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Thread: Syria in 2017 (April-December)

  1. #81
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    Default WOTR: Charting the Future of the Modern Caliphate

    https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/ch...ern-caliphate/

    Selected Excerpts with emphasis added:

    In the pantheon of possibilities ranging from complete collapse to a future resurgence, the organization will likely survive its looming military defeat. This outcome is supported by historical research on insurgencies that indicate groups rarely collapse and disappear. In fact, like the past history of ISIL itself, groups are quite capable of withstanding the loss of territory by returning to earlier stages of organizing, recruiting and fund raising. While ISIL has been fixated with securing and controlling sympathetic populations in the past, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive without territory, as it did between 2008 and 2013. In the future, the underground struggle that follows on the heels of the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa will not require large numbers of fighters. The group’s veterans are experienced in blending back into the local population to wage a low-level insurgency...

    Yet there is no reason to think ISIL is close to being vanquished. The two major factors that led its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, to resuscitate its organization and evolve into a truly global threat — the Syrian civil war and the political manipulation of sectarian tensions in Iraq — remain important variables in what comes next. RAND research that examined all insurgencies between 1945 and 2009 found that the most important factor in reducing their duration is the ability of the counterinsurgents to reduce the tangible support of the insurgents. To achieve this, state security services, police forces and border control are critical, and neither Iraq nor Syria can currently claim to have any of these in abundance or quality...

    Who Governs the Sunnis?

    This political question has been at the heart of the conflict since the U.S. military conducted a surge of troops and diplomats that opened the door for rapprochement between Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and the national government in 2007. This relationship, which at one point held real promise, failed to develop and since 2010 ISIL opportunistically capitalized on its slow deterioration. By 2014, Iraqis in the Sunni majority areas gave a lukewarm embrace of ISIL that was as much of an indictment of the inept and corrupt Iraqi Sunni political class as it was of the Maliki administration’s loss of perceived legitimacy and right to rule.

    Now that Sunnis have learned the hard way that ISIL’s utopian revolution overpromised and under delivered, who will fill the vacuum? The strong organizational structure of the Iraqi Islamic Party that ruled many of the Sunni provinces failed to translate into good governance, creating the opening for ISIL to offer itself as a viable alternative. The hardliners within the broader Sunni political establishment’s attempt to return to power after its previous failures (including the embarrassing loss of Mosul) — coupled with its historical anti-western attitude — means it will be a poor partner for the Iraqi government. Still, as researcher Rasha Al Aqeedi points out, issues including corruption, mistrust in local and central politics and radical ideologies all remain major obstacles to good governance in Iraq — even more so than the conventional wisdom that Sunni rejection of a Shiite order was the primary factor leading to ISIL’s resurrection throughout the most volatile parts of the country.

    One difficult challenge in wooing Sunni politicos has been ISIL’s long-time tactic of preemption and elimination of future Sunni rivals. Starting with the dismantling of the Sahwa in Iraq, local Sunni tribal militias, and the cooption of tribal figures after 2008, ISIL’s use of calibrated violence against its own population has crippled local leaders and torn apart the social fabric— possibly permanently. Nonetheless, if regional Sunni actors can inspire the resurrection of a functioning local governance structure supported and protected by powerful benefactors ISIL will find it difficult to compete anywhere outside of the rump of the remaining caliphate...

    Furthermore, the overreliance on Iraqi counter-terrorism and special police forces as regular infantry in the fierce, door-to-door urban combat of Mosul is destroying the very capability the Iraqi state will need to win the occupation phase for a successful transition to stability, whatever form that might take. Who will fill that security vacuum? If by default the Iraqi government is forced to rely on its ad-hoc mix of popular mobilization forces, ISIL’s chances of a return in Iraq will be much higher due to its lack of legitimacy in Sunni areas. The legitimacy of the Abadi administration has been an underappreciated aspect of Iraq’s success against ISIL. This political mandate must be carried forward if the defeat of ISIL is to be a permanent one, and impending robust challenges by Abadi rivals — including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the populist Muqtada al-Sadr — could sour Washington on future cooperation if either of these two attain power.


