Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 62
By: Vladimir Socor

https://jamestown.org/program/putin-...ochi-part-one/

*Truncated for brevity*

German Chancellor Angela Merkel took the initiative to visit Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi on May 2...

In the Putin-Merkel joint news conference, however, international media interest focused heavily on the situation in Ukraine’s east and Russia’s role therein. This persistent line of questioning led Putin and Merkel to declare their respective views at some length...

Putin’s main tactical goal is to pressure Kyiv into starting political settlement negotiations with the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics”—a process leading to their de facto recognition by Ukraine and Western disengagement from the problem. Toward that end, Russia persists with attrition warfare on the ground against Ukraine while seeking to align Western diplomacy with Russia’s interpretation of the political terms of the Minsk armistice.

As he stated in Sochi, Putin envisions four initial steps in that direction:

  1. initiating a “direct dialogue” between the “parties to the conflict,” namely Kyiv and the (as yet) “unrecognized republics”;
  2. through that dialogue, enshrine a “special status” for Donetsk-Luhansk in the Ukrainian constitution and legislation;
  3. work out a special electoral law applicable to those territories; and
  4. hold local elections in Donetsk-Luhansk that would produce recognized authorities there.


Putin, however, professed to be pessimistic about this scenario. He argued that Kyiv had at one time possessed sufficient domestic leeway to comply with the political terms of the Minsk armistice [as he interprets it], but the Ukrainian government missed that chance, its domestic leeway has since then narrowed, and the prospect of a political settlement is now receding.

That “direct dialogue” means a bilateral negotiation between co-equal parties, Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk, as the first step toward recognition of the latter by the former...

Putin’s four steps are to be understood cumulatively as the first stage, and thus his interim goal, in the overall settlement process. If Kyiv and its Western partners agree to legitimize the Donetsk-Luhansk authorities through elections (a scenario seriously considered in Berlin and Washington in 2015–2016), then Putin’s next stage would involve negotiations on the delimitation of powers between Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk, in the framework of the special status and in the Minsk armistice sequence...

With his seeming equanimity, Putin reinforces Moscow’s recent moves that may, instead of a special status, foreshadow outright secession of the Donetsk-Luhansk territory from Ukraine...

The message to Ukraine is: either concede a negotiated special status for that territory (resulting in a state within the Ukrainian state), or accept de facto the definitive separation of that territory from Ukraine. And the message to Berlin and other Western capitals implies: either pressure Kyiv to concede the special status and elections for Donetsk-Luhansk, or watch that territory’s full secession and the collapse of a diplomatic compromise between Russia and the West...

While the Kremlin’s domestic propaganda continues depicting the Ukrainian government as lacking legitimacy, Putin no longer does so in front of foreign audiences...He seemed oblivious to the implication—which Angela Merkel instantly grasped—that an illegitimate government (if such it was) could not deliver a legitimate agreement...

For, unlike Putin, the German chancellor cannot affect indifference at the possible failure of the Minsk process. Stacked though that process is against Ukraine, the German government (on a bipartisan basis) is firmly beholden to the Minsk process, connecting its fulfillment with the lifting of sanctions on Russia...Moscow expects to wait out and ride out the sanctions.

Aiming for progress on the political implementation of the Minsk armistice...was not the ambition of German Chancellor Angela Merkel when embarking on her visit to...Sochi...

Unlike Putin’s ambivalent message...Merkel reaffirmed her insistence on the fulfillment of military and political clauses, in the sequence laid down by the armistice “agreement.”

As long, however, as Russian and proxy forces continue the attrition warfare in Ukraine’s east, thus breaching the military clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the Minsk armistice, it remains impossible to advance to the follow-up political clauses. Russia wants to enforce those clauses first, which would reverse the “agreement’s” sequence...Merkel held out the lifting of sanctions at some unspecified stage in the sequenced fulfillment of military and political clauses, by Russia and Ukraine in reciprocity.

Merkel’s remarks in Sochi reveal her conception of a road map that was discussed at the “Normandy” summit...

First, the onus is on Russia to abide by the ceasefire, so as to advance to the political stage, which constitutes Russia’s priority interest. Said Merkel, “I am asking the Russian president insistently to do his best and bring about a ceasefire. This could foster an atmosphere in Ukrainian society that would make it accept painful compromises regarding the status of the Donetsk and Luhansk territories.”

Second, “We must reach the stage at which elections are held, resulting in a legitimized leadership in the Donetsk and Luhansk territories. On this basis it will then of course be possible to hold direct talks [between Kyiv and Donetsk-Luhansk]. For this we still need a lot of effort. We need a road map. This is on the table, a work in progress.” Merkel was alluding to the October 2016 proposed road map. On this second point there is a minor difference between Moscow and Berlin: while Moscow wants those direct talks to be held first...Merkel suggests holding those “elections” first...

Third, “Our firm intention remains to help Ukraine to regain access [sic] to its border. This step, however, must be preceded by a political process that would then lead to holding local elections [in Donetsk-Luhansk],” Merkel said. Inasmuch as all participants in the international negotiations unambiguously recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty in this territory, no elections could be deemed valid here without Ukraine’s advance consent that elections be held.

On the other hand, Kyiv is being asked to accept the holding of those “elections”...as a precondition to hypothetically gaining access to the border in that territory. That in turn would be conditional again on agreement with Donetsk-Luhansk...

That tangle of conditionalities is bound to end in a fiasco for Kyiv; and even if it tried, access to the border would still be at the discretion of Donetsk-Luhansk authorities as long as Russian forces are present there. Consenting to “elections” in Donetsk-Luhansk would only strengthen their hand in negotiations (not only on border control but on all issues), without restoring Ukraine’s “access” to that border. Access is a coded word being used instead of “control.” As such it denotes that the aim has been downscaled from Ukrainian border control to a negotiated arrangement between Ukraine and the two “republics,” if legitimized and de facto recognized.

Merkel concluded her remarks in Sochi with a cryptic reference to the “Steinmeier Formula.” This formula lowers the bar for “elections” in the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics” to be deemed valid and their authorities as legitimate. Prior to Steinmeier’s intervention, the negotiations envisaged (based on the Minsk armistice) that those local “elections” be deemed valid only after a positive assessment by [the OSCE]...In that case, the “republics” would presumably earn a title to their special status, which Ukraine would then have to concede. The “Steinmeier Formula,” however, proposes that Ukraine bring into effect the special status temporarily, on the day when those “elections” are held (before the polls close)...

Hours before Merkel landed in Sochi, Putin warmly received the newly elected “president” of South Ossetia, Anatoly Bibilov there. Merkel did not raise that issue...the issue of Georgia’s occupied territories has practically disappeared from the international diplomatic agenda. Perhaps, Moscow reckons that Western tenacity in the case of Crimea and Donetsk-Luhansk would run out before Moscow’s tenacity would.