Are you referring solely to the NLF/NVA? Yes they did.
The U.S. campaign in Vietnam was doomed because of:
- Poor intelligence and therefore understanding of the conflict i.e. not Korea redux
- An overly ambitious objective i.e. a strong and friendly state in South Vietnam
- A restricted commitment in order to placate Beijing and Moscow on the one hand, and the American electorate on the other
Imagine if the U.S. had simply denied the Communists control of Vietnam, relying upon anti-Communist insurgents, small special forces/intelligence teams, and airpower…
Yet returning to the issue of comparing conventional warfare with guerrilla warfare and subversion, every strictly conventional war that the U.S. has fought with major ground forces has been far more costly to those soldiers than the counter-insurgencies in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq (*).
On the contrary, according to Khalizad and
Bush himself, Cheney among others, advocating using tactical nuclear weapons. Bush, of course, was strongly opposed, but the mere suggestion indicates the anxiety over Iraq’s conventional capabilities. Indeed, the U.S. forces committed at the beginning of 1991 indicate a major overreaction to the possibility of war.
The threat that the U.S. faced from Iraq in 1991 was the Soviet one, in miniature, and although a U.S. victory was assured, there was anxiety over how costly that victory would be. Would quality overcome quantity, and to what degree? If liberating Kuwait was hard-fought then the ramifications would be felt by NATO forces in Germany opposite the crumbling Warsaw Pact and the still formidable Soviet Union, as well as the U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific facing North Korea and China.
If you are intending to claim that “everyone” knew that AirLand Battle would work as advertised, then why did Hussein not back down?
Moreover, why did the Soviets express surprise at the effectiveness of U.S. doctrine and technology in action as the following sources indicate?
In 1990, 39% of the total U.S. combat aircraft inventory was deployed to
Desert Storm, whereas 30% was deployed to
Iraqi Freedom, and elements of the latter were already in theater supporting the ongoing NFZ/NDZ in Iraq and
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
So because it’s rainy in Berlin, you’re using tinfoil to stay dry while on your soap box? :P
Hussein had more than five months to withdraw from Kuwait and refused to do so despite the
Desert Shield build up in Saudi Arabia and the UNSCR authorizing force to expel Iraqi forces. If those gathering
Desert Storm clouds – pun intended – did not convince Hussein, how could Bush have done so in 1990?
* Referring to the Civil War, World War I, World War II and the Korean War
Originally Posted by Azor
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