    In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas are much more suspect than its counterparts in Iraq, and surprisingly more complex due to the sheer number of actors in Syria with differing political end states. Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open up a fierce competition for resources and influence between tribes, jihadi groups, rebel groups, the state, and state-aligned proxy forces. Unlike in Iraq, ISIL has been an outsider with limited ties in Syria, although those relationships have grown stronger as ISIL has controlled territory and influenced populations. ISIL success since 2013 in exploiting divisions and stealing away fighters demonstrates how conducive this environment is group survival, and for this reason it will remain an influential entity for some time to come...

    The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions. If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas, these tensions will likely erupt. Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance and the Kurdish militias could have trouble giving back what territory they are able to conquer. Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground, will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey? The United States finds itself in a precarious position, seeking at once to placate its NATO ally Turkey, while simultaneously reassuring the Kurds their hard fought gains are not just fleeting...

  2. #82
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    In best traditions of modern US-made international-security-related... erm... 'journalism', the authors are conveniently talking themselves past the problem.

    In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas...
    Wrong. Alone the notion of 'the Assad regime's chances' indicates they've got no clue about what's going on in Syria.

    Then, if at all, they should be discussing 'IRGC's chances of conquering and ethnically cleansing areas predominantly populated by Sunni Arabs, and this in order to establish firm presence and thus political influence for decades in advance, but also to reap economic benefits.

    But, that is something the USA are staunchly ignoring. Instead, and should they ever come to the idea to write a similar feature on Yemen, the same authors are 1000% guaranteed going to talk about 'Iran-backed Houthis'...

    Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open....
    'likely open'...?

    Welcome on planet Earth, dear aliens!

    By side the fact that the Daesh is actually no part of the Syrian 'Civil' War - not for Syrians, not for Syrian insurgents, not for Assadists, not for the IRGC, and not for Russians - and thus a mere sidenote within the context at hand... but foremost: this is already happening. It just so happens the authors missed what happened in al-Bab area when this was liberated from the Daesh by Turkey-supported Syrian insurgents.

    The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions.
    The same again: 'will be'...? I.e. this is not already the case?

    If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas....
    'If'?

    Do I have to post all citations of the PKK being the essence of the PYD, therefore the YPG, and thus the SDF too...? And, who 'liberated' Manbij and few other towns in the area? Who is currently on the brink of 'liberating' Tabqa? Vanuatuans, with aerial and SF-support from Chile...?

    Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance....
    Well, the fact the Americans don't mind the Pentagon - i.e. the US military - messing around with the governance of the USA, means not this is right. Actually it is so that the - YPG - which is a military force - should be completely outside the loop of civilian governance. However, thanks to the USA, and thanks to the US ignorance of the fact that the YPG is at least 50% staffed by the PKK, this is ignored, just like it is ignore that the PKK - which is a Marxist terrorist organization of Kurds from Turkey - imposed itself (and thus the PYD and the YPG) upon Kurds in northern Syria.

    Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground...
    ...standardised phraseology, making one wonder by what standards are they 'the most fighting effective force'? Provide the same support to any other party there (except Assadists: they wouldn't manage it even with full support of the entire US military), and it's going to become as effective.

    ...will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey?
    Why? Why should anybody demand this? And, is anybody demanding this?

    No. All the various people around the World 'protest' against is the US cooperation with the PKK, which is a Marxist terrorist organization, the cooperation with which is against the law - in the USA, in all of the NATO and nearly all of the EU.

    This means not even that Turkey would mind the US cooperation with Kurds - IF the Kurds in question wouldn't be from the PKK.

    And the reason for this is that one just can't expect anything else from a Marxist terrorist organization, but to terrorise - i.e. apply violence. Which means that the only possible result of any war fought with such an organization on its side is just another war.

    Now somebody tell me why is this so hard to understand...?

    The United States finds itself in a precarious position...
    ...for which the USA are themselves to blame. So, a US problem, but - and as so often - with tragic consequences for all those to whom it's directly related, vast majority of whom are no US citizens.
    Last edited by CrowBat; 05-05-2017 at 09:11 AM.

  3. #83
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    Quote Originally Posted by Azor View Post
    https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/ch...ern-caliphate/

    Selected Excerpts with emphasis added:

    In the pantheon of possibilities ranging from complete collapse to a future resurgence, the organization will likely survive its looming military defeat. This outcome is supported by historical research on insurgencies that indicate groups rarely collapse and disappear. In fact, like the past history of ISIL itself, groups are quite capable of withstanding the loss of territory by returning to earlier stages of organizing, recruiting and fund raising. While ISIL has been fixated with securing and controlling sympathetic populations in the past, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive without territory, as it did between 2008 and 2013. In the future, the underground struggle that follows on the heels of the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa will not require large numbers of fighters. The group’s veterans are experienced in blending back into the local population to wage a low-level insurgency...

