On America’s intimate ties w. the #YPG/#PKK & ratcheting of tensions with #Turkey:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...P=share_btn_tw …
On America’s intimate ties w. the #YPG/#PKK & ratcheting of tensions with #Turkey:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...P=share_btn_tw …
11 #FSA groups + Menagh Revolutionary Council of #Aleppo statement supporting Jaysh al-Islam vs. #HTS—advise Al Rahman Corps to side w/ JaI
Azor.....HIGHLY worth reading as it goes to heart of what CrowBat and myself have been posting here......
Really read it.....
https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/...nd-propaganda/
PKK and Propaganda
By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton) on 29 April 2017
The West’s Syria policy is beginning to unravel of its own contradictions.
AMAZINGLY NATO knows about YPG and PKK being one and the same BUT US SOF and CENTCOM does not????The Turkish government launched airstrikes against the positions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in north-eastern Syria and the Sinjar area of north-western Iraq in the early hours of 25 April. There were international ramifications to this because the PKK in Syria, which operates politically under the name of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and militarily as the People’s Defence Units (YPG), is the main partner of the U.S.-led Coalition against the Islamic State (IS). Turkey has protested the U.S. engaging the YPG/PKK so deeply and exclusively as its anti-IS partner, being displeased at the U.S.’s uncritical (public) stance toward the YPG, even after the YPG violated U.S.-brokered agreements on its operational theatres and used Russian airstrikes to attack Turkey- and CIA-backed rebels.
In response to Turkey’s anti-PKK operations this week, The Washington Post has hosted an op-ed by Ilham Ahmed, identified as “a co-president of the Democratic Council of Syria”.
The Democratic Council of Syria (or Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)) is the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The SDF is a front-group for the PKK, mostly designed to assist the United States in circumventing her terrorism laws since the PKK is blacklisted; the PKK is also registered as terrorist by Turkey, the European Union, and NATO. The SDF has some Arab units attached to it, but this multi-ethnic composition is not allowed to threaten the PKK’s political monopoly within the SDF. Ms. Ahmed is also formally the chairwoman of the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM), the ruling authority in the areas under YPG control that they call “Rojava”. Though TEV-DEM is formally a coalition, most of the ostensibly-different organizations within it are either outright PYD fronts or individuals and parties that have so little support they cannot hinder the PYD.
If these acronyms are beginning to get confusing, that is by design. As a paper for NATO’s Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism noted in 2015, this is part of the “PKK’s continuous effort to escape its terrorist designation”. Ms. Ahmed’s political role, for example, makes much more sense once it is understood that she is a senior official in the PYD. That was only one of the things not mentioned in her op-ed, which was a skilled piece of propaganda that repays some study, since it helps underline some of the misconceptions currently at play over Syria.
Ms. Ahmed’s op-ed was entitled, “We’re America’s best friend in Syria. Turkey bombed us anyway,” and the entire framing of the piece is that the SDC, SDF, and YPG are “democratic, egalitarian and progressive” forces whose main mission is combatting IS in alliance with the West. Nobody denies the YPG/PKK’s success in clearing IS from areas of northern Syria—nor the massive U.S. airpower that has enabled this. The framing is deceptive, however. The YPG’s key strategic aim is the carving out of a statelet; the anti-IS mission was complementary to that, both in terms of gaining territory as the YPG displaced IS and in gaining the political credit from the West of fighting IS.
Rana Marcel recently wrote for Chatham House of the ways the PYD/YPG has tried to gain legitimacy, inside Syria and abroad. The legitimation strategy is significantly based on messaging, Marcel concluded, very carefully “tailored to different audiences”. The PYD/YPG “present[s] its fight against ISIS as a battle between universal liberal values and extremism,” and puts a particular emphasis on gender quality (its female fighters having been much sensationalized in the Western press), environmentalism, and collectivist economics. Inside its territories, the PYD/YPG plays on Kurdish nationalism. Keeping these messages separate is among the reasons the media is so heavily controlled in PYD/YPG-run areas, with independent reporting on either the party or its militia regarded as “an attempt to deliver information to terrorists”.
