there are closer to 180,000 contractors there and upwards of 50k are security contractors. When Gen Shinseki suggested a few hundred thousand troops, we was surely assuming the force would be somewhat unified. He surely didn't imagine that over half of the force would be outside the command structure, virtual black boxes to ground commanders, and operating tactically willfully in many cases ignoring strategic consequences of their actions.
Thanks, I figured the number (total military combat troops) couldn't be as low as 20,000.Originally Posted by Ken White
Thoughts on SOC-SMG security firm
Just wanted to see what anyone else thought about SOC-SMG, a company contracted to provide facility security at US posts in Iraq. The security guards are all African, and the actual contractors are American. Just for fun some of us would test their "defense" by using each others ID cards to gain access to facilities (they usually guard the chow hall, MWR, or gym). It worked everytime. Sometimes we would even use the same card for two people at the same time, one guy behind the other. They never caught us.
This may seem childish, but it served a useful purpose for me...what if I really was a individual who meant to do real harm and was able to get in there. These guys don't only guard the chow hall, but also the inner security perimiter of the base.
If the government is going to lay down millions of taxpayer dollars to a company to protect support facilities and free up more troop manpower from guard duty, at least they could use a better quality security company. Better yet, lets not waste anymore unnecessary taxpayer dollars and get rid of the contract.
It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare; it is because we do not dare that they are difficult.
Seneca
Welcome to the SWC !
All things said and done, I recall that Namibian company shutting down in October this year. Seems they were just as displeased with their contract as you folks were with their performance.
Having lived and worked many years in Sub-Sahara and concluded countless contracts for the USG, your real gripe is with the USG (more than likely the State department).
Let’s face facts, people with a 6th grade education from Texas or Congo still have a sixth grade education and still work for far less than say you or I would be willing.
Contractual obligations however do not take this into account. You as the recipient needs to step up and indicate that services are not up to snuff.
Please take a moment and introduce yourself here.
To You and Yours a Safe and Happy Holiday Season !
I agree, although one may think SOC-SMG is at fault (and to an extent they are in my opinion), the reality is that the government is ultimately the one responsible for awarding the contract to the comapny.
It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare; it is because we do not dare that they are difficult.
Seneca
I disagree...I would not fault SOC-SMG. In essense they are doing the best job they can with the money they are given. They are a private for profit company and as such need to show a profit. However, they are the lowest bidder, and therefore the government gives them the contract. They government cannot afford to pay expats 15,000/month to man internal security, so they have forced companies like SOC-SMG (EODT, Sabre and a couple other companies also do this work on other bases) to find ways of cutting their overhead...paying a TCN 1000/month is a way of doing that.
So the question is...who is at fault...the Private COmpany that was awarded the contract, or the governemnet for chosing the lowest bidder?
Sorry CT
Respectfully disagree.
Companies are in business to make a profit. Check
Companies do as much as possible to maximize that profit/pad the pockets of the executives.
Companies do as little as possible at the pointy end in order to accomplish the above.
Companies will perform to the standards which the gov't enforces.
Therefore -- gotta set the bar high and keep them honest. Means reporting discrepancies, etc.
This really isn't a proper view of the contracting process. The government isn't "forcing" anyone to do anything. The government identifies a need and puts out an invitation for bids (IFB) or request for proposals (RFP), depending on the need. Companies that can meet that need then review the requirements as set forth in the IFB or RFP and, if they can meet them, submit a bid or proposal. If they determine that they cannot make a profit, then they shouldn't bid. Indeed, I know of no companies that would bid if they didn;t see a profit. They may cut overhead by hiring TCNs or something like that, but they must still meet the requirements.
Now the rub is whether the government is properly overseeing the contract. This falls into the hands of the contracting officer or his representative. He is responsible for ensuring that the terms of the contract are satisfied. Hopefully, Gnaeus reported his findings up the chain.
