...and here the source of that copy, and the story: Administrative Decisions on Local Defence Forces Personnel: Translation & Analysis.
Mind: the author of that article, has a giant problem understanding what he's got. And, sadly, that's meanwhile no exception in his work, but a rule.
Namely, the author - Aymen Jawad at-Tamimi, somebody who became quite 'famous' for works of this kind - is not only failing to understand and explain the paper he's got, he's also not aware of its importance.
1.) Tamimi can't put together a story and simply explain facts: when reading his work, I've all the time got a feeling he's circling around the actual topic like a cat around a mug of hot milk. The only exception from this rule was hit 'critique' of Guttman's recent article of the PKK.
2.) He also seems not to understand the simple brutality of the Assad regime. Or is he intentionally downplaying the importance of networks of patronage and crime...?
In this case he starts 'wondering loud':
Actually, the principle is simple: the regime pays next to nothing to the SAA; SAA has no other choice but to defect and is thus criminalized; there come the 'saviours' of some militia, offer amnesty; and the ex-SAA should not only be 'happy', but indeed is 'in debt' with 'merciful regime' that gave his life a new sense......As a result, there has been widespread evasion of compulsory and reserve service, along with desertion from the army ranks. Fear of arrest for these offences would also prevent many people from venturing too far beyond their hometown or area, on account of the risk of encountering a security checkpoint that might have their names on a wanted list.
Instead, militias may be seen as offering a better alternative, as the salaries are often higher than those of army conscripts.
...
And now, with this document, the IRGC is offered a carte blanche in regards of related work. :roll:
3.) Tamimi has also got an immense problem with drawing simple conclusions about the NDF and the LDF. Surely enough, the Russians are trying to change the situation lately, but essentially, both of these are nothing else but an attempt to formalize all the sorts of militias and PMCs, with the LDF usually standing for different 'units' of Hezbollah/Syria.
4.) And, he's paying too much attention at the purported 'symbology': sure, it's nice to have some unit crest explained, but what some insignia stands for or should depict is one thing, while the actual nature and purpose of the unit in question is another. The fact the regime lets militias recruit and pay better means not the resulting unit is 'SAA', just for example.
Therefore, it is not - or it should not be - the least surprising the LDF 'exists beyond Aleppo' (like it is for Tamimi): in essence, the LDF might be wherever the regime decides to call one of IRGC's local surrogates that way - or whatever local gangs prefer to call themselves.
What a 'surprise' then: what the regime considers 'LDF of Mhrada' for example, is calling itself 'Mhrada NDF'.
Overall, the piece is informative in regards of existence of few of armed groups in question. But, Tamimi's narrative and failures to understand the nature of the regime, and the purpose of the NDF/LDF legend, is severely smudging the picture.
BTW, and to make sure, the IRGC is not the only one to get such permissions. The Russians are meanwhile neck-deep into repeating IRGC's example:
Russians 'proposing the creation of a local militia' in Suweida is silly: the area already has some 5-6 own militias - all Druze. Actually, this is indicating the Russians are trying to recruit some of these to fight for them, i.e. for Assad.A #Russia|n delegation was allegedly in #Suweida today & proposed the creation of a local militia. Pic via Suweida24. #Syria
-> Members would get $200 a month, some health care, and have their status regularized :!: (for those who missed service)...
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