Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and the Changing Character of War

[GPaulus]

Ben Barry of IISS has published a book on the utility of force; it is on my bookshelf awaiting attention and is recommended by H.R. McMaster cited below.

The U.S. military’s paradigm for operations is a six-phase planning construct that consists of six stages--phase 0 (shape), phase I (deter), phase II (seize initiative), phase III (dominate), phase IV (stabilize), and phase V (enable civil authority). The first three are a linear progression of conflict through the culminating phase (phase III) of major combat operations, and then a “post-conflict” period of stabilization and transition. No one would deny that they US military leads the world in its ability to dominate the battle space for most if not all wars such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria from phase 0 through phase III but we are weak in the area of "post-conflict" operations in Phase IV and V.

When we fight, Air Superiority is achieved in the first 24-48 hours, sea superiority is achieved in 72 hours and ground superiority is achieved in the first 100 hours of operations but that is insufficient to win because we simply are not trained in the seminal phases of post-conflict that is, in the stabilization and transitioning phases of warfare. If you ask a war-fighter what is their mission they will say to "Close with and Destroy" the enemy but that might win the battle "space" but not the war. When I asked a senior leader about the purpose of our military he said exactly that, we must use our weapons to beat the enemy and when I asked about transitioning, he said that was not our job, it was that of the State Department, host nation government, community leaders, NGOs and others. It is not because our military leaders do not have the manpower, equipment or the tools it is because an insurgency cannot be defeated.

Our Civil Affairs teams who once were pivotal in building HN capacity are broken, maybe beyond repair--they are truly clueless as to what must be done to build host nation capacity including governance, utilities--water, wastewater, electric, communications, roads and bridges, O&M plans, refuge collection, medical, education, rule of law, environmental and all of the "Essential Services for Life." It's not our job is commonly espoused , our war-fighters are trained to break things and our leaders are simply not trained to fight an insurgency war. It is important to note that one does not defeat an insurgency--it simply goes away when the local cause to live for becomes greater then "their" cause to die. And that cause begins with a transition plan to rebuild that nation's infrastructure brick by brick, block by block and village by village using only "local" labor. During this transition the "New" government must hire as many locals as they can manage and train. In essence every war must end with a "Marshall Plan" financed from within and from other nations around the globe in exchange for regional stability and resources...

We spend about $640 billion on DOD activities home and abroad on equipment, installations, and war-fighting but only a pittance on transition skills training.