What is our Message

[horatius]

We talk about I/O, PsyOps, cultural awareness, etc. but what is our message? In Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no specific guidance as to why we are in Iraq. What EXACTLY are our squad leaders supposed to tell locals?
1. We are here to liberate you - what does the USG define as liberty? A situation in which everything is legal except for those actions that impinge upon another's life, liberty or property is the basis for English Common Law vis a vis the philosophy of John Stuart Mill but it assumes an individual based society. Iraq and Afghanistan are family based societies. How do we bridge this gap?

2. We want rights!! Rights are limitations the nation places upon the state - not priviledges the states gives to the people. Iraqis want more priviledges. Until they internalize that it is the nation that is soverign, not the state, they can not have any rights.

3. Equality. What kind? There is equality of outcome which is the basis of communism - small c. Equality of opportunity works in America and is a very protestant idea but is it acceptable to Muslims or Arabs?

4. Capitalism. This incredible system is based on the self serving individual. As long as the aforementioned actor wants to maximize his utility, he will move himself to a position in which he has a sustainable, comparative advantage and be able to amass as much wealth as possible. Collectively, the actions of self serving people benefit all as long as wealth maximization is the collective goal. Again, how can this work in a family based society?

5. Democracy. The buzz word. The magic cause. Government is the organization in society with a monopoly on force. Representative democracy is but a means for the nation to select those who decide on how force in wielded in a society. A person's sole act of power in a democracy is in voting. The only difference between a democracy and a monarchy is a vote. After that, one is still subject to the will of the government. Why is that so good? Why would this work in other places?

6. The problem is Arabs and Pashtuns do not know how they can be Arabs, Muslims and embrace all of the above. WHAT IS OUR GUIDANCE ON HOW TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS?????

Until higher puts out a pub that explains where in the Koran we on the ground can look to bridge these questions, it is not possible to do IO, PsyOps or control the population - the goal of COIN. Therefore, until we actually have an idea, something to sell, we are incapable of winning.

Remember, if you are out looking for bad guys, you are losing. The goal is to control the population and the population needs a message. They need an idealology and Al Qadea has one and is pushing it hard.

Last point - the way in which we answer these questions changes neighborhood by neighborhood because each Imam and Sheik see the world a little bit differently. Until we have an intelligence picture that frames our message, we are not going to be able to tailor or actions effectively.

[RTK]

The bottom line is that we're there to provide safety and security to 26 million people who deserve it as much as anyone on earth. Each day we spend working on the sewage, water, schools, electrical infrastructures, trash removal, medical coverage, and overall security is a day closer to a free and independent Iraq.

[Culpeper]

Remember, if you are out looking for bad guys, you are losing. The goal is to control the population and the population needs a message. They need an idealology and Al Qadea has one and is pushing it hard.

That is incorrect.

"The problem is to start organizing the participation of the population in the struggle. The way to do this is by placing local leaders in positions of responsibility and power."

One cannot accomplish this without looking for Al Queda in Iraq as well as delivering a "message" to the population. Seeking out and destroying Al Queda in Iraq does not equal losing. Neither does the fact that Al Queda in Iraq has an ideology. Al Queda has always had a message but they have never been winning. And they are beyond the point of just not losing simply because Iraq has a governing body that controls the propaganda. Intercepted messages from al-Zarqawi himself clearly show that he was seriously considering taking Al Queda's struggle somewhere else other than Iraq. Why? Because "they" were losing.

"The counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent."

Seeking out and destroying the insurgent is a prime ingredient of the counterinsurgent's recipe. Also, hasn't it occurred to you that Al Queda in Iraq is unable to work on projects in basic fields such as, "economic, social, cultural, and medical fields, where the results are not entirely dependent on the active cooperation from the population"? So, I don't see where Al Queda in Iraq's "message" is providing them with any comfort in their own struggle against the counterinsurgency. By-the-way, what is Al Queda's message in Iraq?

[horatius]

RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.

Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.

Seeking out and destroying the insurgent is not a prime ingredient in the counter insurgent's methods. This did not work in Vietnam, Algeria or any where else.
The mission is to secure the population. After they feel safe, the fish will have been separated from the water. It is when the bad guys seek us out because we are separating from the population that we can measure our success. Ambush patrols and the like in hopes of "generating and maintaing contact" is absurd and does not work.

How do you know AMZ's traffic was not a deception? How do you know it was in response to us and not local Iraqis pressuring him to move to another place? We are not winning in Iraq. Attacks are through the roof.

[horatius]

Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.

[Culpeper]

Culpeper -
You never mentioned how we answer the Iraqi's dilemma of how to balance his ethnic and religious dogma with our ideology.

I didn't answer the question because it is moot to the point you want to make. Our ideology does not have to balance with the Iraqi population. Don't we want the Iraqis to choose their own destiny? Isn't that ideology universal and not limited to the United States of America?

