What Went Wrong in Syria?

...The Syrian uprising didn’t start because of the United States in any way, and its course has followed a path largely — not entirely — by Syrians. The Syrian opposition, both political and armed, could never articulate a vision for the country that rallied a great majority of Syrians to their cause. The political opposition never laid out a transition plan —it eventually became nearly as sectarian and ethnically chauvinistic as the Syrian government, and it never demonstrated a deep commitment to human rights. It did not, for example, condemn excesses by the armed opposition and its rhetoric sometimes was anti-Kurdish. The armed opposition, desperate in its fight against Assad, agreed to coordinate on the ground with extremists, particularly the al-Qaeda linked Nusra Front.

This frightened many Syrian communities. The US specifically put the al-Nusra Front on our terrorism list in December 2012 to warn the armed opposition to stay away from the al-Nusra Front. Unfortunately, they ignored us. Moreover, as early as 2011, some Syrians hoped the American military would intervene, just as we had in Iraq in 2003, to overthrow Assad. I repeatedly warned them the US Air Force would not come, but many political opposition leaders disagreed with me and said Washington would eventually intervene. This belief forestalled their thinking about greater outreach to communities in Syria still supporting the Syrian government.
Three other mistakes we did make. In retrospect, it was not helpful to say that Assad should step aside. Observers did not appreciate the nuance in the American position that said that Assad’s future was for Syrians to decide, not Americans. Our expressing our opinion became understood to mean that the Americans would compel Assad to depart, and there was never any intention to do that. Instead, the Americans wanted a negotiation between the opposition, including moderate armed groups and the Assad government, to determine a transition government by mutual consent, as per Geneva I. My personal mistake was not resisting that August 2011 declaration by the president.

Our second mistake was in not enforcing the red line after the Assad government chemical weapons attacks in 2013. This might have deterred Assad from further use and given impetus to reach the Geneva negotiating table in 2013. The State Department was on record supporting a strike but the president made his decision.

Our third mistake was in supporting Syrian Kurds linked to the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] against ISIS instead of building an Arab force over time. We now are in the situation where our troops are stationed indefinitely in eastern Syria with enemies on all sides. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria will all try to foster our rapid departure and the subjugation of these Syrian Kurdish allies. We will have seriously harmed our bilateral relations with Turkey, and [Recep Tayyip] Erdogan already is a difficult, very problematic leader with which to engage.
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