The War on Terrorism is the Correct Label

[SWJED]

Latest entry on the SWJ Blog by Jim Guirard of the TrueSpeak Institute - The War on Terrorism is the Correct Label.

Peter Beinert's "The War of the Words" essay in the Washington Post (Op-ed, April 1) is seriously lacking on several counts. He demonstrates the same blind spots and faulty analysis as the Pelosi-Murtha House Democrats do when they issue a cut-and-run document which, along with other nonsense, condemns use of the "Global War on Terrorism" label...

If you like this op-ed please go here - Real Clear Politics - and give it a vote - thanks...

[Bob's World]

http://www.theatlantic.com/internati...istake/244667/

I am frequently hard on our intel community. Justifiably so. Sure, they are smart, hard working, and completely dedicated to the task of finding and describing threats. No issues there. They just don't understand the nature of the conflict we are in and refuse to evolve or listen to those who might be able to help them in that regard.

But when I read this today I had to agree completely. Particularly in regards to 9/11 being much more a crime than an act of war (one must take into account the nature of the actor, as well as the nature of the act when making such an assessment); and also in regards to the illogic of going into Iraq. I have never understood that one from the moment the first snowflake of "start thinking about Iraq" drifted down to my work station in the Army AOC from Secretary Rumsfeld's stand up desk.

Click the embedded link in the Atlantic article to get to the tape and transcripts of the full text of this exchange.

[jmm99]

I'm not going to get into a legal argument with you about the legal and policy views of Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller. As to her, I had more than my fill following the Binyam Mohamed proceedings in the US and UK courts. They BTW reached strikingly different results. For those interested, do an Advanced Google Search on "Eliza Manningham-Buller" "binyam mohamed" - with about 15,500 results. BLUF: I disagree with her basic premises; and thus, her conclusions.

As to legal arguments, I've had my fill of making them. They simply tend to go around in circles - unless you are making them for an actual decision maker, who can cut them short and decide which one wins. So, IMO, legal arguments here are generally a waste of valuable time that could be spent (by me, at least) on much better things.

That being said, I've never seen the value (from policy and political standpoints) of relying solely on the criminal law, or solely on military force, to deal with such as AQ and their minions. In short, I see nothing wrong with "declaring war" (an AUMF) on a group of violent non-state actors. That, BTW, is really a political decision - not a legal decision. "Declaring war" on a tactic (terrorism) is an obvious misuse of language.

Why tie one hand behind your back (whether that one hand be the criminal law or military force) in confronting these knuckleheads ?

Regards

[Ken White]

But when I read this today I had to agree completely. Particularly in regards to 9/11 being much more a crime than an act of war (one must take into account the nature of the actor, as well as the nature of the act when making such an assessment);

Possibly true on the crime bit. It is certainly arguable. It is also irrelevant. The international criminal justice system was and is no more prepared to deal with non state actors flying airplanes into buildings than was or is the US DoD. Anything done would have been ad-hocery to the tenth power and would have been of marginal value with all sorts of cock-ups. As, indeed, was the case...

I'd also note that if it was accorded status as a crime, implied is capture and trial of the perps -- that would have been a real circus.

The only really effective response would be to track down and kill all those involved and their families unto fifth Cousins or thereabouts and the sooner the better. Rightly or wrongly, we do not operate that way; thus any action would have been of only marginal effectiveness and all things considered, the military was in a better position to take some sort of action than was law enforcement -- that's why they got the job. The facts that several pre-emptive efforts had been mounted but cancelled at the last minute by vacillating politicians and that both law enforcement agencies and the armed forces had adequate warning of the likelihood of such attacks but were ill prepared is an indictment of those Politicians and our ponderous political (and military...) system -- it is also reality.

