3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

[Jimbo]

NSPD-44 is a poorly worded document that is causing some of the squabbling within state. In theory it should work, but the problem is multifaceted.

Since the establishment of S/CRS in that document S/CRS hasn't really delivered much. They have alienated many parts of state by planning in a vacuum, and then coming in and trying to tell regional bureaus what to do based on thier plan. The have this so-called NSPD-44 process: which is a process of triggers that would force the inter-agency to come to the table and do "something/planning" they are till trying to get this process built then they have to figure out how to implement it. they have consistently had their budget not be met because they haven't quite figured out how to engage with OMB (this issue is bigger than S/CRS), they are responsible for the Civilian Reserve Corps (it happened yet), they aren't sure hwta is meant by stability so the get inot frictional issues with "State" and USAID. So S/CRS has been around for almost 3 years and hasn't presented anydeliverables beyond the Hati plan, and they aren't being resourced. NSPD-44 was written as an inside state document to prevent Lugar and Biden from pushing legisltion from the Hill for structural reform inside State. There is a alot of potntial with the NSPD-44 document, but nobody has sat the different parts of the stae department down and explained how they play in the process ( A DoS "come to Jesus meeting"). Until that happens the NSPD-44 construct is going to be slow coming.

[Stratiotes]

I am somewhat amazed, knowing a little about this country's history, that the idea of a "war czar" does not make more people scream about civilian control. I am just cynical enough to believe that politicians generally do not make decisions in order to improve results so much as they make decisisons to cover their own butts. I think this could be one such occasion - "it isn't my fault, I left that up to the war czar...." When things go well, they could take credit and when they go poorly, they'd have somebody else to blame. It isn't republican vs democrat - its politics as usual - the one thing that permeates evenly across party lines.

[BScully]

As someone who works on interagency issues daily and is trying to get my organization to play a larger role in supporting U.S. National Security, I have to agree with Jimbo. I also agree that the NSC should play a larger role in making things happen. From my perspective, I've seen several factors that have prevented Departments and agencies from getting more involved.

First, and most importantly, the resources just are not there. You can task all you want, but if there is no money and no staff, nothing is going to get done. This leads to my second observation, most Departments and Agencies do not believe they have a role in National Security issues...they are domestic agencies and therefore do not fund national security activities. Third, as with most interagency activities, parochialism runs rampant and Department and Agency agendas take priority.

Personally, I think a War "Czar" would be very useful in pulling the interagency together. While I wouldn't call the position a War "Czar," somebody who has a direct line to the President and his full support, can move resources, can ride Cabinet officials without fear of being fired, would be a tremendous benefit. Until a more effective national security system is put in place, interagency cooperation is only going to be effective if a strong personality/leader with direct access to the President is driving the train.

Could the National Security Advisor play this role? Sure. But if the National Security Advisor was 100% focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, which they'd have to be to be successful, what will the impact be on the rest of U.S. policy?

Take care,
Brian

[Old Eagle]

As many of you know, the catch phrase for interagency coordination is a "Goldwater-Nichols" for the IA. If the administration can't reform itself, it needs to be reformed from the outside. I don't believe in catch phrases, and I don't believe that there will be reform.

I think that one of the points that we tend to overlook is that the Founding Fathers created an inefficient government structure (and an inefficient military) in order to preserve the greater concept of democracy. It would be impossible for any of the major subordinate departments to amass the power necessary to overwhelm the rest of the government. The billpayer for this attitude is the fumble bumble in the IA. Yes, it costs money. Yes, unfortunately, it costs lives. It occassionally leads to failure. Price of doing business. Sorry.

[wm]

I am somewhat amazed, knowing a little about this country's history, that the idea of a "war czar" does not make more people scream about civilian control. I am just cynical enough to believe that politicians generally do not make decisions in order to improve results so much as they make decisisons to cover their own butts. I think this could be one such occasion - "it isn't my fault, I left that up to the war czar...." When things go well, they could take credit and when they go poorly, they'd have somebody else to blame. It isn't republican vs democrat - its politics as usual - the one thing that permeates evenly across party lines.

I too may be jaded, but I think that this is really what is operational here--politics as normal and a need to have a fall guy in case things go south.

We might consider the choice of title here. Wasn't the Czar the failed Russian autocrat who once epitomized totalitarian (i.e, non-democratic) rule and was supplanted as the bete noir of the West by the Communists?

[SSG Rock]

Gentlemen, I'm just a retired NCO who got his graduate degree at night school. I don't have any experience, just common sense. As an NCO, when my troops aren't performing to the standard, I knocked their heads.

President Bush, at this juncture doesn't have to worry about making or keeping friends. Why doesn't he knock some heads? Can he? Has he tried that approach?

Wouldn't the creation of a "Czar" require hammering out new laws? Creating support staff, in short, wouldn't it take a lot of time? And wouldn't the position inevitably be tainted by partisanship anyway? Why go through the trouble to create another position that ultimately will not help?

I think I'd hold a "come to Jesus meeting" and I'd lay it on the line, demand interagency cooperation on a scale never seen before, and I would tell them if this doesn't happen I'll fire you, and if I can't fire you I'll spend the rest of my term making your life as miserable as I possibly can.

