What is our Message

[tequila]

The issue of self-selection appears to be at work with that particular series.

Recent polling done in Iraq appears to contradict the message being released and also has the advantage of being scientifically done by multiple organizations.

http://www3.brookings.edu/fp/saban/iraq/index.pdf

http://abcnews.go.com/images/US/1033aIraqpoll.pdf

http://www.opinion.co.uk/Documents/FINALTables.pdf

[Ender]

Hello Marc!

I love reading your posts and enjoy chewing on the product of your academic pursuits

Actually, I have to disagree with you here. I certainly agree that a squad leader in Mosul has pretty much zilch influence on the broadcast media, but that was why I was talking about interactive media. .

I think that is an excellent distinction and I must admit that my mind was solely focused on what you defined as "broadcast media" when I typed that post. In relation to the broadcast media and the $64,000 question it is not that they are perceived as "neutral" but as being the real enemy. I know a number of Marines who would feel much safer having to escort insurgents on a patrol than they would a reporter. The image is that no single entity has done more damage to the US military that the US media and it is very difficult to shake hands and say let's play nice this time. There is a history there and while not all enlisted guys are rocket scientists they do have an innate sense of where the threat is coming from. As I mentioned in another post it is not as though I served with intellectual shut-ins either and even the guys with degrees who should know the importance of reporting felt as though they were just as likely to hanged by the reporter as they were to be shown in a good light.

By highlighting the ambivalence of Joe I hope I have not painted him in an overly harsh or idiotic manner. While some may be very black and white the majority do see (some of) the finer distinctions. I think today's enlisted ranks are probably the most educated, most interactive and most technologically savvy force we have ever had. It would be too easy to paint everyone under E-5 as being ignorant and ignore the very real and very justified fears they possess of the embeds. Our troops have very little faith in the media in every single form it assumes and they have good cause.

For my first deployment to Iraq we took the USS Bataan over and something about having a month or so on ship helped us not just to prepare for war but to also prepare us for peace on the way back. My second deployment was between Sep 04 and Apr 05ish and we flew both ways. Literally one day I was on a combat patrol in Anbar and the very next I was flying home. I mention this because after the second deployment, after we got home and turned on the television and got on the net we thought we had lost "the war" overnight. The image being beamed onto tv screens and laptops ran completely contrary to what we KNEW in Iraq The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

In regards to the interactive media I again have to say this is an angle I was not considering when I wrote and is the subject of much excitement for younger Americans. My poli sci classes are charged with 20 somethings who BELIEVE they can make a difference on the next election and they are right. It is no coincidence that YouTube is one of the hottest things going for young Americans and as long as this can be harnessed in a productive, positive manner there is nothing Washington, New York or London can do about the NCO's with a video recorder strapped to their helmet. If we were in effect allowed to be, (who is going to stop us right?) our own reporters we would be far more effective in getting our message out.

What can not happen with the interactive media and the troops is exactly what is happening though. For every fluffy, pink, Downy fresh video out there showing troops surrounded by Iraqi youth are five more "Moto" movies that depict every hit, raid, mission, explosion, body part and horrible experience they witnessed. Now I love a good moto video as much as the next Marine but 99 times out of 100 it would be perceived as extremely offensive by even moderates here and in Iraq. This splinter of the interactive revolution is in effect our answer for, or the catalyst for all of the home movies being put out by the "insurgency" over there.

Someone mentioned here on SWC, in effect that our troops more often than not don't need to be told what to do as much as they need to hear what not to do. This is a key component to enlisted psychology and to avoiding your Abu Gharaibs and the like. We have No No lists already but for every offense that is not clearly laid out on the list there is an opening for the Joe to push the boundaries. I would put "No video taping of casualties for personal purposes" at the top of my list as I personally feel the public viewing of their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed by us has done as much damage as Abu G. and the like. Those caught breaking the rules should have their "guts stomped in" by nearest NCO or SNCO and expect to have their ass in a permanent sling until they can be proved as trustworthy.

As I team leader I stomped guts. I mentioned that my guys showed up in Iraq with a very poor attitude towards the populace but I MADE them change their minds by equating even minor offenses with something as serious as falling asleep on watch. My logic was that both falling asleep on watch and unnecessarily provoking people through stupid or ignorant acts were just as likely to get us killed and or cause us to "lose the war." If insensitivities were portrayed as disloyal to the Corps and cause I doubt many would step up and disobey.

