3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

[tequila]

Interesting article by Tom Ricks and Peter Baker.

The White House wants to appoint a high-powered czar to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with authority to issue directions to the Pentagon, the State Department and other agencies, but it has had trouble finding anyone able and willing to take the job, according to people close to the situation.

At least three retired four-star generals approached by the White House in recent weeks have declined to be considered for the position, the sources said, underscoring the administration's difficulty in enlisting its top recruits to join the team after five years of warfare that have taxed the United States and its military.

"The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job. Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. "So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,' " he said.

[John T. Fishel]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

[Tom Odom]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

You are on target, John T.

I would add that this is also a heavy dose of political window dressing designed to look like a real initiative. Gates started out as a leader; he needs to continue to step up and so does the Chairman. The Nat Security Council has to drive the interagency cooperation and the President with his National Security Advisor whispering in his ear is the CZAR. This latest dodge is bovine excrement.

Tom

[Dr Jack]

This story also made the New York Times this morning...
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/11/wa...on/11czar.html

White House Mulling War Czar, Report Says
By THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, April 11 — The White House is exploring ways to restructure the National Security Council, including the possible appointment of an official who would oversee the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, The Washington Post reported in its Wednesday issue.

The change could involve elevating the post held by Meghan O’Sullivan, a deputy national security adviser who deals with both conflicts. She has said she plans to step down.

In an interview on Tuesday night, Gordon Johndroe, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said: “A variety of options are being looked at for the structure of the office. It could remain unchanged, but no decisions have been made.”

A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment.

The Post article said three retired four-star generals had rebuffed overtures about taking an expanded job that would involved coordinating activities of the State and Defense Departments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One, John J. Sheehan of the Marines, said he had concluded after discussions with Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, that the job would be unworkable. He told The Post, “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks.’ ”

The Post said the others were Gen. Jack Keane of the Army and Gen. Joseph W. Ralston of the Air Force.

[jcustis]

This would play out like Garner and Bremer all over again.

[Jimbo]

As somebody who works north of the river and inside the beltway, there is a HUGE unity of command issue going on currently between the different agencies and organizations of the executive branch. The idea of a czar is the best one I have heard yet. Currently many different orgganizations either don't see themselves having a role in either place, or they see themselves having a role, but they will only particiapte on thier own terms, leaving no room for reaching a consensus. These problems have manifested themselves in the requirement for the Defense Department to resource a majority of the reconstruction effort, and the inability of the government to define roles, missions, scope, and expectations of one another.

The lack of unity of command at the naitonal level exacerbates the the issue sthat arrive on the gorund. At a recent NATO conference, our ISAF partners were frustrated with each other over each partner country executing their own agenda on how to do PRT's and cCOIN. Some were very good, and some only work from 9 to 5. Our NATO partners, stated that theykeep getting different stories from each diofferent agency in the USG. In Iraq, this lead to a disjointed effort between the various entities that the State Department owns. Some do not work for the ambassador, and most use thier informal reporting chain back to the Truman building as opposed to the systems that are supposed to be used on the ground. This problem is maganfied when you add the uniformed services, the defense Department, and other executive agencies. The lack of Unity of Command over this effort in Washington is one of the reasons we have not been able to maximize the D,I,and E parts of DIME in our operations. Bottom line:

When you only execute the "M" in DIME, you do "DIE". It is pathetic that you do this because of squabbling and whining over "rice bowls" in DC.

[Tom Odom]

Jimbo,

I don't disagree with anything you say about a lack of interagency cooperation. But I don't think creating another position--with the inevitable bureacracy to support--will affect anything. I suspect it will only make the resistant burrow in deeper.

We have tried CZARS before and they had no lasting effects. Energy Czars, Drug Czars, Disaster Czars, etc etc etc.

One of the measures I always used as an analyst from afar, a historian looking backwards, or an operator on the ground was whether a country actually fixed things that were broken. This rule applies to bureacracies, militaries, people, and infrastructure. The secondary measure I tied to this was if they did not fix what was broken did they replace it and get rid of the old? Or did they add something new that was supposed to do the same job and end up competing units, agencies, parastatals, or even presidents/prime ministers/dictators (this usually led to civil war)?


A War Czar at this stage seems very 3rd World...