The op-ed, of course, contains a considerable amount of messaging against Turkey. Ms. Ahmed detects a “stark contrast” between the progressive, democratic Rojava and Turkey, which President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is “turning … into a totalitarian state,” while “turning a blind eye to terrorism and supporting groups that overtly espouse jihadist ideals.” Allowances made for rhetorical excess, Ms. Ahmed has a point.
There is no doubt, as Michael Koplow pointed out, that—even if there were not, as it seems there were, irregularities in the referendum itself—the recent vote to give Erdogan executive authority was grossly unfair, and the internal trend in Turkey is certainly toward a more authoritarian government. The only qualifier is that some perspective on the violence and repression of the governments overseen by secular military in the 1980s and 1990s, which the West found compatible with its interests, is helpful.
The Turkish government’s Syria policy has proven disastrous, including to itself. There is plenty of blame to go around for this. Ankara had a right to expect greater support from its NATO allies for its interests in Syria—and that these allies would not actively work against her. At the same time, while Erdogan’s turn from the West has been accelerated by Turkey’s shabby treatment over Syria, it is not reactive in origin, and Turkey’s support for Islamist rebel groups in Syria, notably Ahrar al-Sham, even when powerful nationalists were available, has contributed to the diminishing options the West now has in Syria.
The problem is that Ms. Ahmed casts these stones from a glass house. The PKK is in a weak position to be hurling accusations of terrorism and extremism. Nor does the PKK have much footing in governance terms. The PKK followed one of its own leaders through three states in Europe to assassinate him after he suggested democratic reforms within the organization, for example, and many other Kurds who joined the PKK have fallen to these purges, carried out on the most arbitrary basis. In Syria, the PYD/PKK has run a harshly authoritarian system, inherited almost wholesale from the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The deep economic and political integration between the Rojavan project and the Assad regime is among the things that did not make it into Ms. Ahmed’s op-ed, but it is one of the reasons that some Kurds compare the PYD’s rule to that of the Ba’ath Party.
Last summer, Ibrahim Biro, the leader of the main Kurdish opposition group, the Kurdish National Council (KNC or ENKS), was expelled from Rojava by PYD security forces and threatened with murder if he returned. A wave of attacks on Kurdish opposition parties began after that: party headquarters burned down, anti-PYD operatives beaten up and even killed either by mobs or the police directed by PYD regime, and a large number of arrests. In recent weeks, this crackdown has intensified as the PYD moved to formally ban all parties but its own.
Ms. Ahmed continues the effort to obfuscate the relationship between the PYD/YPG and the PKK. “[A]ny attempt to equate us with the PKK is disingenuous,” says Ms. Ahmed. She concedes that the PYD and YPG “share a founder and many intellectual values with the PKK,” though the PKK “run contrary to our core value of decentralization of power”. Even the smoothest media operation can have a bad day.
The key claim from Ms. Ahmed is that “our political and military leadership is completely separate from that of the PKK.” This is simply a lie.
In a fortuitously-timed release, the International Crisis Group also had a piece out yesterday, which noted:
The YPG and [PYD] are the PKK’s Syrian affiliates, and there is little prospect for their organic link with the mother party to change in the foreseeable future. Qandil-trained and battle-hardened PKK cadres with years—in some cases decades—of experience in the organisation’s struggle against Turkey hold the most influential positions within the YPG and, by extension, within the SDF’s chain of command; within the PYD-run civil governing bodies that administer YPG-held areas; and within the security forces, such as the Asayesh (security police), which are the backbone of that governance. While most of these cadres are Syrian Kurds (though notable roles are also played by Kurds from Turkey and Iran), loyalty to the PKK’s internal hierarchy appears to override relations to local society. Many also operate largely behind the scenes, or with titles that understate their actual authority, while nominally responsible officials lacking direct ties to the organisation are reduced to placeholders. Though this gives the PKK presence in northern Syria a local face, the reality of who wields power is evident to those living there and should be to external observers as well.
The PYD was founded in 2003 in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, where the PKK has had a base since 1982 when it established a camp at Lolan from which it launched its war against Turkey in 1984, by Osman Ocalan, acting at the orders of his brother, Abdullah Ocalan (Apo), the PKK’s leader. Osman has since explained his role in this after he defected from the PKK in 2005.
Continued.....
The invisible holders of power in Rojava above the YPG commanders are longtime PKK operatives to a man.
