PMC / Mercenaries in Iraq (catch all)

[SWJED]

Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.

Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.

From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:

One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?

...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...

Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...

Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...

But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...

Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.

[jcustis]

In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...

Plain and simple right there. It would be dumb. Might as well place a few phone calls to the Comoro Islands while theire at it, to see if they can dig up any consultants lingering around.

[Rob Thornton]

1) Hard to blame CENTCOM/MNF-I for what is essentially their approach to filling a capacity gap. The number of units and individual augmentees going into theater to do advisory work has not fallen off; it is actually on the increase as more and more units going into theater are finding some aspect of SFA and advising in their mission set. We can continue along with lots of identified but unfilled holes, or we can do what I believe is trying to be done, contracting out those gaps. Its my understanding that these are primarily meant to be support teams, which will play a key role as LOG architecture in Iraq is modified over the coming years - this may prove to be the more sustainable option. It may also allow more uniform types to go where they are critically needed vs. in the supporting structure. I'd also mention that at least one segment - those of senior level/ministerial advisor teams may actually be better filled from the pool of retirees who have worked at those levels vs. plugging a NBQ O5 into that position who has not developed the specific skill sets required for that job - he might be a hell of an Infantryman, but might not know anything about FMS or developing bureaucracy.

2) Even if we said we were going to reorganize and create something new for Iraq, it would take some real time to get there. We can outline new stuff on paper, but until we actually recruit, train, equip and grow our own force structure - the holes would continue to go unfilled - a concern for MNF-I/CENTCOM who must contend with current and future conditions which not only reflect those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also those here on the domestic political front. In my opinion, they are taking action as opposed to leaving it up to hope.

3) We have not determined if Iraq and Afghanistan are representative of the real demand signal for SFA in a given state. While we know the requirements in both of those places, and we know that we are not meeting them like we'd like to (e.g. development across their security services has been uneven not because we like it that way, but because we've had to make choices due to our own resource constraints). It may be that Iraq and Afghanistan are not representative of future SFA requirements with regard to any one state. Regime change, and the complete dismantlement or destruction of a security sector have created requirements that may not reflect the typical future requirement for SFA - its hard to say for sure, but I think unless we have a situation where regime change is a requirement and the complete destruction or dismantlement of that regime's security sector is a requirement, we'd be well advised to consider alternative ways of generating, organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising FSFs - its just that big of an investment, and the political objective needs to be of commensurate importance - as I contend they are in Iraq. Future SFA may look different in its scope.

4) You could make the issue that all ground forces should be converted to TTs to meet the CENTCOM demand signal, however - as I mentioned in points one and two - most units going over now already are touching SFA in some way - and there is still some requirements there to do the things that BCTs do best as well. If you converted them all to work as advisors exclusively you'd create risk in other areas - some of it would be of the unacceptable type. There is also the issue of our global commitments - as important as Iraq and Afghanistan are - we still have other GCCs to support - the number of violent places seems to be on the uptick.

Singer had some decent points, and in a perfect world where we had the luxury to concentrate on 1 or even 2 things for awhile, where we had all the resources we could ask for, where we wrote something on paper and received authorization and funding for it, and it was filled the same day - we might come up with more palletable, please everyone solutions. These are not the times we live in. - the low hanging fruit disappeared from the tree some time ago. Can we do better - probably some - particularly in the individual leadership piece - but that is almost always the case. Hopefully they have done the legwork to determine what advisory efforts within the broader whole require a set of ACUs/Cammies over a pair of slacks and knit polo. It may be the best we can do based on the rules of supply and demand.

Anyway, just a few thoughts, things never seem to be quite as easy or straight forward as think tanks paint them.


Best, Rob

[sandbag]

On the uniform side, is it possible we just aren't matching skill sets properly? My view on MITT assignments is that they're filled by the "shotgun blast" method of old-fashioned quotas per branch/OCF. Perhaps we (Army) might want to look at who is needed as opposed to the what (re: OH SH*T FILL THOSE SLOTS, ASSIGNMENTS GUY) as a method. The unit-driven MITT concept, while an improvement in C4I and internal log, is still flawed so long as we're driven to frothy-mouthed desperation in staffing those units.

[John T. Fishel]

to contracting for things that should be inherently governmental!

In general, contracting training of other people's militaries (and police) is something that should be done by the USG (and its allied governments). That said, if Rob is correct, then some of the current contracting is, indeed, legitimate. On one issue, however, I would argue that there is little reason to use contractors and that is in the Ministry Support Teams. Here, the expertise lies in the USAR Civil Affairs Commands and is an outgrowth of their function beginning in WWII. The MSTs were pioneered in Panama, Kuwait, and Haiti and draw on the functional teams inherent in a CA Command and the civilian expertise that members bring.

Is there a place for contractor's in the MSTs? Some of us older guys who have retired could be brought in under contract to fill holes in the MSTs but, I think it would be better, cheaper, and easier to simply recall some of us to active duty out of the retired reserve.

Cheers

JohnT

[Old Eagle]

Edison once said that he never failed in his experiments, but in the process of developing something like the incandescent light bulb, he discovered 10,000 ways that didn't work.

Well, we have discovered a host of ways that don't work in the security force assistance business.

The is documented evidence from multiple previous advisory efforts demonstrates that advisors need certain psychological skills and that they need to be developed in order to be successful. Yet, as sandbag points out, HRC uses the shotgun method of assigning advisors. There are combat advisors in Iraq or on their way who have NO combat experience and stale tactical experience. Luckily, they had a wealth of "dwell time", so they would obviously make great advisors.

You can also look at the experience HRC (I love Sean Byrne like a brother) sent to John Nagl to train advisors out at Riley -- Very few former advisors. Even now that the assignment process has improved, the ratio of advisors to the rest of the faculty ain't great.

Ministry-level advisors. Gotta disagree w/John T. At the ministry level, contractors (the right ones, guys like John T. and others who have served on national-level staffs) make great advisors, as long as they have other skills. Or maybe the Service chiefs just need greater recall authority. MRD moves a lot of talent out of the Army (and other Services). Haul these guys back in and put them in uniform. I'd take the tax breaks, awards, financial accouterments and add'l 2-1/2 percent retirement increase any day of the week.

Essentially government services. Although this belongs on the contractor thread, let me just say that the definition of what government essential services subsume has been debated long and hard, and to date no one has come up with a meaningful solution. The sound bites offered by talking heads conveniently dodge major war-stopping issues, but sound good. I can tell you that the mindset of government employee good, contractor bad is not useful.

Have a great Memorial Day!

[John T. Fishel]

took me a while to figure out what we disagree about. I think I've got it though. I would not reject pulling in as contractors for MSTs old geezers like us although, as we both said, recall from the Retired Reserve would be a better option.

I do think that in the 350th, 351st, and 352nd CA Commands there are probably enough relatively senior folk - with the needed civilain skills (unless we've lost those guys in the last decade) - to man the required MSTs (perhaps with some augmentation by contractors or recalled retirees as above). Or, do we disagree on this?

Have a super Memorial Day, all.

Cheers

JohnT