If the content of the videos could be trusted I dont see why we couldn't send every platoon out with a couple camcorders... let them film all they want and then have a small unit whose purpose is to edit all of the material that is sensitive or boring and put it together in a hot format... their goal? Create two products, one for us back here and one for them over there. The Iraqis love to see pictures of themselves and their children and if we went around handing out Arabic dvd's of every soccer game, luncheon and social interaction we had with them over a period of X number of months it would go a long long way to personalizing the message. A thought.

[Ender]

Which makes me think that we really do not need to '"create" a message, the material is already there and it is displayed every day in patrols all across Iraq. We just have to assemble the pieces, wrap it and send it. If we forgot about the message and just put the stuff out there the data would speak for itself.

[marct]

Hi Ender,

I enjoy your posts very much as well: they are really helping me to grok exactly how people are viewing "the media".

I think that is an excellent distinction and I must admit that my mind was solely focused on what you defined as "broadcast media" when I typed that post.

Honestly, the more I see and the more carefully I read many of the posts here, the more convinced I am that military institutions are "stuck' in the broadcast mindset. Maybe it's just the upper echelons, but I was watching a 60 Minutes segment on CENTCOM's net team and I just couldn't believe my eyes and ears. I found it truly hard to comprehend that it was not being viewed as a battlespace. Then again, I've been involved in the net and online communities for over 20 years (pre-WWW), so I know I'm biased .

In relation to the broadcast media and the $64,000 question it is not that they are perceived as "neutral" but as being the real enemy. I know a number of Marines who would feel much safer having to escort insurgents on a patrol than they would a reporter. The image is that no single entity has done more damage to the US military that the US media and it is very difficult to shake hands and say let's play nice this time.

Hmmmm, it's worse than I thought, then. Do you know if anyone has actually studied this (i.e. interviews, focus groups, etc.)? If someone has, I wold really like to look at their data. If they haven't, I would like to set up a research project to do so. I know I'm showing my academic side, here, but I thin that this is a really important issue!

By highlighting the ambivalence of Joe I hope I have not painted him in an overly harsh or idiotic manner.

Not at all! Any time there is a reaction this strong, there is an underlying reason (or reasons) for that reaction. Having such a reaction just means that Joe is human and, in all probability, frustrated as snot about something. I'd like to find out exactly what he is frustrated about so that the causes can be addressed.

While some may be very black and white the majority do see (some of) the finer distinctions. I think today's enlisted ranks are probably the most educated, most interactive and most technologically savvy force we have ever had. It would be too easy to paint everyone under E-5 as being ignorant and ignore the very real and very justified fears they possess of the embeds. Our troops have very little faith in the media in every single form it assumes and they have good cause.

Again, I agree. Let e point out that most webheads also think the broadcast media is a crock as well and have little or no patience with them.

For my first deployment to Iraq we took the USS Bataan over and something about having a month or so on ship helped us not just to prepare for war but to also prepare us for peace on the way back. My second deployment was between Sep 04 and Apr 05ish and we flew both ways. Literally one day I was on a combat patrol in Anbar and the very next I was flying home. I mention this because after the second deployment, after we got home and turned on the television and got on the net we thought we had lost "the war" overnight. The image being beamed onto tv screens and laptops ran completely contrary to what we KNEW in Iraq The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

Oh, Gods what I could do with such a quote!!!!!! Sorry, I've spent most of my academic career looking at the effective use of rituals, symbols and communications systems in changing perception, and your story about the ship time just tagged off every one of those models!

Let's talk about your last comment for a minute:

The perception is not that the media is an equal opportunity hunter for blood but that they are blatantly biased and enslaved to the fickle whims of an ignorant population who do not want the truth.

That's a pretty harsh judgement, and I'd really like to know how widespread it is and what, if any, exceptions are made. I'm not saying that it is inaccurate, though .

In regards to the interactive media I again have to say this is an angle I was not considering when I wrote and is the subject of much excitement for younger Americans. My poli sci classes are charged with 20 somethings who BELIEVE they can make a difference on the next election and they are right. It is no coincidence that YouTube is one of the hottest things going for young Americans and as long as this can be harnessed in a productive, positive manner there is nothing Washington, New York or London can do about the NCO's with a video recorder strapped to their helmet. If we were in effect allowed to be, (who is going to stop us right?) our own reporters we would be far more effective in getting our message out.