Continued......
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2017 at 05:19 PM.
The @HRW report on the Khan Sheikhoun attack has previously unpublished images of the filling cap from the bomb used
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVGDcReFz9k …
HRW also find's government's use of helicopter-dropped chlorine bombs more systematic; (b) pro-Assad ground-forces also now using chlorine.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2017 at 05:47 PM.
Suheil al Hassan with a Russian Major General, probably near Hama
Turkish military digging trenches&setting up new positions in #Akcakale along #Syria border.Some parts of border walls removed
#TalAbyad
Iran’s Diplomatic Corps: Between a Rock and the Quds Force
http://bit.ly/2oQ1uC4
YPG shelled #Azaz with artillery this evening. Probably to provoke #FSA and #Turkey.
YPG thinks they are under #US & #Russia|n protection and invulnerable now. Let's see what they try next.
A FSA Levant Front source just let me know that houses of civilians r being shelled in Azaz, shelling from Mar'anaz
Hama Battle: Central Division carried out an Inghimasi operation in area of Zalin checkpoint, killing 7 pro-Assad and seizing weapons.
S. #Aleppo: #HTS destroyed an #ATGM launcher in Tulaylat near Al-Hader firing a guided missile.
E. #Damascus: fierce clashes in #Barzeh and #Qabun where Regime made advances around Electric Station backed by shelling and airstrikes.
N. #Hama: #Lataminah area still intensively bombed, incl. by #RuAF Su-25.
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35....621552&z=12&m …
Hama Battle: Jaish Al-Nasr shelling pro-Regime forces in #Helfaya with dozens of Grad rockets.
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35....609364&z=13&m …
Hama Battle: Central Division took out with a #TOW a fuel tanker near #Maan.
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=en&lat=35....795616&z=13&m …
Main deployment areas of #Hazaras (Afghans) from pro-Assad #Fatemiyoun Brigade past months, via @historicoblog4. https://twitter.com/historicoblog4/s...76716240424961 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-01-2017 at 07:02 PM.
Meh. This is like trying to stay out of a barroom brawl but just get a few kicks in on one of the brawlers. It doesn't work. Either you go in with some friends and a chair, or you stay out of it and sip a beer while you watch.Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Updates from Syria Liveuamap
- Leaked video purports to show YPG/SDF forces in Raqqa countryside going into civilian houses looking to loot/steal, Raqqa Governorate, Syria
- Clashes between the Free Syrian Army and the YPG/SDF on the axis of A'zaz -Maranaz, north of Aleppo
Turkish-YPG Fighting
- Turkish artillery pounding YPG positions in Afrin with artillery
- Howitzers and T-122 Sakarya MLRS is reportedly pounding YPG positions in Afrin
Perhaps Washington will come to the realization that there are no angels here, except the White Helmets.
Neither the YPG nor the FSA should be fighting in Sunni Arab and Kurdish areas, respectively, and any operations in mixed areas should come under strict joint oversight to prevent cleansing.
Last edited by Azor; 05-02-2017 at 01:14 AM.
To CrowBat RE: Blockade/NFZ/NDZ
According to SIPRI, Russia provided more than 50% of the value of the arms transferred to Syria from 1992 to 2013, with data being scarce for 2014 and unavailable for 2015-2015. Russia was the single largest transferor in 2002-2003 and 2009-2013, or for one third of that period. Has the Syrian account been up to date? Certainly not. But such is the cost of doing business in the arms trade, and neither Yeltsin nor Putin have had problems providing corporate welfare to Russian defense contractors.
With regard to Tartus, it is effectively a glorified dock. Russia has been unable to even thinly spread its assets across its existing bases, let alone take advantage of naval facilities in Syria and Vietnam. Recently, the Russian Navy had to cannibalize its Black Sea Fleet to reinforce its Baltic Fleet, and deploying the naval group off of Syria has been a strain.
As stated previously, I referred to “client” in a very loose sense given that Russia’s international relationships are far fewer and far weaker than those of the United States, and I won’t belabor the point further.
What new ROEs have been introduced? Thus far Russia has offered to turn transponders on if all NATO aircraft (i.e. spy planes) will do likewise.