Just because the government selects the lowest bidder does not mean it is at fault. Sure, the lowest bidder is usually selected for contract award, but price is never the only consideration. The bidder must be responsive and responsible. This basically means that the bidder must demonstrate an ability to perform the contract and to meet the terms of the contract. A term in use for some contracts is "lowest price technically acceptable." If you look at it in these terms then you see that the government is using the ocntracting process to ensure that any awardee is capable of meeting the contract requirements. Of course, capable and actually doing it are two different things and this is where the contracting officer comes in. As Stan and Old Eagle indicate, oversight is key.
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Who put YOU on the Red Team?
Yeah, it does.
Other than amusing yourself, what useful purpose did you serve?
If you have legitimate concerns you could have addressed them to the NCOIC of the facility, or to PMO, or to the Force Protection Officer. Or you could be real grown up and express your issues to the SOC-SMG Site Manager. Be sure to have your plausible explanation for how screwing with the Ugandans is within your lane.
Force protection is in everyone's lane. Whether he should have done what he did or not is now irrelevant. He identified a potential security breach and now it needs to be addressed; although it should have been done then.
Speaking as one who has performed security guard duties, using another's ID to gain access isn't screwing with someone if they're doing their job. If it had been me, rest assured he wouldn't have gotten in with another's ID. I would have turned him away and would have made him use another entrance just to show him that I'm master of my domain (General Order #12 is always in effect).
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Hmm. Good thing I wasn't the Gunny
in that scenario 'cause I'd have had strip of hide. What if he went to another entrance and someone not as alert as you let him in? Depending on the local rules, he shoulda been detained -- at a minimum you should've confiscated the improper ID to turn in. Attempts and tricks like that just for fun may be tolerated nowadays but let me tell you, Mac, back in the Old Corps, we usedta ...
All hypotheticals (and in fun) of course but even as long as it's been I still remember both the 12th and the 11th GOs...
Testing and Evaluating the Guard Force is not in everyone's lane
Complying with FP regulations, cooperating with FP personnel, and reporting FP threats is in everybody's lane. Instigating controversy for ####s and grins just gets the Ugandan sent home and ends up making it a helluva lot harder to get everybody fed at lunch.
People want to play games, each and every uniformed service member can have their CAC card run through a Hand Held Terminal and recite their PIN every time they want to eat.
If it can prevent this (Carnage in Mosul), I'm all for it.
Luckily for me, my chow hall was guarded by some fine soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division ("Balls of the Eagle," "No Slack;" see I speak Army).
-john bellflower
Rule of Law in Afghanistan
"You must, therefore know that there are two means of fighting: one according to the laws, the other with force; the first way is proper to man, the second to beasts; but because the first, in many cases, is not sufficient, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the second." -- Niccolo Machiavelli (from The Prince)
Well maybe they should. They do that at the residence hall dining facilities on my university. Any student who wants to eat has to have his or her ID with them and have it swiped before they can enter. No card, no food. And the gate folks are supposed to compare the picture with the bearer (and most do...not worth your job just to let some idiot eat on someone else's meal plan). They're even going over to a palmprint system within the next year or so. And that's just for dorm food.
And on a side note, I'd appreciate it if folks could keep this discussion civil. That includes basic things like refraining from posting responses in either ALL CAPS or all bold. Thanks.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Did you mean what useful purpose did it serve or what useful purpose did I serve? I will assume you mean the former.
I will try to address your concerns the best I can. First, maybe childish and just for fun were bad choice phrases to use. There was necessity in doing this. First of all, we had a job to do and tasks to accomplish. Has one of my fellow Marines forgotten thier ID card and then when they returned to the FOB, only then did they realize that they did not have it. Sure...that thing could have possibly happened over the course of a deployment. So, now, we are posed with a delima. Do I try to explain for 15 minutes to a security guard that this Marine left his ID on the FOB, but verify to him...who has no authority over me or is not in my chain of command...that this is individual is in fact a United States Marine, even though this security guard can barely understand English. Or, do I make another choice. We're tired, hungry, and the sun is down. We may have returned to our FOB, but it will still be another serveral hours before we finally rack out. Do I really have time for this? By the mere fact that I could have pulled this off, shows the whole internal security situation to be a farce.
Second. There was no PMO. The first, MP unit to roll into our FOB arrived as we were preparing to leave. But, as you probably know, just being an MP unit doesn't make you PMO.