Make no mistake, in the US, something had to be done simply because that's the way -- wrongly but universally -- we operate; the Pols must be seen as doing something -- even if it is wrong as is usually the case...

and also in regards to the illogic of going into Iraq. I have never understood that one from the moment the first snowflake of "start thinking about Iraq" drifted down to my work station in the Army AOC from Secretary Rumsfeld's stand up desk.

I'm surprised that a Stratagerist doesn't understand that. Not agreeing with it is one thing, not understanding it is another. It wasn't illogical, it resulted from flawed thinking in some aspects but there was a sound logical basis.

The need to be seen doing something to effectively respond to probes from the ME over almost 30 prior years; doing that without greatly disturbing world oil trade; the geographic centrality of Iraq; its size and ease of access by air, sea and land; the pariah status of its leader; base locations the US has long wanted in the area (for what reason is a different question...); halting the conversion of international oil trade from dollars to Euros, disrupting the French, German and Russian economic hegemony in the area and returning it to a UK /US fief; disrupting the EU Constitutional process -- literally dozens of good reasons. Shame about the terribly flawed execution. That, however was the fault of the US Army, not Bush or Rumsfeld.

Flawed execution does not denote an illogical effort. The fact that it was rushed was due to US domestic politics. Bush believed something needed to be done, he accepted the dippy neocon plan and had it modified to suit his purposes -- do something significant to get the attention of folks in the ME (in contrast to his four predecessors who swatted flies and as opposed to Afghanistan which is not part of the ME; Afghanistan was do not attck the US on its soil, Iraq was do not attack US interests anywhere...), do it in order to lock in his successor, do that in the first term just in case he did not get reelected, do it to spend lots of money to also hog-tie said successor...

One can disagree with any or all that but none of it is illogical. Though any or all can be 'wrong' in the view of some.

Nah, it was logical, just not done very well -- yet more examples of how the US domestic political scene totally drives our foreign policy and how the US Army isn't quite as good as it likes to say it is (I think it knows better but it cannot say that).

[Chris jM]

One can disagree with any or all that but none of it is illogical. Though any or all can be 'wrong' in the view of some.

To identify logic to strategic actions of many players in recent times (America being but one) I imagine that you are making assumptions and deductions. For example, you were told that intervention into Iraq was necessary because of WMDs, whereas my small populous get the line that commitment to Afghanistan is necessary for democracy/int'l security/stability to prevail. It seems that we all assume realism occurs behind the scenes, yet idealism is all that is preached to the masses (of course it's a little more blurred than that, but for the sake of argument I'd suggest that this generalisation is more or less correct).

I don't think that the US is alone, either - Stratfor has done some recent articles on the German actions in the Eurozone crises, and alleges that Berlin is trying to increase her control over the Euro block but cannot/ will not speak in those terms.

Heading back to the opening posts, the term 'war on terror' can only be described as an opiate for the masses, rendering the complexities of geopolitics as part of the mythic good-v-evil struggle that is as easily retweeted as the central plot of any of the Star Wars movies.

Essentially, I wonder if the topic here is less the accuracy of words and more about how we are governed and led, and about how the governing elite in a democracy establishes support for and sells their plans to their constituency.

[Fuchs]

I tend to prefer "Phony War on Terrorism" or "Stupid War on terrorism".

Because well, you wouldn't attack Saddam and side with his Kurdish foes if you were waging war on terrorism. The Kurds were the only ones harboring terrorists, after all.

Same for Florida - and I don't mean a flying school. It's well-known that there are extremist exile Cubans who fit the "terrorist" label if you look at them with open eyes.

Then there are the domestic right wing terrorists who are being vastly underrated as a threat in comparison to foreign terrorists. (So maybe "terrorism" isn't the dominant characteristic?)

Maybe I should mention the fact that the U.S. is now fighting together with Libyan rebels, some of whom were apparently once handed over to Libya as terrorists?

Or maybe it should be called "war with terror", for the permanent media bombardment with terror topics qualifies as terror itself, even though it free rides on others' violence?


I still kept my fingers off the hottest topics...