[BScully]

Why doesn't he knock some heads? Can he? Has he tried that approach?

Wouldn't the creation of a "Czar" require hammering out new laws? Creating support staff, in short, wouldn't it take a lot of time? And wouldn't the position inevitably be tainted by partisanship anyway? Why go through the trouble to create another position that ultimately will not help?

I think I'd hold a "come to Jesus meeting" and I'd lay it on the line, demand interagency cooperation on a scale never seen before, and I would tell them if this doesn't happen I'll fire you, and if I can't fire you I'll spend the rest of my term making your life as miserable as I possibly can.

SSG Rock,

The problem isn't the "come to Jesus meeting," which the President can easily pull together, it's the lack of ability to followup that causes the problem. That's why a "Czar" would be helpful. He has the full authority and support of the President along with the time necessary to make sure folks are getting their jobs done. My agency gets many tasks from the NSC and White House. Despite the fact they are Presidential/NSC initiatives, they don't always get the support you would think. We often fight for funding just to meet the minimum requirements (and we're not always successful).

If things worked as they should, each Department and Agency would review the National Security Strategy, figure out how they can support it, and put resources to the task. This simply doesn't happen in most (any?) departments or agencies.

Until the entire system is fixed, you need somebody who can crack skulls with the President's approval.

That's my view anyway.

Brian

[selil]

The Mongolian horde effect...

Adding bodies to a problem of coordination is adding another variable, another barrier, another point of failure, another blame point, another... you get the idea.

When something is going wrong the commander gets on the phone, gets in the trench, figures out where things went wrong and fixes it.

Putting somebody else in charge of a sinking ship doesn't do the baling.

Pedantic and simplistic makes the obvious simpler. A Czar is a pseudo solution to a real problem that only a real leader can truly solve. The president can not abdicate the responsibilities of running a war to a political appointee.

But, what would I know I'm a Gen X'er and irresponsible in my enthusiasm for abject hero worship.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi all,
Good to be back. Trying to get my house in order, go on vacation and then start the PCS and enroute schools - sums up my last couple of three weeks.
I was thinking about this morning when I read it on the earlybird. Aside from possibly inserting a layer of command that would further delay needed decisions and possibly installing a personality whose situational perspective is far away from ground truth (time and space), yet whose inter-perspective is one of being validated by both his military experience and obligation to try and get it right; how about the idea of opening yourself (those asked to take the job) to becoming a magnet (or shield) for criticism from both sides- what was the term one perspective candidate used "ulcer?
I think this is important in the context of some of the other things coming to light. Anybody read what retired General Scales wrote recently about ground truth? One of the things he mentioned in addition to the status of equipment & time needed to refit and train was in ref. to the data quoted by DoD ref. retention of experienced, innovative, creative talent that the private sector is competing for. A buddy of mine just called to say he got word his TT tour was going to be 15 months. He is close to 20, I predict he will leave when he gets back. There seems to be a couple break points for most - those under the point with good opportunities are apt to leave prior to a delayed captain's course, those at 20 are not really considering 30 (although I know some 06s who are looking at high 3, etc.) These are good people. Those of us in the middle are playing the wait and see, but it doesn't look good - why, because we see the mill continuing to turn with less compensation ( ex. we lose money when we PCS because we try and make it easy on the family )while we try and balance obligations to family with obligations to our service and nation.
Here is the part that I think military service members are really starting to look hard at, and I think the response to the "War Czar" is indicative of.

1) Those who serve or served ( I think its reasonable to include LE and FDP types) understand that they are a minority, most American citizens don't understand the word sacrifice in the sense that we do.
2) They also don't understand what they inherit by virtue of birth, they have not really faced adversity, get their news in sound bytes, prescribe to the T.V and Internet for morals and values and in general don't understand us a minority - many I've run into are glad we do what we do, but many of those are only glad that someone else does a job that they would never want to.
3) So why should less then 1% take up the burden for so many for so little in return? Sure when there is no war, its a pretty good life, but most of are aware that the world is fundamentally changed, and war will be with us for a long time to come.

So why when Congress and the administration play politics with the money we need for training, equipping, etc; when although there are bonuses for retention of some and recruitment of others, but no real fundamental shift in investing in people (a significant raise that competes with Industry/Private Sector), performance bonuses, etc that place people above cash cows should that 1% obligate themselves to the point of exhaustion (anybody seen the new #s on how many 04s and 05s the Army is short - anybody want to guess how we'll fix that?) Retired General Scales is 100% correct on the value he places on people - good equipment is good and part of investing in people, but to do both we'll need a larger % of the GDP.

I think those who serve love serving, but you have to compensate them better if you are going to ask more of them. I'll bet the Czar candidates thought of Sherman's words when asked - can you blame them? I love the all volunteer military, but I think unless we start looking hard at compensation (not one shot bonuses, but the kind of compensation that people see they are in an organization that invests in them for the long term - yes people are expensive - good ones more so - but you have to have them), I think we'll be forced to consider selective obligatory service. This war is not over in 2008. I think we'll be at war in this populated and competing world and committed to fighting those who would come here and kill us for decades, if we are going to ask a small percentage to shoulder the burden, then we better ante up.

We have a long term strategic human resource problem that we are addressing with tactical foresight - its a cultural problem.