Which is, to my mind, a much better option than allowing the broadcast media to do it . I really think that this would be a much better option all around: it bypasses he broadcast media, it likes dispersed communities together, and it is something that can only be done well by the grassroots. In effect, we would be creating the cyber-strategic corporal.

What can not happen with the interactive media and the troops is exactly what is happening though. For every fluffy, pink, Downy fresh video out there showing troops surrounded by Iraqi youth are five more "Moto" movies that depict every hit, raid, mission, explosion, body part and horrible experience they witnessed. Now I love a good moto video as much as the next Marine but 99 times out of 100 it would be perceived as extremely offensive by even moderates here and in Iraq. This splinter of the interactive revolution is in effect our answer for, or the catalyst for all of the home movies being put out by the "insurgency" over there.

I think there is a place for these types of video clips, but it would probably be best to restrict it to a highly limited segment: "What has AQI done for you lately" and show the aftermath of the last car bomb.

Someone mentioned here on SWC, in effect that our troops more often than not don't need to be told what to do as much as they need to hear what not to do. This is a key component to enlisted psychology and to avoiding your Abu Gharaibs and the like. We have No No lists already but for every offense that is not clearly laid out on the list there is an opening for the Joe to push the boundaries. I would put "No video taping of casualties for personal purposes" at the top of my list as I personally feel the public viewing of their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed by us has done as much damage as Abu G. and the like. Those caught breaking the rules should have their "guts stomped in" by nearest NCO or SNCO and expect to have their ass in a permanent sling until they can be proved as trustworthy.

Agreed. the use of shaming in pastoralist cultures is tricky - you have to separate out the effect of shame on the individual and shame on the family. For example, gratuitously showing "... their (very guilty) brothers and uncles being killed..." insults the entire family and the clan. Clan honour is invoked and calls for blood vengeance. On the other hand, if someone has publicly abjured, say, IED making/planting and taken an oath to that effect and then they are caught, well, that also requires blood vengeance - against hem for bringing dishonour to their family and clan. In that case only, such a video might be worthwhile with the support of their family and clan.

If the content of the videos could be trusted I dont see why we couldn't send every platoon out with a couple camcorders... let them film all they want and then have a small unit whose purpose is to edit all of the material that is sensitive or boring and put it together in a hot format... their goal? Create two products, one for us back here and one for them over there. The Iraqis love to see pictures of themselves and their children and if we went around handing out Arabic dvd's of every soccer game, luncheon and social interaction we had with them over a period of X number of months it would go a long long way to personalizing the message. A thought.

Good idea, although I would also suggest that they be integrated into a glocal web site.

Marc

[Ender]

Hi Ender,

I enjoy your posts very much as well: they are really helping me to grok exactly how people are viewing "the media".

Ok you were cool before but with the Heinlein/Stranger reference, my esteem has shot even higher!

[marct]

Ok you were cool before but with the Heinlein/Stranger reference, my esteem has shot even higher!

LOLOL

So, when do we start seeing the Corps running an H&MP course .

Marc

[Ender]

LOLOL

So, when do we start seeing the Corps running an H&MP course .

Marc

At this rate, VERY soon!

I really think you are on to something with this bypass the broadcast bubbas approach and go straight to "grass roots." I go to the University of Colorado at Denver (only slightly less liberal than Boulder) and if I had a dime for every time I heard "grass roots" re: Obama or some other politician I would not be in school now. Just the words have a magnetic appeal to people my age and I know that if a grassroots campaign were instituted not by Marines and Soldiers, but by "brothers, fathers, cousins, boyfriends and grandfathers" it would at least get us in the door with my peers. After that the message WOULD sell itself.

[marct]

Hi Ender,

I really think you are on to something with this bypass the broadcast bubbas approach and go straight to "grass roots." I go to the University of Colorado at Denver (only slightly less liberal than Boulder) and if I had a dime for every time I heard "grass roots" re: Obama or some other politician I would not be in school now. Just the words have a magnetic appeal to people my age and I know that if a grassroots campaign were instituted not by Marines and Soldiers, but by "brothers, fathers, cousins, boyfriends and grandfathers" it would at least get us in the door with my peers. After that the message WOULD sell itself.