In 2017, there were at least six incidents of Russian military aircraft flying in international Baltic airspace with their transponders off.
In 2016, there were 110 intercepts in the Baltic area, including at least four where Russian transponders were off, and six violations of Estonian airspace. In addition, there were ten violations of Bulgarian airspace and at least one unsafe interception by Russia over the Black Sea. NATO intercepts were lower for 2016 than 2014 and 2015, but are still far above 2013 levels.
Well, Russia may be “Upper Volta”, but it still has “rockets”, does it not? This country has directly challenged American interests since 2008, and has invaded and partitioned two prospective American allies.
Regardless, you continue to have difficulty reading what I actually write. I never said that Russia would attack American or Coalition forces in Syria. What I did assert was that Russia probably would ignore a no-fly zone, no-drive zone and/or a blockade, and dare the Coalition to fire on it first. Despite lacking true allies, Russia would certainly have allies of convenience in Damascus and Teheran.
Consider the Berlin Airlift, when American and British forces were faced with overwhelming Soviet quantitative and qualitative superiority, frayed lines of communication and only perhaps two dozen atomic bombs were available to the U.S. once the B-29s had been deployed. The Allies violated the blockade peacefully, adhered to pre-blockade arrangements as much as possible, and were prepared to lose men and machines to Soviet aggression and the weather, if need be. The airlift was a logistical feat for the British and French, and humiliated the far stronger Soviet Union.
After the fall of Qaddafi and the refusal of Obama to treat him as an equal partner, Putin has been determined to humiliate the U.S. despite Russia’s weaknesses. Were the U.S. to establish a blockade or NFZ/NDZ, I believe that Putin would move heaven and earth to violate it and risk the lives of Russian sailors and pilots doing so.
And? It all boils down to whether the U.S. would fire upon Russian and Iranian blockade runners.
Of course Moscow cared. It just had bigger fish to fry. Assuming that the blockade did not include airstrikes on Assad’s ground forces, it would have taken the rebels some time to defeat Assad, during which Moscow and Teheran could have tried to run men and materiel through the blockade, by air, sea and overland through Iraq, which was not exactly an American ally in 2013.
If Obama had launched TLAMs or established a blockade in 2013, Assad would have been screaming for help.
Right. We are talking about your alternate timeline where Obama launches TLAMs and establishes a blockade.
The Iranians would have had this prerequisite long before the JCPOA was drafted, and would have signaled Obama if he had intervened in Syria in 2013.
Russia could take an alternate air route with refueling, rely upon sealift or transit via Iraq, which was led by Maliki, who would probably have allowed it. After all, Iraq currently hosts Iranian special forces and has sent Iranian-led Iraqi Shia militias to Syria.
BUT when you pick the wrong bar...the wrong friends...have no chair and no beer...will you then realize you might in one heck of a serious problem....THIS is where SOF and CENTCOM are now and yet I do not think they even realize it...
AND that is sad....
Maybe if they read SWC/SWJ more often????
Testimony (Charles Lister): Syria After the Missile Strikes: Policy Options
The following testimony was presented to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 27, 2017, by Charles Lister
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/t...policy-options
Selected excerpts and my comments - Part 1/2:
In August 2013, Assad had at least 1,000 tons of chemical weapons, including several hundred of Sarin. According to the DOD (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42848.pdf), securing Assad’s stockpiles by force would have required the deployment of up to 75,000 soldiers, including thousands of regular and special forces on the ground in Syria, and an air and naval campaign far larger than the 60 aircraft and 7 ships required for Operation Odyssey Dawn in 2011. Not only did the 2013 “Framework” destroy or remove nearly all of Assad’s CWs, it dismantled their infrastructure and delivery systems. The deal prevented Assad’s formidable arsenal from being transferred to Hezbollah for use against Israel, or falling under Al Qaeda or Daesh control, which U.S. military intervention may not have been able to achieve. Unfortunately, the deal ensured Assad’s survival and continued war against his own citizens, with increased Iranian and Russian support.
