What is our Message

[horatius]

Jedburgh wrote, "On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words."

This is absolutely, completely, totally wrong. This is an old mindset that has been obsolete for 40 years and if we continue with it, we are going to lose.

Every patrol is selling something. First they are selling an idea. An idea for which people will risk their lives by giving us intelligence on the enemy. An idea that is REINFORCED BY ACTIONS - the MEDCAPs, infrastructure projects, etc. that you mentioned.

Before those actions can take place, before a patrol sends out a "Psychological Presence" it needs to understand why we are doing a MEDCAP and what psychological message we are sending.

There are Islamic NGOs that do MEDCAPS, build schools, hand out books. However, their message is based in Salafist, Wahhabi Islam and encourages its people to kill all non Muslims.

The reason we need an official, unified message is exactly for this reason. What does freedom mean? Someone wrote we are here so Sunni do not kill Shiia. Does this mean our intervention in Iraq is based on intra-Iraq religious tolerance. How do you know those people are interested in religious tolerance? They need to pick up what we put down.

Freedom. Freedom to do what? Freedom from what?

In counter insurgency, the most important thing a patrol does is sell an idea. America is an idea. Marines jump on hand grenades for an idea, a feeling, a belief. So do jihadists. Every action we take must be in support of selling our ideology. It is from this ideology that we can tailor the means by which we sell it -sometimes with a gun, other times with a band aid on a block by block, neighborhood by neighborhood battle.

[Jedburgh]

Well, Horatius, you managed to completely misunderstand - or ignore - my entire post. What I stressed was exactly developing that "idea" in the head of the indig - going beyond mere security and showing that we care about their well-being and their future.

But for a patrol to go out and attempt to engage in discussion and debate over ideology with the indig is simply stupid. Even "talking points" put out by higher to be pushed when so engaged can be dangerous (rhetorically speaking) and turned on Joe. A wise old soldier once told me never short-change a whore or argue with an Arab. However, there are elements that will engage the indig in this manner - but it is not appropriate for the patrol level.

But I'll accept your term of "selling" as in the selling of such ideas by our actions. If you re-read my post you'll see that is what I was trying to put across. As well as the complex coordination that such perception management by deed requires, in order to be effectively implemented and leveraged from the patrol level.

But I do strongly disagree with you on this point: we should not be "selling" our ideology. Effective use of perception management in this environment is more pointed towards getting the sectarian / ethnic/ tribal/ clan / political factions to understand that they need to work together peacefully in a unitarian state. This damn sure is a difficult, complex and often frustrating task - more so now than a year ago. And we are not necessarily pushing them toward any pre-designated US or even western template - the indig need to figure it out, and we're just helping them along. You can not force feed someone your ideology.

[horatius]

Jedburgh,
It is on this point of squad leaders talking ideology that we disagree. Most ideology is fed - not forced as in at the tip of a gun - but fed. That is why Arabs are the way they are we are the way we are.

Foreigners do not have to buy our ideology wholesale. If we explain it - in terms that are meaningful to them (which is the other side of my first post) - they will be more receptive to all of our Actions.

We do not have to argue with Arabs. We must discuss, we must engage about God, family, individualism. If squad leaders can not tell them that they are the descendants of Ishamel and we are the descendents of Issac so we are therefore brothers, that squad leader is untrained.

Although Genesis 16 says that God cursed Ishmael and he will hate everyone and everyone will hate him is a point that we do not have to bring up.

If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

Your old soldier friend probably didn't want to get into these ideas because he was, well, old. He was of the obsolete mindset that says soldiers kill people and break things. We are here to use kinetic force or "win hearts and minds" if you are a SOF type.

It is impossible to win hearts and minds unless you can look a man in the eyes and explain to him how the two of you are in the same boat and on the same journey with God, family and nation.

On the modern battlefield - this is the one after Korea - the most important fight is the war of ideas. Killing people, breaking things, healing folks and building stuff fall under the umbrella of working toward a unified ideological goal. As with previous generations of warfare, things are becoming more decentralized and it is now on the shoulders of our smallest tactical unit - the squad - to engage people at EVERY LEVEL simulateously.

Your proposed system of just focus on ACTIONS - the one that we have been at for 45 years - HOW IS IT WORKING???