    Yet there is no reason to think ISIL is close to being vanquished. The two major factors that led its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, to resuscitate its organization and evolve into a truly global threat — the Syrian civil war and the political manipulation of sectarian tensions in Iraq — remain important variables in what comes next. RAND research that examined all insurgencies between 1945 and 2009 found that the most important factor in reducing their duration is the ability of the counterinsurgents to reduce the tangible support of the insurgents. To achieve this, state security services, police forces and border control are critical, and neither Iraq nor Syria can currently claim to have any of these in abundance or quality...

    Who Governs the Sunnis?

    This political question has been at the heart of the conflict since the U.S. military conducted a surge of troops and diplomats that opened the door for rapprochement between Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and the national government in 2007. This relationship, which at one point held real promise, failed to develop and since 2010 ISIL opportunistically capitalized on its slow deterioration. By 2014, Iraqis in the Sunni majority areas gave a lukewarm embrace of ISIL that was as much of an indictment of the inept and corrupt Iraqi Sunni political class as it was of the Maliki administration’s loss of perceived legitimacy and right to rule.

    Now that Sunnis have learned the hard way that ISIL’s utopian revolution overpromised and under delivered, who will fill the vacuum? The strong organizational structure of the Iraqi Islamic Party that ruled many of the Sunni provinces failed to translate into good governance, creating the opening for ISIL to offer itself as a viable alternative. The hardliners within the broader Sunni political establishment’s attempt to return to power after its previous failures (including the embarrassing loss of Mosul) — coupled with its historical anti-western attitude — means it will be a poor partner for the Iraqi government. Still, as researcher Rasha Al Aqeedi points out, issues including corruption, mistrust in local and central politics and radical ideologies all remain major obstacles to good governance in Iraq — even more so than the conventional wisdom that Sunni rejection of a Shiite order was the primary factor leading to ISIL’s resurrection throughout the most volatile parts of the country.

    One difficult challenge in wooing Sunni politicos has been ISIL’s long-time tactic of preemption and elimination of future Sunni rivals. Starting with the dismantling of the Sahwa in Iraq, local Sunni tribal militias, and the cooption of tribal figures after 2008, ISIL’s use of calibrated violence against its own population has crippled local leaders and torn apart the social fabric— possibly permanently. Nonetheless, if regional Sunni actors can inspire the resurrection of a functioning local governance structure supported and protected by powerful benefactors ISIL will find it difficult to compete anywhere outside of the rump of the remaining caliphate...

    Furthermore, the overreliance on Iraqi counter-terrorism and special police forces as regular infantry in the fierce, door-to-door urban combat of Mosul is destroying the very capability the Iraqi state will need to win the occupation phase for a successful transition to stability, whatever form that might take. Who will fill that security vacuum? If by default the Iraqi government is forced to rely on its ad-hoc mix of popular mobilization forces, ISIL’s chances of a return in Iraq will be much higher due to its lack of legitimacy in Sunni areas. The legitimacy of the Abadi administration has been an underappreciated aspect of Iraq’s success against ISIL. This political mandate must be carried forward if the defeat of ISIL is to be a permanent one, and impending robust challenges by Abadi rivals — including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the populist Muqtada al-Sadr — could sour Washington on future cooperation if either of these two attain power.


    In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas are much more suspect than its counterparts in Iraq, and surprisingly more complex due to the sheer number of actors in Syria with differing political end states. Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open up a fierce competition for resources and influence between tribes, jihadi groups, rebel groups, the state, and state-aligned proxy forces. Unlike in Iraq, ISIL has been an outsider with limited ties in Syria, although those relationships have grown stronger as ISIL has controlled territory and influenced populations. ISIL success since 2013 in exploiting divisions and stealing away fighters demonstrates how conducive this environment is group survival, and for this reason it will remain an influential entity for some time to come...

