Syria in 2017 (April-December)

[Azor]

The following testimony was presented to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 27, 2017, by Charles Lister

http://www.mei.edu/content/article/t...policy-options

Selected excerpts and my comments - Part 2/2:

A holistic strategy is required that treats all the various symptoms as inter-linked components of a very big problem. The United States can choose to make big decisions and spend substantial amounts of resources now, or we can continue today’s strategy and face virtual certainty of having to come back and do even more to try to fix an even greater problem several years from now.

Washington will go with choice “b”. Even if a commitment on the order of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea is the most sensible choice, Americans will balk at the up-front costs. The war in Afghanistan is not even over, but according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, development aid to Afghanistan has already cost the U.S. more than the Marshall Plan in equivalent U.S. dollars. That is a damning indictment of “leading from behind”, leaving a “light footprint” or whatever American bureaucrats call a limited and restricted intervention. Note that today, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea are all American allies and host U.S. forces; they all contribute to American and global freedom, peace and prosperity. Conversely, we all know what losing the peace meant in the former Confederate states, Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, and what limiting the war effort meant in South Vietnam.

There is no perceivable opening for a grand, nationwide settlement to the conflict in Syria. As such, the best available interim solution is to introduce calm to geographically distinct zones in Syria, in which local Syrian actors and external actors with influence in the area can agree to freeze existing lines of conflict...In today’s dynamics, five such zones come to mind: (1) the existing zone under Turkish influence in northern Aleppo; (2) a new zone under Turkish influence in northern Idlib; (3) the formalization of a zone of stability under SDF influence in northeastern Syria; (4) a new zone of stability in southern and southwestern Syria, under the influence of Jordan and Israel; and (5) a new, future zone of stability in eastern Syria, divided between the Assad regime and newly formed, local U.S.-backed anti-ISIS forces…These zones of calm would face multiple determined spoilers, particularly Assad himself.

Regarding:

(2) What about the existing pro-Assad zone around Aleppo and the Kurdish zone around Afrin? Assad would have to give up Aleppo to Turkish/FSA forces and the Kurds would be surrounded by Turkish or FSA forces on all sides of their enclave.

(3) Yet there is evidence of ethnic and sectarian cleansing by the YPG against non-Kurds, and Turkey would not be particularly tolerant about a PKK-aligned statelet bordering its restive southeastern Kurdish region.

(4) Why Israel? Nothing brings Syrians of all ethnicities and faiths closer together than the presence of Israeli forces on their soil.

(5) This is a terrible idea. Having Shias and Kurds occupy Sunni Arab areas is a recipe for endless insurgency. It would be preferable to cede this area to Jordan as well. Assad should be confined to his western enclave.

The United States must urgently acknowledge and act to confront the malign activities of Iran in exploiting pre-existing instability in the Middle East to undermine its rivals and to establish hegemonic influence for itself.

Yet confronting Iran brings with it serious risks, such as the abrogation of the JCPOA with the looming cloud of war to disarm Iran, as well as a spoiling of the anti-Daesh efforts in northern Iraq, which are dependent upon Shia militias subject to a great deal of Iranian influence. In addition to Iraq, Iran could also make life difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan and turn Hezbollah’s attention back toward Israel.