Something like that happened here in Canada with the "Red Fridays" campaign. Basically, our last government downplayed what we were doing in Afghanistan and there was a "popular revolt" - wear something red on Fridays to show support for or troops (our British heritage don't you know ). All in all a great, and ongoing, campaign that had the added benefit of confusing some of the socialist "youth" .

Getting the "friends and family" involved in such a campaign would be the way to go. You mentioned that you were taking (teaching?) poli sci classes, and it would be interesting, as an exercise in practical politics, to see if you could get some of those 20 somethings to start in on this. If they are anything like the ones I teach, they are probably frustrated with the media and more than willing to help with any type of project that exposes media bias and corruption.

Marc

[Ender]

Something like that happened here in Canada with the "Red Fridays" campaign. Basically, our last government downplayed what we were doing in Afghanistan and there was a "popular revolt" - wear something red on Fridays to show support for or troops (our British heritage don't you know ). All in all a great, and ongoing, campaign that had the added benefit of confusing some of the socialist "youth" .

Marc,
I heard about this! I am friends with a Canadian military couple who are stationed down in the Springs and while they are the first to admit that the CF are nowhere near as large as ours, and that the average Canadian thinks about enlistment far less often than us, the Canadians as a whole will NOT tolerate cannibalism of their own. Over the last year I have grown to understand and appreciate our "Northern Neighbors" a great deal more and think the U.S. could do with some very heavy cultural sharing in relation to opening channels between the two. On the macro level I know tremendous steps have already taken place, notably down in the Springs but am eager, even hopeful, to see what can be shared and learned on the micro level.

You mentioned that you were taking (teaching?) poli sci classes, and it would be interesting, as an exercise in practical politics, to see if you could get some of those 20 somethings to start in on this. If they are anything like the ones I teach, they are probably frustrated with the media and more than willing to help with any type of project that exposes media bias and corruption.

Taking classes, and I agree it would be very interesting if I could present it in a politically neutral manner, keeping the sights aligned on the evils of broadcast media without having spill over. I think the students here are very similar to the ones you teach but while they are VERY frustrated with the popular press here, they are even MORE pissed at George W. (Due in large part...drum roll... to the popular media!) so it would have to be calculated in such a manner that the focus does not shift to targets of opportunity. I could see some of my peers wanting to replace popular media bias with their own (if they were allowed) so if the intent were strictly designed as an offensive approach, a "velvet covered hammer" (get too visceral and people get turned off) agianst media bias (as opposed to a coup of the Fourth estate by Frat Boy Freddie who has aspirations for 2028) I could see quite a number of people here in Denver getting on board.

My problem is I suffer from a diamond in the rough syndrome and while I may have potential and a number of ideas, I do not however know the first thing about how to get something like this off the ground. I can sell anything but wouldn't know where to start... thoughts, ideas? (From anyone?)

Given the state of mind I have been in for the last few months if I were given a cardinal direction and a plan, I could make a serious impact here on the Denver students. It is no accident that the DNR is coming here, this area is a hotbed of potential and ideas and if something took off here it WOULD catch.

Joel

[marct]

Hi Joel,

I'll have to think about strategies for a bit since the US and Canada are different enough that I doubt the ones I'd use would work. basically, if I was going to do it up here, and I just might, I would

1. give people a specific time/space focus: say, Mosul in 2006;
2. then get them to compare and contrast three different media outlets coverage of hat area;
3. then I would get them to look for material actually produced by people on the ground there during that time period.

Ideally, the exercise would be used as a way to get my students to figure out what the bias of each source was. As an academic exercise, it would probably work (it did last summer).

Marc

[horatius]

Jedburgh wrote, "On the other hand, the patrol should not be in the business of "selling" anything - or pushing any sort of ideological "message". Actions speak louder than words."

This is absolutely, completely, totally wrong. This is an old mindset that has been obsolete for 40 years and if we continue with it, we are going to lose.

Every patrol is selling something. First they are selling an idea. An idea for which people will risk their lives by giving us intelligence on the enemy. An idea that is REINFORCED BY ACTIONS - the MEDCAPs, infrastructure projects, etc. that you mentioned.