    The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions. If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas, these tensions will likely erupt. Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance and the Kurdish militias could have trouble giving back what territory they are able to conquer. Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground, will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey? The United States finds itself in a precarious position, seeking at once to placate its NATO ally Turkey, while simultaneously reassuring the Kurds their hard fought gains are not just fleeting...
    Rus MoD held a briefing on principles of implementation of #Memorandum on Syria de-escalation zones
    https://youtu.be/5cF-gIL8yzk

    AND remember the US cannot fly and or participate in these safe zones...

  4. #84
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    Default To Outlaw 09

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    I find it interesting that you have never participated in either VN nor Desert Storm nor sat in the actual planning phases of DS or even during the Cold War in Germany yet you quote like wild...
    Not taking that bait. Nice try though.

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    If you really did do your research on SVN you might have noticed that actually the SVN Army was holding up well and with heavy B52 strikes effectively stopped the NVA Easter invasion in it's tracks and pushed them back into Laos and Cambodia...

    The NVA licked it wounds and waited...WHAT exactly was the next US government move...they simply cut off SVN from any further military aid...and then the NVA moved again.

    If you the reread a lot of the 1975 battlefield reports coming from SVN army/marine units...they basically ran out of ammo and there was nothing there to supply them with and then broke and ran....
    Nice strawman. When did I laugh off the ARVN?

    Of course, with U.S. materiel aid and airpower, the ARVN could have held off the Spring Offensive, but the NLF insurgency would have continued indefinitely, particularly given the developments in Cambodia.

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    Back to tact nukes…US politicians can talk all they want to but at no time were the handlers of those weapons "alerted to move" a key sign they were going to be used...so again understand what you are talking about.
    Cheney was SECDEF at the time, not a mere “politician”. As Bush strongly opposed the idea, why would there be any alerts or redeployments with regard to these weapons?

    You will note that in the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Clinton and Bush the Younger administrations believed that the U.S. could use conventional weapons to neutralize WMDs, including Russia’s; Russia and China, for their part, agreed and were very concerned about the Prompt Global Strike program.

    Yet prior to Desert Storm, the Bush administration repeatedly warned Iraq that if it used WMDs against the U.S. or its allies, it would be open to U.S. nuclear strikes.

    There was an obvious sea change in strategic thought after the Second Offset/Fight Outnumbered and Win/Precision-strike/RMA was successfully tested in the crucible of battle.

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    BTW you avoided my comments on the I&W warning Bush but Bush not reacting...why was that…Their reasoning is still today this and it has not changed with time...he wanted the war with Saddam...But somehow we do not talk about that do we Azor?
    You avoided my response on why Hussein did not back down during the intervening five months, or how Bush could have prevented the invasion of Kuwait despite being unable to coerce Hussein's withdrawal...

    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    …you are badly off topic so drop this line and get back to answering what CrowBat and I have posted....which is far more interesting that reliving the past...
    Yawn. We were discussing whether it was preferable to be facing guerrillas/subversives or conventional fighters, which is germane to this thread, as Daesh is defeated as a conventional fighting force. I have never claimed that Raqqa’s fall would end Daesh or that it would not revert to 2008-2013 form. What I did say was that once the American public sees Daesh driven underground, Washington has a greater ability to help resolve the other and more important conflicts plaguing Iraq and Syria.

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    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
    Azor...heads up...now tell me what the Trump FP response will be on this....and then check the actual locations of the four safe zones....you will notice something...but will allow you to "see" the connection to this statement...Russia: Syria safe zones to be shut for U.S., coalition planes - agencies...Russia says U.S. coalition forbidden from operating in planned Syria safe zones...
    And? Russia is in no position to impose no-fly zones on the Coalition.

    I have not been able to find a map of the proposed NFZs but regardless, I would welcome it.

    Basically, it would be a reversal of the scenario I suggested to CrowBat earlier, with Russia now being forced to fire first upon Coalition aircraft or back down. Russia will also have to explain how imposing a NFZ on the Coalition furthers the supposedly common goal of defeating Daesh. From a public relations standpoint, this places the onus on Russia to make a claim and then defend it.

    Turkey supposedly agrees with the Russian "safe zone" concept in principle, but that is meaningless in practice as Turkey is not about to shoot down U.S. aircraft operating in Syria. While Turkey is enraged at the U.S. lionizing of the YPG, Russia has provided CAS for the YPG as well. If the PKK-PYD links, allegations of YPG ethnic and sectarian cleansing and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict are being discussed so openly, rest assured that behind closed doors there are efforts to deal with the problem...