Third. I literally had about a hundred tasks to accomplish in a single day. What number do you think talking to the site manager was on my list?
After we were able to get through the first time this peaked my interest. So, we "tested" it a few more times. This was by no means a normal or everyday occurance. 99% of the time we went through the regular routine, all presenting our own valid cards, and proceeded about normally.
Maybe it would have been better to say it was an experiment born out of a situation that arose during a specific time period. I recall something similar to this happening in the news when agents smuggled bomb making materials through TSA checkpoints. Fortunately we had only ourselves and our equipment to bring through the gate.
Now that I'm back in the States I can address this issue. I assumed that taking it to a fourm for discussion would be a good starting point. Criticize the issue, but do not go into a personal attack.
It is not because things are difficult that we do not dare; it is because we do not dare that they are difficult.
Seneca
How can you address the issue from back in the rear?
What useful purpose did your little Red Team exercise serve? What deficiency did you identify to anyone who could correct the deficiency?
Ass U Me. Not out of me, Devil Dog.I will assume you mean the former.
Particularly bad if you consider any agreement with your own characterization a personal attack.First, maybe childish and just for fun were bad choice phrases to use.
Your fellow Marine was in the wrong.There was necessity in doing this. First of all, we had a job to do and tasks to accomplish. Has one of my fellow Marines forgotten thier ID card and then when they returned to the FOB, only then did they realize that they did not have it.
Does a security contractor manning an entry control point not have the same authority to challenge you or your CAC cardless buddy when you try to get into his DFAC as you have over him when he tries to get into your ASP?Sure...that thing could have possibly happened over the course of a deployment. So, now, we are posed with a delima. Do I try to explain for 15 minutes to a security guard that this Marine left his ID on the FOB, but verify to him...who has no authority over me
Is this another assumption on your part, or did you attempt to explain? Most of the Ugandans speak some English. He wasn't in radio contact with his Supervisor?even though this security guard can barely understand English.
Your buddy is running around without his CAC card, you are aiding and abetting unauthorized entry into the facility, and the whole internal security situation is a farce because both of you aren't face down in the gravel?Or, do I make another choice. We're tired, hungry, and the sun is down. We may have returned to our FOB, but it will still be another serveral hours before we finally rack out. Do I really have time for this? By the mere fact that I could have pulled this off, shows the whole internal security situation to be a farce.
[QUOTE] Second. There was no PMO. The first, MP unit to roll into our FOB arrived as we were preparing to leave. But, as you probably know, just being an MP unit doesn't make you PMO.[/UNQUOTE]
No Facility NCOIC? No Force Protection Officer? No Guard Force Supervisor?
Quite low, obviously. What has caused this incident to rise to the top of your priority list so many months later?Third. I literally had about a hundred tasks to accomplish in a single day. What number do you think talking to the site manager was on my list?
Who did you report the results of your "test" to? What use was made of the information you obtained? What deficiencies were corrected through your diligence as a self-appointed Assistant Contracting Officer's Representative?After we were able to get through the first time this peaked my interest. So, we "tested" it a few more times. This was by no means a normal or everyday occurance. 99% of the time we went through the regular routine, all presenting our own valid cards, and proceeded about normally.
What gate would this be?Maybe it would have been better to say it was an experiment born out of a situation that arose during a specific time period. I recall something similar to this happening in the news when agents smuggled bomb making materials through TSA checkpoints. Fortunately we had only ourselves and our equipment to bring through the gate.
Negative. The time to address the issue in a positive manner was when you discovered the deficiency. The people who should have been made aware of it at the time have been deprived of your input from then until now. And many of those people may well be gone by now.Now that I'm back in the States I can address this issue.
See paragraph 4 above.I assumed that taking it to a fourm for discussion would be a good starting point.
If you consider criticism a personal attack, perhaps you can understand how people who work for SOC-SMG or who have worked with them could consider your statements slanderous.Criticize the issue, but do not go into a personal attack.
1-866-369-9100 is the toll free number to SOC-SMG.
ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil <ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil> can probably hook you up with AT/FP at the FOB in question.
Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising
Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.
Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.
From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:
Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?
...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...
Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...
Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...
But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...
Plain and simple right there. It would be dumb. Might as well place a few phone calls to the Comoro Islands while theire at it, to see if they can dig up any consultants lingering around.In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...
Just a few thoughts
1) Hard to blame CENTCOM/MNF-I for what is essentially their approach to filling a capacity gap. The number of units and individual augmentees going into theater to do advisory work has not fallen off; it is actually on the increase as more and more units going into theater are finding some aspect of SFA and advising in their mission set. We can continue along with lots of identified but unfilled holes, or we can do what I believe is trying to be done, contracting out those gaps. Its my understanding that these are primarily meant to be support teams, which will play a key role as LOG architecture in Iraq is modified over the coming years - this may prove to be the more sustainable option. It may also allow more uniform types to go where they are critically needed vs. in the supporting structure. I'd also mention that at least one segment - those of senior level/ministerial advisor teams may actually be better filled from the pool of retirees who have worked at those levels vs. plugging a NBQ O5 into that position who has not developed the specific skill sets required for that job - he might be a hell of an Infantryman, but might not know anything about FMS or developing bureaucracy.
2) Even if we said we were going to reorganize and create something new for Iraq, it would take some real time to get there. We can outline new stuff on paper, but until we actually recruit, train, equip and grow our own force structure - the holes would continue to go unfilled - a concern for MNF-I/CENTCOM who must contend with current and future conditions which not only reflect those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also those here on the domestic political front. In my opinion, they are taking action as opposed to leaving it up to hope.
3) We have not determined if Iraq and Afghanistan are representative of the real demand signal for SFA in a given state. While we know the requirements in both of those places, and we know that we are not meeting them like we'd like to (e.g. development across their security services has been uneven not because we like it that way, but because we've had to make choices due to our own resource constraints). It may be that Iraq and Afghanistan are not representative of future SFA requirements with regard to any one state. Regime change, and the complete dismantlement or destruction of a security sector have created requirements that may not reflect the typical future requirement for SFA - its hard to say for sure, but I think unless we have a situation where regime change is a requirement and the complete destruction or dismantlement of that regime's security sector is a requirement, we'd be well advised to consider alternative ways of generating, organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising FSFs - its just that big of an investment, and the political objective needs to be of commensurate importance - as I contend they are in Iraq. Future SFA may look different in its scope.
4) You could make the issue that all ground forces should be converted to TTs to meet the CENTCOM demand signal, however - as I mentioned in points one and two - most units going over now already are touching SFA in some way - and there is still some requirements there to do the things that BCTs do best as well. If you converted them all to work as advisors exclusively you'd create risk in other areas - some of it would be of the unacceptable type. There is also the issue of our global commitments - as important as Iraq and Afghanistan are - we still have other GCCs to support - the number of violent places seems to be on the uptick.
Singer had some decent points, and in a perfect world where we had the luxury to concentrate on 1 or even 2 things for awhile, where we had all the resources we could ask for, where we wrote something on paper and received authorization and funding for it, and it was filled the same day - we might come up with more palletable, please everyone solutions. These are not the times we live in. - the low hanging fruit disappeared from the tree some time ago. Can we do better - probably some - particularly in the individual leadership piece - but that is almost always the case. Hopefully they have done the legwork to determine what advisory efforts within the broader whole require a set of ACUs/Cammies over a pair of slacks and knit polo. It may be the best we can do based on the rules of supply and demand.
Anyway, just a few thoughts, things never seem to be quite as easy or straight forward as think tanks paint them.
Best, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 05-13-2008 at 12:01 AM.
On the uniform side, is it possible we just aren't matching skill sets properly? My view on MITT assignments is that they're filled by the "shotgun blast" method of old-fashioned quotas per branch/OCF. Perhaps we (Army) might want to look at who is needed as opposed to the what (re: OH SH*T FILL THOSE SLOTS, ASSIGNMENTS GUY) as a method. The unit-driven MITT concept, while an improvement in C4I and internal log, is still flawed so long as we're driven to frothy-mouthed desperation in staffing those units.
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