Before those actions can take place, before a patrol sends out a "Psychological Presence" it needs to understand why we are doing a MEDCAP and what psychological message we are sending.

There are Islamic NGOs that do MEDCAPS, build schools, hand out books. However, their message is based in Salafist, Wahhabi Islam and encourages its people to kill all non Muslims.

The reason we need an official, unified message is exactly for this reason. What does freedom mean? Someone wrote we are here so Sunni do not kill Shiia. Does this mean our intervention in Iraq is based on intra-Iraq religious tolerance. How do you know those people are interested in religious tolerance? They need to pick up what we put down.

Freedom. Freedom to do what? Freedom from what?

In counter insurgency, the most important thing a patrol does is sell an idea. America is an idea. Marines jump on hand grenades for an idea, a feeling, a belief. So do jihadists. Every action we take must be in support of selling our ideology. It is from this ideology that we can tailor the means by which we sell it -sometimes with a gun, other times with a band aid on a block by block, neighborhood by neighborhood battle.

[Jedburgh]

Well, Horatius, you managed to completely misunderstand - or ignore - my entire post. What I stressed was exactly developing that "idea" in the head of the indig - going beyond mere security and showing that we care about their well-being and their future.

But for a patrol to go out and attempt to engage in discussion and debate over ideology with the indig is simply stupid. Even "talking points" put out by higher to be pushed when so engaged can be dangerous (rhetorically speaking) and turned on Joe. A wise old soldier once told me never short-change a whore or argue with an Arab. However, there are elements that will engage the indig in this manner - but it is not appropriate for the patrol level.

But I'll accept your term of "selling" as in the selling of such ideas by our actions. If you re-read my post you'll see that is what I was trying to put across. As well as the complex coordination that such perception management by deed requires, in order to be effectively implemented and leveraged from the patrol level.

But I do strongly disagree with you on this point: we should not be "selling" our ideology. Effective use of perception management in this environment is more pointed towards getting the sectarian / ethnic/ tribal/ clan / political factions to understand that they need to work together peacefully in a unitarian state. This damn sure is a difficult, complex and often frustrating task - more so now than a year ago. And we are not necessarily pushing them toward any pre-designated US or even western template - the indig need to figure it out, and we're just helping them along. You can not force feed someone your ideology.

[horatius]

Jedburgh,
It is on this point of squad leaders talking ideology that we disagree. Most ideology is fed - not forced as in at the tip of a gun - but fed. That is why Arabs are the way they are we are the way we are.

Foreigners do not have to buy our ideology wholesale. If we explain it - in terms that are meaningful to them (which is the other side of my first post) - they will be more receptive to all of our Actions.

We do not have to argue with Arabs. We must discuss, we must engage about God, family, individualism. If squad leaders can not tell them that they are the descendants of Ishamel and we are the descendents of Issac so we are therefore brothers, that squad leader is untrained.

Although Genesis 16 says that God cursed Ishmael and he will hate everyone and everyone will hate him is a point that we do not have to bring up.

If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

Your old soldier friend probably didn't want to get into these ideas because he was, well, old. He was of the obsolete mindset that says soldiers kill people and break things. We are here to use kinetic force or "win hearts and minds" if you are a SOF type.

It is impossible to win hearts and minds unless you can look a man in the eyes and explain to him how the two of you are in the same boat and on the same journey with God, family and nation.

On the modern battlefield - this is the one after Korea - the most important fight is the war of ideas. Killing people, breaking things, healing folks and building stuff fall under the umbrella of working toward a unified ideological goal. As with previous generations of warfare, things are becoming more decentralized and it is now on the shoulders of our smallest tactical unit - the squad - to engage people at EVERY LEVEL simulateously.

Your proposed system of just focus on ACTIONS - the one that we have been at for 45 years - HOW IS IT WORKING???

[jcustis]

If squad leaders can not sit and talk with Iraqis and explain that we understand their dilemma of not knowing how to balance being Arab, Muslim and western - in that I mean live under secular law and move to a more individual based economy instead of a family one - because we are all immigrants and our ancestors faced the same problems - he is untrained.

That's one of the problems. I don't think many men on the street really see a dilemma at all. The youth may be trying to balance things, but the family man isn't, in my opinion.