  6. #86
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    Quote Originally Posted by Azor View Post
    https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/ch...ern-caliphate/

    Selected Excerpts with emphasis added:

    In the pantheon of possibilities ranging from complete collapse to a future resurgence, the organization will likely survive its looming military defeat. This outcome is supported by historical research on insurgencies that indicate groups rarely collapse and disappear. In fact, like the past history of ISIL itself, groups are quite capable of withstanding the loss of territory by returning to earlier stages of organizing, recruiting and fund raising. While ISIL has been fixated with securing and controlling sympathetic populations in the past, it has demonstrated a remarkable ability to survive without territory, as it did between 2008 and 2013. In the future, the underground struggle that follows on the heels of the conquest of Mosul and Raqqa will not require large numbers of fighters. The group’s veterans are experienced in blending back into the local population to wage a low-level insurgency...

    Yet there is no reason to think ISIL is close to being vanquished. The two major factors that led its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, to resuscitate its organization and evolve into a truly global threat — the Syrian civil war and the political manipulation of sectarian tensions in Iraq — remain important variables in what comes next. RAND research that examined all insurgencies between 1945 and 2009 found that the most important factor in reducing their duration is the ability of the counterinsurgents to reduce the tangible support of the insurgents. To achieve this, state security services, police forces and border control are critical, and neither Iraq nor Syria can currently claim to have any of these in abundance or quality...

    Who Governs the Sunnis?

    This political question has been at the heart of the conflict since the U.S. military conducted a surge of troops and diplomats that opened the door for rapprochement between Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq and the national government in 2007. This relationship, which at one point held real promise, failed to develop and since 2010 ISIL opportunistically capitalized on its slow deterioration. By 2014, Iraqis in the Sunni majority areas gave a lukewarm embrace of ISIL that was as much of an indictment of the inept and corrupt Iraqi Sunni political class as it was of the Maliki administration’s loss of perceived legitimacy and right to rule.

    Now that Sunnis have learned the hard way that ISIL’s utopian revolution overpromised and under delivered, who will fill the vacuum? The strong organizational structure of the Iraqi Islamic Party that ruled many of the Sunni provinces failed to translate into good governance, creating the opening for ISIL to offer itself as a viable alternative. The hardliners within the broader Sunni political establishment’s attempt to return to power after its previous failures (including the embarrassing loss of Mosul) — coupled with its historical anti-western attitude — means it will be a poor partner for the Iraqi government. Still, as researcher Rasha Al Aqeedi points out, issues including corruption, mistrust in local and central politics and radical ideologies all remain major obstacles to good governance in Iraq — even more so than the conventional wisdom that Sunni rejection of a Shiite order was the primary factor leading to ISIL’s resurrection throughout the most volatile parts of the country.

    One difficult challenge in wooing Sunni politicos has been ISIL’s long-time tactic of preemption and elimination of future Sunni rivals. Starting with the dismantling of the Sahwa in Iraq, local Sunni tribal militias, and the cooption of tribal figures after 2008, ISIL’s use of calibrated violence against its own population has crippled local leaders and torn apart the social fabric— possibly permanently. Nonetheless, if regional Sunni actors can inspire the resurrection of a functioning local governance structure supported and protected by powerful benefactors ISIL will find it difficult to compete anywhere outside of the rump of the remaining caliphate...

    Furthermore, the overreliance on Iraqi counter-terrorism and special police forces as regular infantry in the fierce, door-to-door urban combat of Mosul is destroying the very capability the Iraqi state will need to win the occupation phase for a successful transition to stability, whatever form that might take. Who will fill that security vacuum? If by default the Iraqi government is forced to rely on its ad-hoc mix of popular mobilization forces, ISIL’s chances of a return in Iraq will be much higher due to its lack of legitimacy in Sunni areas. The legitimacy of the Abadi administration has been an underappreciated aspect of Iraq’s success against ISIL. This political mandate must be carried forward if the defeat of ISIL is to be a permanent one, and impending robust challenges by Abadi rivals — including former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the populist Muqtada al-Sadr — could sour Washington on future cooperation if either of these two attain power.


