: "you have to conduct 4 patrols tomorrow." Rarely was I given specifics on where, why, who I was trying to influence, what I was supposed to say ("beyond don't promise anything"), etc. The best I got was normally just to show a "presence."...
Presence Patrols aren’t so much delivering a serious ideological “message”, as they are primarily intended as a low-level tactical show of force with our physical presence a psychological reinforcement of existing security. Of course, if the security situation is in the crapper, and the members of the patrol are in full turtle gear and continually on armed alert while palavering with the locals, the only message being reinforced is the total lack of security.

On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words.

Anyway, getting to my point sideways, a critical and truly valuable aspect of such patrols is collection - both passive and active. If the patrols are not being pre-briefed and debriefed every time they go out, something ain’t right. Max's summary of his mission brief indicates piss-poor leadership (Not on your part Maximus, on the part of those giving you your orders).

In an ideal world, such collection would be linked to the full spectrum of military-interagency cooperation, which, if effectively implemented, would do far more good than trying to have a bunch of Joes spread an ideological “message”.

Leveraging collection to roll up and kill bad guys is something everyone understands - or at least is cognizant of the possibility. Using patrol reporting to target infrastructure projects, humanitarian aid, veterinary assistance, ol’fashioned MEDCAPs, etc. - even relatively minor (but more personal) assistance like returning with needed repair parts, school supplies, or bringing along a specifically requested tech/specialist the next time provides clear evidence that the troops were listening when the indig were talking – if the follow-up is timely. Listening – and responding – when they need something is the best way to set it up so that you will be able to listen to info needed to roll up and kill bad guys. But in order to listen to needs, you gotta get there. We're the big guys, we control the conversation - ignore the political and ideological (unless you have an IR that points that way) and go direct to their problems.

In sum, Joe shouldn’t be worrying about what “message” to send. He should have a crystal clear mission each time he goes out, covering both aspects: Be fully briefed on what he’s supposed to be looking for and reporting back on, as per indicators pointing to bad guys. And be fully briefed on what non-kinetic capabilities can be brought to bear so he understands what to look for to help put a boot in USAID, NGOs and the other sunshine-and-butterflies folks to render needed assistance. As regards “relatively minor” assistance, our guys have shown themselves on innumerable occasions to be empathetic to the plight of ordinary Iraqis and have lent of their own belongings and resources to help them out. This needs to be more formalized, so it can be properly exploited.

The hard part, as always, is not with Joe – but with the leadership and getting all the players to cooperate, and to do so in a seamless and timely fashion. But when it works, it works. Really.