[jcustis]

If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

That's one of the problems. I don't think many men on the street really see a dilemma at all. The youth may be trying to balance things, but the family man isn't, in my opinion.

I agree with you generally on the your economic point, but I again disagree that we don't even have an individual based economy. Look at how many extended families live under one roof here in the states, or how many children stay at home until they are 35, the way in which fathers pay for weddings, we go into debt to get kids into college, etc. Our economy is most definitely a family one, even if children don't remain under one roof for the same length of time that they are tied to the purse strings.

My point goes back to my longstanding sentiment that an Iraqi may not care what we say. Just look at the most gang-infested areas of major cities. At some point, folk just don't give a damn what message you put out. You still have to work the issue, but don't expect the silver bullet.

[Cori]

I'm new here, so let me first by way of introduction explain that I'm an academic whose research focuses on press coverage of the GWOT (and specifically terrorist and insurgent attempts to manipulate the coverage.) I think the idea that even (perhaps especially) small units should carry cameras at all times is a terrific one -- I've suggested it myself, although to Civil Affairs folks, not combat units. Reading this thread, and now that the MNF-I YouTube channel is up, it seems to me everyone ought to be running around with cameras, and the idea that the military ought to be providing their own footage, straight to the Internet, of all these "good news stories" is so good I'm planning to, you know, steal it. (Footnoted, of course.)

That said, I am very, very disturbed by the attitudes expressed here regarding accepting embedded reporters. God knows, I've been plenty critical of the coverage, early and often. But folks have got to understand that, as much excitement as there is about the web, the numbers tell the tale: it is still the case that the vast majority of Americans get their news from the mainstream media. As an example, close to thirty million people still watch the network's nightly news shows, and year after year a large number of the top sites on the Internet are actually associated with traditional media outlets -- in other words, same content, different platform, such as Cnn.com, nytimes.com and so forth. You can't just throw up your hands and refuse to deal with them, because, particularly this far out from the draft when so many Americans have no other way to find out about the war other than what they get from the press, (because they may simply not know someone in uniform) the media are the military's conduit to the American people, period, dot.

Now, it seems to me your only option is to try and forge a relationship with the press given that, and the simple fact is that the quality of embedded reporting, over and over, is an order of magnitude better than that which comes from reporters who aren't embedded. Would you rather have stories which come complete with context, or stories that lack context?

With all due respect, relations with the press need to be considered "mission critical," and the military has to work those relationships, encourage them, make sure reporters understand what it is that's going on while they're with units, why it's important, so on and so forth.

This doesn't mean a unit has to accept every single request for an embed from every single reporter -- but to blanket reject the very notion of embeds, to simply reject the press out of hand -- again, with all due respect, that's a very, very risky approach.

[Merv Benson]

Welcome Cari,

There is no doubt that reporting has been critical to the US's ability to make war. In Vietnam for example it was critical in undermining the war effort and led to disastrous consequences for the Vietnamese. Mark Moyar's brilliant new book, Triumph Forsaken describes how reporters directly contributed to the coup and assassination of Diem. They also fellled for the Buddhist "sectarian violence theme" which was in fact the work of communist infiltrators in the Buddhist movement.

Then there is Tet where they turned an American and Vietnamese victory into a strategic defeat. Big Story analyzes the reporting of this event and gives the facts that should have been reported.

I come away from this with the belief that we need to provide reporters with a course that explains how errors in reporting have consequences that can not be corrected with a retraction or an apology. They are every bit as critical as decisions made by commanders.

However, I agree with your assessment on the value of embeds. They do the best reporting and one reason is that they get the input of knowledgeable troops who not only provide context, but can enlighten them on what it means. It was an embed that first reported on the red on red action in Anbar a couple of years ago, and people are beginning to comprehend the significance.

As for the cameras, they are a double edge sword, because a picture does not always provide context. A camera can lie. It want tell you why.

[RTK]

My experience with reporters in theater is that the more open and honest you are with them, the more favorable their article is about your unit. If you try to hide something or prevent them from seeing your AO for what it is, they pick up on that pretty quickly. The article will probably be written in a manner or method which you don't necessarily agree with.