    In Syria, the Assad regime’s chances of reclaiming territory in former rebel-held areas are much more suspect than its counterparts in Iraq, and surprisingly more complex due to the sheer number of actors in Syria with differing political end states. Any ISIL retreat east to its remaining rump state along the Euphrates will likely open up a fierce competition for resources and influence between tribes, jihadi groups, rebel groups, the state, and state-aligned proxy forces. Unlike in Iraq, ISIL has been an outsider with limited ties in Syria, although those relationships have grown stronger as ISIL has controlled territory and influenced populations. ISIL success since 2013 in exploiting divisions and stealing away fighters demonstrates how conducive this environment is group survival, and for this reason it will remain an influential entity for some time to come...

    The challenge in Raqqa and the rest of eastern Syria will be the growing Kurdish-Arab and Kurdish-Turkish tensions. If the Kurdistan Workers’ Party aligned with Syrian Democratic Forces becomes involved in liberating urban areas, these tensions will likely erupt. Moreover, the Turks will likely never accede to a People’s Protection Unit (YPG) role in governance and the Kurdish militias could have trouble giving back what territory they are able to conquer. Despite being among the most effective fighting forces on the ground, will the Kurds eventually be jettisoned as an ally in favor of maintaining positive relations with Turkey? The United States finds itself in a precarious position, seeking at once to placate its NATO ally Turkey, while simultaneously reassuring the Kurds their hard fought gains are not just fleeting...
    Turkey has deployed more tanks to Akcakale, Urfa Province, opposite the #YPG/#PKK-held Tel Abyad, #Syria [v @metesohtaoglu].
    Attached Images Attached Images

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    Azor...so are we now going to see a rain of Trump unleashed TLAMs?????

    Assad continues to produce chemical WMD, #Iran and #Russia are aware of this, Western intel agency tells @BBCNews.
    http://bbc.in/2p4nf1k

    Assad is producing chemical WMD at branches of the #SSRC in Masyaf (Hama), Dummar and Barzeh (both near Damascus).

    "Masyaf and Barzeh facilities both specialise in installing chemical weapons on long-range missiles and artillery."

    Latest OPCW report [24 April] mentioned Barzeh and Dummar (Jamraya) as sites that had been inspected, samples taken. https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/...e_.pdf#…

    Assad—surprise!—lied about "one of [SSRC's] research branches," claiming it did "defensive" work; it "develop[s] offensive capabilities."

    Intel given to @BBCNews names Bassam al-Hassan as key in ordering CWMD attacks.

    Was sanctioned by Treasury, 05/14
    https://www.treasury.gov/press-cente...1.aspx#…
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-05-2017 at 05:51 PM.

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    Turkey is recruiting Syrians in #Bursa to join Turkish police & stating that Syrians who in Turkish police will be given Turkish citizenship

    Thuwar al-Sham fighter: "I think it is just a matter of time until [#Syria's rebels] all go to war with #HTS [al-Qaeda]."

    U.S. supplied rebels enough support to make them targets for AQ/HTS, not enough to allow them to defend themselves.
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    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-05-2017 at 05:28 PM.

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    SDF denies it reached a deal with ISIS that secures the evacuation of the extremist group from #Tabqa, reports ongoing "intensive clashes"

    Analysis by @PaulIddon: Alleged deal for #ISIS’s withdrawal in Tabqa is not unprecedented in Syria
    https://goo.gl/8gESGv

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    @ForeignPolicy Putin Has a New Secret Weapon in Syria: 1000 Chechen SF Troops.....

    http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/04/...yria-chechens/

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    Azor...heads up....

    Senior PKK commander Rıza Altun says PKK to declare Iraqi Kurdistan as a war zone and target Turkish military outposts there

    So here's fun. The U.S. has "no evidence" of an overlap between #YPG and #PKK, says the Pentagon.
    https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcr...ce-from-bag/#…

    While DoD can't detect evidence for a #YPG/#PKK overlap, here is one of their employees stood next to Sahin Cilo, a living embodiment.
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    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-05-2017 at 05:35 PM.

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    Here is the @CrisisGroup on the total integration of the #YPG within the #PKK's command structure
    https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-e...-raqqa#…
    Attached Images Attached Images

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    NATO's Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism explaining that #PYD/#YPG *is* #PKK, not an "affiliate". https://imes.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/i...ft.pdf#…

    The leadership, ideological, and personnel integration of #PKK and the #YPG/#PYD is detectable. https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/...ganda/#…
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    Azor..........