[Maximus]

Great discussion. I'm with Horatius on this one. No one ever explained to me what I was trying to get the Iraqis to buy into. I tried to sell RTK's "free and independent Iraq", but exactly what does this mean? I'd argue it means very different things depending on where you're operating in the country. In Shia areas, "free and independent Iraq" was generally accepted; not the same when I was in Sunni areas. What about up north with the Kurds, who are perfectly content with "free and independent" Kurdistan? What's our message to the Sunni Arabs? Of late I think it has something to do with a message of inclusion: splitting oil revenues, allowing most former Ba'athist back into the government, etc. But for the past 3-4 years, most Sunnis felt that our "cause", if there was one, didn't benefit them in the least bit. Thus we helped create/spread the Sunni insurgency.

WRT Al Qaeda in Iraq having a message and the people buying it... I'd say this was definitely the case in Anbar for a long time. Most either bought Al Qaeda's message or were intimidated enough to let the fish hide amongst them UNTIL 2 things happened: 1) Al Qaeda in Iraq misjudged the family/tribal system and killed the wrong people; 2) we stopped playing "whack a mole" and instead began moving in with the people (starting w/ Al Qaim and now just about everywhere in Anbar) with a primary focus of controlling/securing the populace in a way that would make Galula, Trinquier, Krepinevich, Komer, Colby and others proud.

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

[jcustis]

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Exactly one of my frustrations too, even though I'm a couple of years removed from my second rotation over there. I think that when you look at all the servicemember generated media out there (blogs, message board posts, etc.) you are still going to find a lot of folks who were at the tip of the spear yet still don't have a basic level of respect for the average Iraqi on the street. It is getting a bit more balanced, but when you stop and take a serious look at a few trends, it's ridiculous in some ways.

Take for example the so-called "morale patches" that can be found and discussed at certain tactical forums. One of the recent ones is Arabic lettering stitched in a variety of colors to represent the phrase/word "Infidel". There are contractors and servicemembers who think it's chic to wear the patch in full view, and I saw a post from one Soldier who stated that he only moved the patch when some LNs became agitated. It is beyond me that it even came to that, so yes, we are failing at the single narrative and certainly failing to educate the troops that we are doing something not just because the general/special orders say so, but because it is elemental to success in the fight.

I also think that there is a certain divide that arisen between the various ranks (although I can't point to the exact level of the schism) and echelons of troops. REMF and Fobbits are despised now in much the same way they were in Vietnam, and higher headquarters are equally villified when they generate new fragos. I think it began with the lack of armor for vehicles and Rumsfeld's "Go to war with what you have," comment.

I concur totally that the bottom line may be security and stability, but to many at the tip it might hold the same degree of clarity that 4GW holds for me (absolutely none). Let's add a twist to the line of thought...how much does it matter?

Does a single narrative ensure that the troops take their eyepro off when talking to an Iraqi, and that they hand out sweets rather than throw it to the ground for children to pounce on? Regardless of the single narrative that might try to exploit, is the average Iraqi buying what we are selling?

[Culpeper]

Big picture for me on the subject though--I know your average squad leader or platoon commander patrolling the streets still doesn't know exactly what we're trying to "sell" as our cause or narrative, be it in Iraq, America or globally. Thus we're violating Kilcullen's article #21: Exploit a single narrative. This isn't a good thing when our junior Marines/Soldiers are the ones with the most face time with Iraqis.

Please don't tell me you are assuming that the most important elements of military leadership that you pointed your finger at above are inept of situation awareness both strategic and tactical? Oh, no. You didn't write that by mistake. A vast chunk of the Small Wars Council are currently holding these positions or have held them in the past.

Also, we have always shown bravado. The balance is a two way street. They saw off heads. We paint crap on walls. Why shouldn't the average Iraqi understand this as well. Or are they too inept or sensitive to understand?

[Culpeper]

Culpeper - Trinquier, Gulula, and Krepenivich all disagree with you. The direct approach to destroying the insurgent does not work.

I was quoting Galula.

[RTK]

RTK - what does a free and independent Iraq mean? Why do they deserve anything? What does freedom mean? We use these words without a clear definition and thus we do not have a message.

"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.

[goesh]

"What applies in one province isn't necessarily the case in another."

Security is security, regardless of what context or where you're talking about. In many cases, establishing some sort of law and order is all that's missing from the 'free and independent' realm.

Why do they deserve it? Because in a lot of different ways we robbed them of it 4 years ago. It's unethical to leave them the steaming s**t sandwich to take a huge bite from now.

Freedom - In layman's terms, it to have the ability to do what you want to do without the risk of getting beheaded because you're of a specific ethnic set.

It makes sense to me to tell the Iraqi people just that - 'we are here to try prevent you from getting blown up because you are a Shi'ite or Sunni or because you neighbor is. The Quarn says innocent people are not supposed to be murdered' . I suppose it would help if that could be said in Arabic but then it's easy for me to sit here safe and sound, fat and sassy and offer advice.