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Jimbo, there is a War Czar. He is created by Article II of the Constitution of the United States. His title is President. Would reorganizing the NSC staff help him do his job better? Perhaps. But, if you were Bob Gates, would you be willing to take orders from Meghan O'Sullivan? Or Condi Rice from her former DOS subordinate? Remember, these are legally constituted department heads who are answerable to the President, alone in the Executive Branch, and to Congress which confirmed them. I don't recall anybody confirming O'Sullivan or Hadley - the positions are staff, only. Put differently, if the J3 issues an order to a subordinate commander it will only be obeyed if it is perceived as coming from the commander. If there is doubt, the subordinate commander will go directly to his boss, not the J3.

That said, you are correct that the interagency process does not work nearly as well as it should. I just don't believe that this is the best way to fix it.

[Jimbo]

The topic of the NSC came up at a meeting I was at two days ago, and some really smart people pointed out that structurally, the NSC really isn't setup to run the day to day issues that arise in our current fight. These guys also added that the NSC really doesn't have the authorities to what has to happen. Yes, under title II the Prsident is the War Czar, I think he needs an XO or S-3 for what we are currently invovled in. I am currently working on the closest thing to an interagnecy plan, and the friction is enormous. What the President needs is someone who understands what the President wants done, what the principals have bought into, is plugged into what is going on at the execution level (here in DC), and is willing to call Bulls*@# at a principlas/deputies level meeting when the respective agencies brief their stuff with rose colored glasses on. That is what needs to happen.

[Tom Odom]

The topic of the NSC came up at a meeting I was at two days ago, and some really smart people pointed out that structurally, the NSC really isn't setup to run the day to day issues that arise in our current fight. These guys also added that the NSC really doesn't have the authorities to what has to happen. Yes, under title II the Prsident is the War Czar, I think he needs an XO or S-3 for what we are currently invovled in. I am currently working on the closest thing to an interagnecy plan, and the friction is enormous. What the President needs is someone who understands what the President wants done, what the principals have bought into, is plugged into what is going on at the execution level (here in DC), and is willing to call Bulls*@# at a principlas/deputies level meeting when the respective agencies brief their stuff with rose colored glasses on. That is what needs to happen.

Jimbo

You just described the role of the National Security Advisor as it should be performed. Rice did not do it that way and I see no signs that is happening now.

Tom

[jcustis]

For anyone who chooses to read the full text at the link, humor me a bit. I'm pushing up on 38 next month, went to a decent school and studied Pol. Sci. with a concentration in Int. Relations, and yet when I look at the folks profiled in the article, I'm still a little shocked that there are people my age in such positions of influence.

I'm also a tad bit alarmed, because I wonder what life experiences these folks have (outside of a semester abroad as an undergrad) that gives them a grasp of what is going on out there.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...031002003.html

The NSC's Sesame Street Generation


By Dafna Linzer
Sunday, March 12, 2006; Page B03

They headed off to college as the Berlin Wall was coming down, were inspired by globalization and came of age with international terrorism. Freed from a constant nuclear standoff as a dominant fact of international life, members of Generation X no longer fear war or upheaval in the global status quo.

Understand them -- and where they came from -- and suddenly President Bush's Middle East forays, grand democratic experiments and go-it-alone strategies take on a different look.

That's because nearly a dozen thirtysomething aides, breastfed on "Sesame Street" and babysat by "The Brady Bunch," are now shaping those strategies in unexpected ways as senior advisers at the National Security Council, the White House's powerful inner chamber of foreign policy aides with routine access to Bush. This small group of conservative Gen Xers -- members of an age cohort once all but written off as stand-for-nothing underachievers -- is the first set of American policymakers truly at home in a unipolar world.

-----
One quote in particular alarms me, and that comes from O'Sullivan herself:

"If your frame of reference is the Soviet invasion and how they got bogged down, then I think you'd be very modest about what could be achieved in Afghanistan," O'Sullivan said. "That's not how I see it. I see an end of Taliban rule and a nascent democracy."

Coming straight out of the mouth of someone who has a role in whether servicemembers go there to fight and potentially die. This isn't some capital venture gig where you are targetting those areas ready to explode, given the right investment. WTFO?

I would not even come close to pretending that I know squat about steering a course for governance of an entire country, and I consider myself a reasonably smart mofo.

[tequila]

She's gone now, undoubtedly to a well-paid sinecure before returning for the next go-around. Next year in Tehran?

[jcustis]

I'm slogging through Imperial Life in the Emerald City, and now I remember her name, and the Garner/Cheney issue. I haven't gotten beyond the point where the stock exchange is being addressed, so I hope to learn more about her involvement.