    USG has to continue the charade of distancing the PKK from the YPG/PYD for legal reasons......

    But analytically it's an ex-argument.


    WHY because it is hard to distance yourself in the US MSM if you are "suddenly seen" as supporting a Communist Kurdish terrorist group....while supposedly fighting another terrorist group...

    WILL not be good for Trump's popularity numbers if that gets out...

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    Quote Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09 View Post
    Azor...heads up ..now tell me what the Trump FP response will be on this....and then check the actual locations of the four safe zones....you will notice somethin...but will allow you to "see" the connection to this statement...

    Russia: Syria safe zones to be shut for U.S., coalition planes - agencies
    http://reut.rs/2qGMQdR

    Russia says U.S. coalition forbidden from operating in planned Syria safe zones
    http://tass.ru/politika/4233897?utm_..._social_share#
    BTW...these Russian proposed safe zones are the Russian way of "freezing the conflict"...just as they did in eastern Ukraine and Transnistria or Georgia....

    BUT WAIT......
    Neither #Syria’s opposition nor the #Assad regime agreed to sign or attend the signing of the #Astana “de-escalation/secure zone” document.

    Assad's delegation vetoed any language that implied the opposition retaining control of territory in #Syria, even if in an interim period.

    Assad’s delegation also vetoed the inclusion of language (in earlier drafts) banning #Syria’s airforce from operating over opposition areas

    Opposition is [rightly] skeptical due to lack of *any* enforcement mechanism/guarantees by stakeholder countries.

    This is the same as previous CoH/ceasefire “deals”

    We get a little calm, but then escalation after #Assad had time to prepare for Round 127
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-05-2017 at 05:55 PM.

  16. #96
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    Ragıp Soylu‏
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    @ragipsoylu
    Top Turkish officials visiting Washington today: Chief Advisor İbrahim Kalın, Turkish Military Commander Gen. Akar, Intel Chief Fidan

    Some tough conversations ahead, here.
    *U.S. isn’t going to drop the #YPG/#SDF.
    *#Turkey considers #YPG/#SDF its greatest security threat.

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    BREAKING: US troops in #Syria.
    LCCs report 250 US troops & 48 armored vehicles just entered #Syria's al-Malikiya, across from #Iraq border.

    After several months in #Turkey "Abu al-Tow” had returned home to Jabal al-Zawiyeh.
    He recently posted pics of him mocking #HTS signs.


    “Abu al-Tow” (affiliated w. #FSA’s 1st Coastal Division) returned to #Idlib as 12+ FSA groups are considering a large merger in #Idlib.

    Sources: Suheil al-Hamoud ("Abu al-Tow") only briefly went to #Turkey in early-2017. He has mostly been in west #Aleppo & northern #Idlib.

    Sources: While “Abu al-Tow” has maintained contact with the #FSA’s 1st Coastal Division, he’s recently established work with Faylaq al-Sham.

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    For those, not so firm with #Syria's geography.
    This is what the #Kremlin regime's "zones of de-escalation" mean for Western military jets

    AND Trump's FP response to this is what again????

    "even with notice"
    To be very clear: #Russia's "de-escalation zones" are indeed a justification to defend #Assad bases vs. #US air strikes.

    US and western jets will only be allowed to fly over #Raqqa and #DeirEzzor to fight ISIS.
    Also southern ISIS-held areas seem to become NFZ.
    Attached Images Attached Images
    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 05-05-2017 at 06:09 PM.

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    Default Putin Calls for Safe Zones in Syria Under Russian Supervision

    By Pavel Felgenhauer at Jamestown Foundation: https://jamestown.org/program/putin-...n-supervision/

    Selected Excerpt:

    Moscow wants to win the Syrian war and use this victory as a basis of a future dominant role in the Middle East. But this is impossible to achieve only through bombing: Moscow must split and undermine internal Syrian and international resistance to its actions. If Trump, Erdoğan and Merkel want “safe zones” in Syria for a public relations win and to curtail the flow of refugees, they may have them, the Kremlin apparently believes. Selected Syrian opposition warlords may, in turn, receive designated fiefdoms—“de-escalation zones.” Such a strategy worked in Chechnya; it could work in Syria. Or at least that is seemingly the plan.

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