[Bob's World]

While I believe the acts much more a "crime" than an act of war, I believe that states should exercise extra-judicial authorities in responding to such crimes. Any trial would be either a travesty or a farce. We know AQ did it, so go out and punish AQ. That does not mean "declare a war" on them, or issue warrants for their arrest, trial and possible punishment if proven guilty. There is a middle ground, more like how Israel relentlessly, and without fanfare, hunted down and terminated certain Nazi war criminals.

We need to be pragmatic. Anytime a state adopts a program of punishment that is as hard on the taxpaying citizens as it is on the criminals it seeks to punish; and equally, is of a design that really does little to resolve a problem and in many ways makes it worse (think "war on drugs", "war on terror", and probably a few of the other pseudo-wars as well) it is bad policy.

AQ is the symptom. Put a death warrant on the symptom. That done, now stop and think about what the roots of the problem are that gave rise to those symptoms, that allow an organization such as AQ to have influence, that fuel the widespread revolutions sweeping the Middle East, that have so damaged US reputation in the same region in increasing degree since a peak of positiveness at the end of WWII and design new policies for more appropriately engaging that important region of the world. Waging a war instead only serves to distract from the critical tasks, and to overly focus on military actions over civil actions.

Being a nation that operates under the rule of law does not mean that we are a slave to the laws that are currently on the books. We could have written new laws to support what we needed to do that would have met much broader approval than our decision to employ existing laws in the context of war. The current laws we operate under are wholly inappropriate and illogical to the problem we apply them against. They guide us into programs of actions that make the problem worse as often as they help.

Its like we needed to play a game of soccer, but the only rule books avilable were for Chess and American Football, and we resigned ourselves to having to pick one to follow. We should have just written rules for soccer that fit the game and go play.

[Jeffersonrion]

A Washington, DC-area attorney, writer, lecturer and anti-terrrism strategist, Jim Guirard was longtime Chief-of-Staff to former US Senators Allen Ellender and Russell Long of Louisiana. His TrueSpeak Institute and TrueSpeak.org website are devoted to truth-in-history and truth-in-language in public discourse.

[Bob's World]

Another perspective. Not definitive, just my initial effort at reframing a clearer perspective on what governments are so quick to simply label as "terrorism."

Al-Qaeda: An illegal political action group with no specific state affiliation conducting a networked approach to unconventional and guerrilla warfare, often employing terrorist tactics, in order to shape the political domain of the greater Middle East to their will. AQ uses an extreme Islamist ideology to gain influence with their target populaces of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims to promote revolution to address poor governance in their respective states, coupled with a global resistance campaign against what is perceived as excessive Western influence over the governance of the region.

AQ is empowered by the confluence of two major events occurring over the past 25 years:
1. The demise of the threat of Soviet dominion over the region, and the general continuation of Western containment policies and postures;
2. The unprecedented breakthroughs in information technologies

The demise of the Soviets removed much of the rationale for the degree of presence and influence exerted by the US and West over the political and security landscape of the greater Middle East. While most governments were satisfied with sustaining the status quo, there has been a steadily growing discontent among the populaces of the region with their domestic governance, as well as the perceive role played by Western powers in sustaining what has been viewed increasingly as an unacceptable status quo. This was the catalyst.

The role of advances in information technology has been both the expander and the accelerant. As populaces became more aware of the larger surroundings it fed frustrations across the political, social and religious spectrums. Those in control acted to exert greater control, and those disempowered acted to gain greater power. Individuals, nationalist and regional organizations were all able to leverage these technologies by pass state controls on everything from sharing information to organizing to conduct revolutionary activities.