[Jimbo]

There are people younger than O'Sullivan making a bigger impact in DC. Most of your staffers, who do the real work, are only in their late 20's, early 30's at best. Most have M.A.'s and some have Ph.D.'s. It can be quite disconcerting at times. Sometimes we are really lucky that tasking X lands on staffer X's desk and not staffer Y. Soemthing to think about.

[Jimbo]

Tom,

I agree with what you stated about the National Security Advisor. I thinbk what is needed currently is someone to function as the chief of current operations, and someone to function as the chief of plans. What I am picking up in DC is that there is too much going on for the Rice, Hadley, or anyone else to truly do both currently.

[jcustis]

There are people younger than O'Sullivan making a bigger impact in DC. Most of your staffers, who do the real work, are only in their late 20's, early 30's at best. Most have M.A.'s and some have Ph.D.'s. It can be quite disconcerting at times. Sometimes we are really lucky that tasking X lands on staffer X's desk and not staffer Y. Soemthing to think about.

Ah yes, and they are thoroughly couched in theory as opposed to having developed the expertise at recognizing the patterns, currents, and even the occasional eddy or two. Crikeys!

[Tom Odom]

Ah yes, and they are thoroughly couched in theory as opposed to having developed the expertise at recognizing the patterns, currents, and even the occasional eddy or two. Crikeys!

And they exist in every administration. For me in Zaire and Rwanda they were the Clintonistas. That group was somewhat older but not necessarily so.

You can't change this pattern, guys. It is part and parcel of what makes our world so different from theirs. We treasure knowledge tempered with experience. They treasure knowledge unfettered with reality but constructed through a prism of political loyalty. By that I mean knowledge is only valuable if it can be bent to the message of the day.

To O'Sullivan's credit, she at least talked to folks in the State Department and that nearly got her canned early on. Have no doubt, she will be back.

Best

Tom

[John T. Fishel]

Jimbo

Perhaps, some reorganization of the NSC staff would help do this if the NS advisor will not play it as Tom suggests he/she should. Nevertheless, the success of the staffer in riding herd will depend on the President's willingness to come down hard on a Cabinet officer who is not treating the staffer as speaking for the Pres.

On interagency planning: The first such plan was for Haiti in 1994. Read Walt Kretchik's superb chapter on planning in our CSI book, Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion." PDD 56 issued by the Clinton Administration sought to address the problem and was one of the few PDDs continued by the Bush Admin. It never went far but NDU's ITEA program contin ues to work the issue and its head, Erik Kjonnerud might have some helpful thoughts.

Cheers

John

[Dr Jack]

PDD 56 issued by the Clinton Administration sought to address the problem and was one of the few PDDs continued by the Bush Admin.

When NSPD-44 (Mananagement of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization) was issued on December 7, 2005, it superceded the Clinton-era PDD 56:

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf

The press statement that accompanied NSPD-44 (http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/relea.../20051214.html) stated:

The directive establishes that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. Depending on the situation, these operations can be conducted with or without U.S. military engagement. When the U.S. military is involved, the Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict.

A new "War Czar" would require a complete re-look at this process...

[Jimbo]

NSPD-44 is a poorly worded document that is causing some of the squabbling within state. In theory it should work, but the problem is multifaceted.

Since the establishment of S/CRS in that document S/CRS hasn't really delivered much. They have alienated many parts of state by planning in a vacuum, and then coming in and trying to tell regional bureaus what to do based on thier plan. The have this so-called NSPD-44 process: which is a process of triggers that would force the inter-agency to come to the table and do "something/planning" they are till trying to get this process built then they have to figure out how to implement it. they have consistently had their budget not be met because they haven't quite figured out how to engage with OMB (this issue is bigger than S/CRS), they are responsible for the Civilian Reserve Corps (it happened yet), they aren't sure hwta is meant by stability so the get inot frictional issues with "State" and USAID. So S/CRS has been around for almost 3 years and hasn't presented anydeliverables beyond the Hati plan, and they aren't being resourced. NSPD-44 was written as an inside state document to prevent Lugar and Biden from pushing legisltion from the Hill for structural reform inside State. There is a alot of potntial with the NSPD-44 document, but nobody has sat the different parts of the stae department down and explained how they play in the process ( A DoS "come to Jesus meeting"). Until that happens the NSPD-44 construct is going to be slow coming.