I agree. Yet behind Assad is Iran, much as Iran was behind Maliki’s efforts to marginalize the Sunni Arabs of Iraq. Therefore, we arrive at the second humanitarian compromise in order to minimize the threat of WMDs: permitting Iran to pursue a sectarian war in Iraq and Syria in return for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
I doubt Assad is comfortable, as he sits only at the pleasure of Teheran, whose calculus may well change. His recent use of Sarin was an unambiguous test of the new U.S. administration’s interest in Syria and resolve.
This is in addition to Syria’s invasions of Israel and Lebanon, ties to U.S. adversaries Iran and North Korea, support for designated terrorist group Hezbollah, and attempt to develop nuclear weapons.
Specifics will be needed. Is the U.S. supposed to partition the country into ethnic and sectarian enclaves and then use force to prevent one group from aggressing against another? What about the mixed areas on the frontlines? Should the U.S. be neutral except where Al Qaeda and Daesh are concerned, but ignore the foreign Shia mercenaries marauding on behalf of Assad? How can the U.S. ensure compliance from Iran and Russia? Currently, the regime is determined to reconquer the country, despite being reliant upon foreign funding, manpower and materiel to do so. How can its calculus be changed without changing the regime itself?
Exactly. Moscow will tolerate a slap on the wrist that does not materially alter the balance of forces, but not a decapitating blow.
Agreed.
Russia is likely interested in a negotiated settlement and a partitioned country with a “frozen conflict”, whereas Iran is determined to secure total victory over every inch of Syria.
They may not have a choice. The Sunni Arab majority will not accept minority Alawi rule; neither will the Alawis, Christians and Druze accept a possible tyranny of the majority by way of democracy (such as in Iraq). Moreover, the Kurds are not about to surrender a de facto independent Rojava, which ideology aside is not dissimilar to Iraq’s KAR.
Testimony (Charles Lister): Syria After the Missile Strikes: Policy Options
The following testimony was presented to the United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs on April 27, 2017, by Charles Lister
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/t...policy-options
Selected excerpts and my comments - Part 2/2:
Washington will go with choice “b”. Even if a commitment on the order of Western Europe, Japan and South Korea is the most sensible choice, Americans will balk at the up-front costs. The war in Afghanistan is not even over, but according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, development aid to Afghanistan has already cost the U.S. more than the Marshall Plan in equivalent U.S. dollars. That is a damning indictment of “leading from behind”, leaving a “light footprint” or whatever American bureaucrats call a limited and restricted intervention. Note that today, Japan, Western Europe and South Korea are all American allies and host U.S. forces; they all contribute to American and global freedom, peace and prosperity. Conversely, we all know what losing the peace meant in the former Confederate states, Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, and what limiting the war effort meant in South Vietnam.
Regarding:
(2) What about the existing pro-Assad zone around Aleppo and the Kurdish zone around Afrin? Assad would have to give up Aleppo to Turkish/FSA forces and the Kurds would be surrounded by Turkish or FSA forces on all sides of their enclave.
(3) Yet there is evidence of ethnic and sectarian cleansing by the YPG against non-Kurds, and Turkey would not be particularly tolerant about a PKK-aligned statelet bordering its restive southeastern Kurdish region.
(4) Why Israel? Nothing brings Syrians of all ethnicities and faiths closer together than the presence of Israeli forces on their soil.
(5) This is a terrible idea. Having Shias and Kurds occupy Sunni Arab areas is a recipe for endless insurgency. It would be preferable to cede this area to Jordan as well. Assad should be confined to his western enclave.
Yet confronting Iran brings with it serious risks, such as the abrogation of the JCPOA with the looming cloud of war to disarm Iran, as well as a spoiling of the anti-Daesh efforts in northern Iraq, which are dependent upon Shia militias subject to a great deal of Iranian influence. In addition to Iraq, Iran could also make life difficult for the U.S. in Afghanistan and turn Hezbollah’s attention back toward Israel.
Azor...I had already seen the Lister comments via social media...BUT here is the interesting thing...outside of social media comments...US MSM and the Trump WH NSC basically ignored his comments...
AND neither Trump WH NSC nor CENTCOM nor US MSM is actively questioning the American support to and for a Communist inspired and led Kurdish PKK a US named terror group...
Example it took social media pointing out that a proRussian mercenary who had fought in the Russian mercenary army in eastern Ukraine and joined the US Army and was on active duty...then finally a single MSM outlet picked it up...and it ended there...
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