PMC / Mercenaries in Iraq (catch all)

[SWJED]

All Hands On Deck – Radically Reorienting Private Security in Iraq by Malcolm Nance at Small Wars Journal Blog.

Authors Note: This article was written in late August 2007, well before the present controversy over the Mansour neighborhood shootings by Blackwater Security. It is not a response or intended to address that incident.

The role of Private Security Companies (PSCs) operating in Iraq has always been controversial. It is said Iraq is a ‘different kind of war’. That is true in the sense that all Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines, no matter what their regular duties, suddenly became light infantry in a vicious counterinsurgency. It is a battle without a rear area and an extremely small military presence in proportion to the local population.

Rear area security, perimeter security and highway escort of supplies were once the domain of the Military Police and light infantry units. They virtually belong to PSCs now. Originally, a temporary measure for reconstruction, PSCs are deeply enmeshed in the fabric of Iraqi security.

It is far too late to argue whether more combat forces should have been brought to Iraq in the first place. Reconstruction priorities proved to be a significant drain on the U.S.'s already-overstretched force. The massive plan to completely redevelop Iraq’s war damaged infrastructure and get oil and energy back on line became a high priority for the Bush administration. Other projects included refurbishing the national electrical grid, rebuilding destroyed bridges, revitalizing the southern Iraq marshes, demining the battlefields, investigating Saddam’s crimes against humanity and a wide-spread democracy building program. For a society of 25 million people, this effort was massive. These projects employ tens of thousands of American, British and Iraqi partners who had one thing in common at the start. They had no security. The US Army could not provide it and the need for follow on security forces was clear. There was a pressing need for PSCs in Iraq and with it came unforeseeable troubles such a group could bring...

Much more at the link...

[tequila]

Looks like SecDef Gates has been reading Abu Buckwheat ...

Pentagon sees one authority over contractors - NYTIMES - 16 Oct.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is pressing for the nearly 10,000 armed security contractors now working for the United States government in Iraq to fall under a single authority, most likely the American military, in an effort to bring Blackwater USA under tighter control, senior administration officials and Pentagon advisers say.

That idea is facing resistance from the State Department, which relies heavily for protection in Iraq on some 2,500 private guards, including more than 800 Blackwater contractors, to provide security for American diplomats in Baghdad. The State Department has said it should retain control over those guards, despite Blackwater’s role in a September shooting in Baghdad that exposed problems in the current oversight arrangements.

In practical terms, placing the private security guards who now work for the military, the State Department and other government agencies under a single authority would mean that those armed civilians would no longer have different bosses and different rules. Pentagon advisers say it would also allow better coordination between the security contractors and American military commanders, who have long complained that the contractors often operate independently ...

[John T. Fishel]

in terms of resoving the immediate and near term problem. His proposal also goes a long way toward defining what should be the proper command relationship between PSCs and the USG in future operations. What he doesn't address - and this is not a criticism - is the proper role of PSCs (and other contractors.

The expanded role of contractors including PSCs was a long time in the making. I watched contracting expand during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations long before the current war. I have seen contractors, including PSCs, performing appropriate roles extremely well. But I have also seen abuse and, more importantly, role expansion into areas that I believe properly belong to the government and the government alone.

One issue in contracting - especially for PSCs - is the terms of the contract. I am quite sure that the terms of Blackwater's contract with DOS are reasonably interpreted to protect their FSO charges against any and all threats by whatever means are necessary. Such a contract - one that is open to this type of interpretation - is certainly a part of the problem. The culprit here is not the PSC but its client (in this case DOS which seems to have forgotten that its FSOs are commissioned officers of the USG and, therefore, can be required to take risks that other civilian employees do not have to take). At the same time, the PSC should not be off the hook for overzealous (at best) behavior in what appears at first glance to be a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach to personnel security. Mr, Nance's proposal would go a long way toward resolving this problem as well as providing time to develop appropriate policies and roles for government contractors and, especially, PSCs.

[SteveMetz]

in terms of resoving the immediate and near term problem. His proposal also goes a long way toward defining what should be the proper command relationship between PSCs and the USG in future operations. What he doesn't address - and this is not a criticism - is the proper role of PSCs (and other contractors.

The expanded role of contractors including PSCs was a long time in the making. I watched contracting expand during the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations long before the current war. I have seen contractors, including PSCs, performing appropriate roles extremely well. But I have also seen abuse and, more importantly, role expansion into areas that I believe properly belong to the government and the government alone.

