Meta-Warfare

[Azor]

The [i]levee en masse[i] is perhaps the most defining example of political revolution leading to military revolution. The destruction of the [i]ancien regime[i] and its replacement by a (nominal) people's government resulted in the mass mobilization of the French population. On the battlefield, this resulted in larger armies and decisive victories for France. It was only sustainable by a burgeoning bureaucracy reinforced by a revolutionary zeal. That nation-state system is still largely in place today, although the changing nature of interstate relations, global urbanization, and the growing international bourgeois lends towards smaller, professional, highly technical armies.

You may be misattributing to political development, what are consequences of technological development…

The size of professional militaries ebbs and flows. Over the past 75 years, the basic units of advanced militaries have gone from division to brigade to battalion, and quality has eclipsed quantity.

Gradual advancements in farming and weaponry during the Medieval and Early Modern periods enabled large armies to be formed by the 17th Century, albeit these were primarily of mercenaries. By the time of the 18th Century, muskets were relatively inexpensive and easy to use, compared to the advanced arms of prior centuries.

Given their experience of 18th Century warfare and in the context of seeking to avoid absolutist rule or mercenary hosts, the framers of the U.S. Constitution wisely recommended the establishment of a citizen’s militia rather than a professional standing army. Yet only a highly professional military can operate the weapons of today and create the effects that the politicians and generals demand.

Therefore, we are reverting to the Medieval period, when states relied upon relatively small groups of armored heavy cavalry, well-trained bowmen and pikemen or arquebusiers with nerves of steel…

…the military should aim to target the permanent, objective, material political relations that bind the enemy structure together. This is less 'nation-building' than it is 'political-destroying', that is destroying the enemy's political strength. This occurred in the aftermath of World War II when the Allies imposed upon a Japan commitment to peace and deprived it of any offensive military capabilities; the security apparatus was reduced in form to less than what exists in other states.

Agreed. However, you are forgetting that the United States battered and bludgeoned the Confederates, Germans and Japanese into submission. The United States armed forces relied upon the “30% solution” of attrition. In the aftermath, the United States committed itself to reconstructing strong and friendly states, an undertaking that it never really attempted in Indochina, Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya.

When strong states are destroyed, non-state actors or other states fill the vacuum, which is what has happened in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya. But remember when the Taliban were sheltering Al Qaeda and Iraq, Syria and Libya were starting wars and developing WMDs?

…The difficult the U.S. faces in places like Afghanistan, in my view, is not because some elusive nature of terrorism or insurgency, but because it is not just an engagement of arms, but also a clash of political systems that the U.S. military finds difficult to navigate.

Not at all. Look at the reconstruction efforts and engagement in the former Confederacy, Germany, Japan, Italy or American engagement with non-adversaries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Western Europe and now much of Eastern Europe. Look at the strongmen that the United States depended on in those countries where it wasn’t worth the bother…

Unfortunately, Americans want to have strong and friendly states in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, with the least amount of effort. It doesn’t work that way.

The military would therefore do well step outside of its own uniform and assess the conditions in which it exists, and ask itself if it is prepared to meet emerging challenges to security. A small, professional, highly technical army works in today's political context (for the most part). But will it work in the next? And what is that next context? And when will it arrive?

It will depend upon technology. Automation and artificial intelligence indicate that we will require smaller militaries, or perhaps have more of the personnel operating unmanned platforms. As these systems are expensive, it is preferable to have as many people working in the private sector and paying taxes to support these developments rather than clinging to old military bureaucracies. Remember in 1968 when Soviet farm trucks were commandeered by the Warsaw Pact for the invasion of Czechoslovakia? That’s not what we want…