I agree with you generally on the your economic point, but I again disagree that we don't even have an individual based economy. Look at how many extended families live under one roof here in the states, or how many children stay at home until they are 35, the way in which fathers pay for weddings, we go into debt to get kids into college, etc. Our economy is most definitely a family one, even if children don't remain under one roof for the same length of time that they are tied to the purse strings.

My point goes back to my longstanding sentiment that an Iraqi may not care what we say. Just look at the most gang-infested areas of major cities. At some point, folk just don't give a damn what message you put out. You still have to work the issue, but don't expect the silver bullet.

[Cori]

I'm new here, so let me first by way of introduction explain that I'm an academic whose research focuses on press coverage of the GWOT (and specifically terrorist and insurgent attempts to manipulate the coverage.) I think the idea that even (perhaps especially) small units should carry cameras at all times is a terrific one -- I've suggested it myself, although to Civil Affairs folks, not combat units. Reading this thread, and now that the MNF-I YouTube channel is up, it seems to me everyone ought to be running around with cameras, and the idea that the military ought to be providing their own footage, straight to the Internet, of all these "good news stories" is so good I'm planning to, you know, steal it. (Footnoted, of course.)

That said, I am very, very disturbed by the attitudes expressed here regarding accepting embedded reporters. God knows, I've been plenty critical of the coverage, early and often. But folks have got to understand that, as much excitement as there is about the web, the numbers tell the tale: it is still the case that the vast majority of Americans get their news from the mainstream media. As an example, close to thirty million people still watch the network's nightly news shows, and year after year a large number of the top sites on the Internet are actually associated with traditional media outlets -- in other words, same content, different platform, such as Cnn.com, nytimes.com and so forth. You can't just throw up your hands and refuse to deal with them, because, particularly this far out from the draft when so many Americans have no other way to find out about the war other than what they get from the press, (because they may simply not know someone in uniform) the media are the military's conduit to the American people, period, dot.

Now, it seems to me your only option is to try and forge a relationship with the press given that, and the simple fact is that the quality of embedded reporting, over and over, is an order of magnitude better than that which comes from reporters who aren't embedded. Would you rather have stories which come complete with context, or stories that lack context?

With all due respect, relations with the press need to be considered "mission critical," and the military has to work those relationships, encourage them, make sure reporters understand what it is that's going on while they're with units, why it's important, so on and so forth.

This doesn't mean a unit has to accept every single request for an embed from every single reporter -- but to blanket reject the very notion of embeds, to simply reject the press out of hand -- again, with all due respect, that's a very, very risky approach.

[Merv Benson]

Welcome Cari,

There is no doubt that reporting has been critical to the US's ability to make war. In Vietnam for example it was critical in undermining the war effort and led to disastrous consequences for the Vietnamese. Mark Moyar's brilliant new book, Triumph Forsaken describes how reporters directly contributed to the coup and assassination of Diem. They also fellled for the Buddhist "sectarian violence theme" which was in fact the work of communist infiltrators in the Buddhist movement.

Then there is Tet where they turned an American and Vietnamese victory into a strategic defeat. Big Story analyzes the reporting of this event and gives the facts that should have been reported.

I come away from this with the belief that we need to provide reporters with a course that explains how errors in reporting have consequences that can not be corrected with a retraction or an apology. They are every bit as critical as decisions made by commanders.

However, I agree with your assessment on the value of embeds. They do the best reporting and one reason is that they get the input of knowledgeable troops who not only provide context, but can enlighten them on what it means. It was an embed that first reported on the red on red action in Anbar a couple of years ago, and people are beginning to comprehend the significance.

As for the cameras, they are a double edge sword, because a picture does not always provide context. A camera can lie. It want tell you why.

[RTK]

My experience with reporters in theater is that the more open and honest you are with them, the more favorable their article is about your unit. If you try to hide something or prevent them from seeing your AO for what it is, they pick up on that pretty quickly. The article will probably be written in a manner or method which you don't necessarily agree with.

[Cori]

I agree completely with the last two posts. (And let me say that The Big Story is a superb, and a very important study, that's important not only in terms of the history of Vietnam but also as a study of mistakes the press should guard against when covering any war. I still assign it to the graduate students I work with, some of whom come over from our J-School, and it's a crying shame it's gone out of print. Anyone reading it will come away as a better reader-of-press-coverage.)