Governmental response:
To date governmental response has primarily been reactive and designed to enforce the rule of law and preserve the status quo. Acts of terrorism have been met with programs of counterterrorism. Acts of insurgency have been met with programs of counterinsurgency. AQ has suffered tactical defeats but is widely assessed as being stronger now than it was on 9/11. While AQ’s UW efforts have failed to gain traction with the broader populaces of the region, those populaces have acted out of their own accord to attain the change they seek nationally through the on-going revolutionary events of Arab Spring. There are essentially two kinds of states in the region; those that are experiencing revolution now, and those that will experience revolution soon. The unwillingness of governments to make reasonable concessions coupled with the over-reliance upon some mix of social bribery and internal security to sustain an artificial façade of stability will become increasingly untenable.

[Dayuhan]

AQ uses an extreme Islamist ideology to gain influence with their target populaces of disenfranchised Sunni Muslims to promote revolution to address poor governance in their respective states

Again I think you're duistorting AQ to fit it into your own governance-centric model, rather than adjusting the model to fit what's actually worked for AQ. AQ has generally failed pretty miserably in their efforts to "promote revolution to address poor governance"... not because people are happy with the governance they get, but because very few seem to believe that AQ has anything better to offer. Where AQ and its precursors have succeeded is in firing up and exploiting anger at foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. AQ has tried to exploit a number of different narratives, but the only one that's ever drawn support beyond a very small circle is "expel the infidel from the land of the faithful".

I also think the impact of information technology on AQ's organizing is very much overrated, and I've yet to see any credibly supported argument to suggest that it's a major factor. Worth noting that AQ has had the most success in entrenching itself in environments such as pre-2001 Afghanistan, Yemen,m and Somalia, where neither information technology nor domestic governance exist to any significant degree. I suspect that direct contact through the madrassa network and other physical networks is a more potent (if less fashionable) force than social media. Not saying that these networks don't use social media as they would use any tool available, but I don't see it as a key enabler at all.

[Bob's World]

You name the places AQ hides, not the populaces AQ targets, in Afg and Somalia. Pre-9/11 I don't think AQ had much traction with Pashtun populaces, and there is not much governance in Somalia to revolt against. Yemen is both, a great place to hide for AQ and Yemeni and Saudi insurgents. Technology does not help one hide, it allows one to run a networked, mult-nodal approach to UW over a vast area, and coordinate terrorist attacks over an even larger area.

But more importantly, because one cannot "create" insurgency through UW, but can only leverage insurgency where it already exists; the advances in info tech are driving social evolution across many populaces feeding a growing discontent with governments that show little appetite to evolve as well to meet the growing, changing expectations of their people.

Motivations, issues, etc all vary widely. Insurgency, however is political. If not political it isn't insurgency. So yes, it is always about grievances with governance. Certainly other types of instability exist as well, tied to criminal activity and other issues unrelated to governance. Lumping these together by their symptoms and tactics leads to clumsy approaches intended to create stability. Attacking symptoms can suppress those symptoms, but ultimately makes the underlying problems worse. The fact that most insurgencies get involved in criminal activities to fund their movements, and that many large criminal enterprises can grow to challenge government muddies the water, but my belief is that governments achieve the best enduring effects by focusing responses on root causes and by better appreciating what the primary purposes of various organizations are and focusing on that.

[Dayuhan]

You name the places AQ hides, not the populaces AQ targets

AQ's targeting of populaces has only gained widespread support when those populaces were supporting a jihad against a foreign invader in Muslim lands. AQ's predecessors gained widespread support for their jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Once that war ended support quickly dwindled and AQ's subsequent attempts to raise war against Muslim governments were failures. It was only when they successfully baited the US into direct military intervention that they regained influence with any significant portion of any populace.

Insurgency, however is political. If not political it isn't insurgency. So yes, it is always about grievances with governance.

That's true of insurgency, but AQ is not an insurgency, nor has it succeeded in gaining widespread leverage with any insurgent populace. AQ gets support when it fights foreign intervention.

We don't have to try to disable AQ by reforming governments in the Middle East, which is a good thing, since we can't reform governments in the Middle East. We can refuse to provide them with the thing they thrive on: foreign military occupation.