One issue in contracting - especially for PSCs - is the terms of the contract. I am quite sure that the terms of Blackwater's contract with DOS are reasonably interpreted to protect their FSO charges against any and all threats by whatever means are necessary. Such a contract - one that is open to this type of interpretation - is certainly a part of the problem. The culprit here is not the PSC but its client (in this case DOS which seems to have forgotten that its FSOs are commissioned officers of the USG and, therefore, can be required to take risks that other civilian employees do not have to take). At the same time, the PSC should not be off the hook for overzealous (at best) behavior in what appears at first glance to be a "shoot first and ask questions later" approach to personnel security. Mr, Nance's proposal would go a long way toward resolving this problem as well as providing time to develop appropriate policies and roles for government contractors and, especially, PSCs.

It's amazing that attention is just now falling on this. T.X. Hammes made the same point about security details several years ago. Ricks quoted him in Fiasco (which, incidentally, I'm currently re-reading as research for my book. )

[John T. Fishel]

And I thought that my comments were 'original" since they were based on experiences and observations as a soldier, a contractor, and a DOD civilian.
It is interesting that others made similar observations earlier. Since my education is sorely lacking in that I have never read Hammes and haven't gotten around to Rick's yet, would you be good enough to provide the full Hammes citation and the Ricks page citation?

Thanks

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

I almost find it amusing in that I worked the same issue in Goma in 94 with Stan and we were trying to improve security in the camps for international organizations and NGO workers, The solution was to get a Zairian-Israeli security firm to take on the job and that happened over time and some metamorphisis.

State was against given anyone the authority to shoot as needed because they were not in the camps. My DCM declared the folks I was recruiting to be "thugs."

Now it seems it is shoot anyone who even seems a threat to an FSO.

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

the times they are a'changin'. Although, it was clear in the 80s in Panama that State was more concerned about threats to the precious bodies of their FSOs (and their comforts) than running any personal risk. (Perhaps, I am being too harsh.)

[Stan]

I almost find it amusing in that I worked the same issue in Goma in 94 with Stan and we were trying to improve security in the camps for international organizations and NGO workers, The solution was to get a Zairian-Israeli security firm to take on the job and that happened over time and some metamorphisis.

State was against given anyone the authority to shoot as needed because they were not in the camps. My DCM declared the folks I was recruiting to be "thugs."

Now it seems it is shoot anyone who even seems a threat to an FSO.

Tom

Hey Tom,
Indeed, they were our thugs and considering the local situation, mst likely the best to handle said.

Distasteful I recall from the embassy right about the point John JA JA directed us into a war zone with an Izuzu Trooper, so he and his better half (the blonde bomb shell from K-town) could report first hand...the war was over What a Delta Hotel he was.

I'd bet your retirement (no, not mine just yet), that John would fully employ BW or even our Israeli/Civil Guard if we had to do it all over again.

They had already paid a family off with $20K to preclude embarrassment when a drunk officer ran a push cart flat. There are no limits

[SteveMetz]

And I thought that my comments were 'original" since they were based on experiences and observations as a soldier, a contractor, and a DOD civilian.
It is interesting that others made similar observations earlier. Since my education is sorely lacking in that I have never read Hammes and haven't gotten around to Rick's yet, would you be good enough to provide the full Hammes citation and the Ricks page citation?

Thanks

JohnT

I also quote T.X. on that point in my Rethinking Insurgency monograph. Guess you haven't gotten around to THAT either!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


The passage is on pages 370-371 of Fiasco.

I have to pass on an anecdote about Fiasco though. On pp. 323-324 Ricks wrote, "'Rotating nearly the entire force at once degraded capability, [and that] may have contributed to loss of control over several cities in the Sunni Triangle,' wrote the Iraq Stabilization Study Team, a group at the [Army War] college's Strategic Studies Institute that has produced some of the military establishment's most insightful work on the Iraq war."

Let me tell you who was on said "team": me. We did a two part study in 2003. The main part dealt with the conventional ops. When the professor who prepared it briefed our Commandant, he was berated for putting the names of the analytical team on the first slide. He was told that you don't put individual names on tasked studies. Lesson learned. I ran up to the office and took my name off of the first slide of my briefing (which dealt with the "postconflict" period). I had to put something there, so I made up the name "Iraq Stabilization Study Team."

Actually, my briefing was never official released, so someone leaked it to Tom. But I need to fill him in on this next time I see him.

[Tom Odom]

Actually, my briefing was never official released, so someone leaked it to Tom. But I need to fill him in on this next time I see him.

Be sure and get the team's approval before you do....