But let me also just point out that there are reporters covering this war who are very professional, well informed, and fair, and whose stuff is always well worth reading. I haven't quite figured out how to embed links yet, but it should be a fairly easy matter to Google the reports filed by UPI's Pamela Hess during the recent nine weeks or so she spent reporting out of Iraq -- note particularly the stories she filed out of Anbar. (Since this started with a discussion of IO, look esp. for the story she filed about the Major who tried all measure of media to get his unit's IO messages across, leaflets, radio, TV -- nothing worked. Then one day he was listening to the call to prayer when it finally hit him -- LOUDSPEAKERS.)

[Ender]

Cori,
I hear you on your post above and sincerely welcome your perspective on this matter. I agree that there isn't a group out there who can report as well as us and that this far removed from a draft the broadcast media is, (NO QUESTIONS, NO DEBATES) the single most effective method for bridging the gap between here and there. The theory is sound but the application is where we find our rub. I "think" I could safely say that most commanders, if loosely given the choice and no other strings were attached, would consistently pick not having reporters along for the ride over having them. (I am clearly no commander so I could be wrong ) There is no doubt that the benefits from a good report COULD be helpful to the armed forces but it is assured that a negative one WOULD and WILL hurt them BADLY every time.

I think the perception (from the lower enlisted side) is that the broadcast media is a large, double-edged sword with one side that is MUCH sharper than the other because only one sees any real use. With all due respect Cori, I don't care how good the press is at their job, until they become as proficient at building us up as they are ripping us apart the stigma is going to be tough to shake, especially in the ranks where it counts the most.

We had "embeds" that had zero clue about what the Marine Corps in general or Recon specifically were about and it was very frustrating for me to have an attachment from Reuters who had his own agenda or angle he wanted to pursue in his story and a mission that was developing in a different direction.

I was on a patrol in Zaidon during the elections in early 2005. On top of my team I had a large number of attachments on this one, to include the dude from Reuters, 8 or so Iraqi "special forces," some Army engineers, our own combat engineers, some Civil Affairs, and a few others...

Long story short, very short, one of the ISF was run over in the road by an attacker in what we suspected was an SVBIED that did not go off. In the ensuing very limited engagement to stop the vehicle, our interpreter (one of the most amazing men I have ever met) was shot in the back by one of the Showani’s (hmmm), the perp took off and had to be hunted down a few blocks away, my patrol was split and no one knew what was hell was going, at least until we killed the bad guy and regrouped. I had an injury and a gaggle of POGs and we needed to bounce in a major way. We had just dodged a major bullet and needed to NOT BE THERE RIGHT THEN. I had to physically make this clown stop taking pictures of the dead guy, drag him all the way back to his truck and make him get in the back. He had no clue that while there may have been officers and SNCO's on the patrol, I HAD TACTICAL control. It was explained in the brief (he was there) and everyone with a uniform had the billet hierarchy down. All this guy saw was an E-4 who may or may not have known what was going on and his foot dragging at the very least was unprofessional and at worst could have gotten him or any of us killed.

I concede this guy could have been an anomaly, that maybe this was a bad example but seriously if I have to think about what some guy is going to write when the rounds are NOT flying, and also worry about what he’s doing when they are, then the potential returns are not worth the probable risk for me.

I can be persuaded though and can analytically see the benefits to a mutualistic relationship between “us and them.” But until some of my questions are answered in regards to what has changed since 2003-2005, specifically in preparing the reporters better for life with (every other embed I saw focused on an outside in, or Marines under a magnifying glass approach) the military as opposed to life “just outside” the military I am going to be skeptical. I know about the mini boot camps and the entire reporter military crash course idea but that doesn’t cut it….it can’t just be a stint, or an adventure; in war it has to be as real for the person reporting as it is for the person being reported on and if my reality is different than Reuters when the rounds start flying then something is seriously wrong with one of us.

Sorry I know I am venting a little here… there is a point in here somewhere and if you can tease it out I would appreciate it because I really can see benefits to getting along and would like to help in some small way so that we can all fix this, move on and go back to the business of being effective, warfighting Americans!

Joel

[Maximus]

http://www.time.com/time/world/artic...607603,00.html

Thought this article would add a nice touch to this thread, particularly the part about how Al Qaeda in Iraq's overstepped its bounds all being listed one-by-one, with text from the Koran to support.