3 Generals Spurn the Position of War "Czar"

[tequila]

Interesting article by Tom Ricks and Peter Baker.

The White House wants to appoint a high-powered czar to oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with authority to issue directions to the Pentagon, the State Department and other agencies, but it has had trouble finding anyone able and willing to take the job, according to people close to the situation.

At least three retired four-star generals approached by the White House in recent weeks have declined to be considered for the position, the sources said, underscoring the administration's difficulty in enlisting its top recruits to join the team after five years of warfare that have taxed the United States and its military.

"The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job. Sheehan said he believes that Vice President Cheney and his hawkish allies remain more powerful within the administration than pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq. "So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, 'No, thanks,' " he said.

[John T. Fishel]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

[Tom Odom]

What this article shows is that the administration thinks that the problem is lack of unity of command in Washington. It is not. The problem of a lack of unity of command is in Baghdad and Kabul. In each case, we have a major military operation ongoing and a fully functioning embassy. IAW the ambassadorial appointment letter the ambassador is responsible for all USG actions and agencies in a given country except the military during a major military operation (an ambssador friend argues that even then the ambassador is in charge unless the President has specifically stated otherwise). Clearly, in practice, General Petraeus does not report to Ambassador Crocker or vice versa. That, in a nutshell, is the unity of command problem. It is one that will not be solved by appoining another layer of Washington bureaucracy but would be solved by the simple expedient of the President dseignating one of the two as "in charge" and the other as "working for him."

You are on target, John T.

I would add that this is also a heavy dose of political window dressing designed to look like a real initiative. Gates started out as a leader; he needs to continue to step up and so does the Chairman. The Nat Security Council has to drive the interagency cooperation and the President with his National Security Advisor whispering in his ear is the CZAR. This latest dodge is bovine excrement.

Tom

[Dr Jack]

This story also made the New York Times this morning...
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/11/wa...on/11czar.html

White House Mulling War Czar, Report Says
By THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, April 11 — The White House is exploring ways to restructure the National Security Council, including the possible appointment of an official who would oversee the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, The Washington Post reported in its Wednesday issue.

The change could involve elevating the post held by Meghan O’Sullivan, a deputy national security adviser who deals with both conflicts. She has said she plans to step down.

In an interview on Tuesday night, Gordon Johndroe, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said: “A variety of options are being looked at for the structure of the office. It could remain unchanged, but no decisions have been made.”

A White House spokesman did not respond to a request for comment.

The Post article said three retired four-star generals had rebuffed overtures about taking an expanded job that would involved coordinating activities of the State and Defense Departments in Iraq and Afghanistan.

One, John J. Sheehan of the Marines, said he had concluded after discussions with Stephen Hadley, the national security adviser, that the job would be unworkable. He told The Post, “So rather than go over there, develop an ulcer and eventually leave, I said, ‘No, thanks.’ ”

The Post said the others were Gen. Jack Keane of the Army and Gen. Joseph W. Ralston of the Air Force.

[jcustis]

This would play out like Garner and Bremer all over again.

[Jimbo]

As somebody who works north of the river and inside the beltway, there is a HUGE unity of command issue going on currently between the different agencies and organizations of the executive branch. The idea of a czar is the best one I have heard yet. Currently many different orgganizations either don't see themselves having a role in either place, or they see themselves having a role, but they will only particiapte on thier own terms, leaving no room for reaching a consensus. These problems have manifested themselves in the requirement for the Defense Department to resource a majority of the reconstruction effort, and the inability of the government to define roles, missions, scope, and expectations of one another.

The lack of unity of command at the naitonal level exacerbates the the issue sthat arrive on the gorund. At a recent NATO conference, our ISAF partners were frustrated with each other over each partner country executing their own agenda on how to do PRT's and cCOIN. Some were very good, and some only work from 9 to 5. Our NATO partners, stated that theykeep getting different stories from each diofferent agency in the USG. In Iraq, this lead to a disjointed effort between the various entities that the State Department owns. Some do not work for the ambassador, and most use thier informal reporting chain back to the Truman building as opposed to the systems that are supposed to be used on the ground. This problem is maganfied when you add the uniformed services, the defense Department, and other executive agencies. The lack of Unity of Command over this effort in Washington is one of the reasons we have not been able to maximize the D,I,and E parts of DIME in our operations. Bottom line:

When you only execute the "M" in DIME, you do "DIE". It is pathetic that you do this because of squabbling and whining over "rice bowls" in DC.

[Tom Odom]

Jimbo,

I don't disagree with anything you say about a lack of interagency cooperation. But I don't think creating another position--with the inevitable bureacracy to support--will affect anything. I suspect it will only make the resistant burrow in deeper.

We have tried CZARS before and they had no lasting effects. Energy Czars, Drug Czars, Disaster Czars, etc etc etc.

One of the measures I always used as an analyst from afar, a historian looking backwards, or an operator on the ground was whether a country actually fixed things that were broken. This rule applies to bureacracies, militaries, people, and infrastructure. The secondary measure I tied to this was if they did not fix what was broken did they replace it and get rid of the old? Or did they add something new that was supposed to do the same job and end up competing units, agencies, parastatals, or even presidents/prime ministers/dictators (this usually led to civil war)?


A War Czar at this stage seems very 3rd World...

Tom

[SWJED]

23 April Washington Times commentary - Generals Dodge a Bullet on Iraq War by Stefan Halper.

That at least three four-star generals, according to The Washington Post, have rejected a White House offer to assume the new post of "war czar," to coordinate the Iraq and Afghan wars, is an extraordinary and unprecedented vote of no confidence. One of them, Marine Gen. Jack Sheehan, summarized, "The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," adding that Vice President Dick Cheney's hawkish views still dominated over the pragmatists looking for a way out of Iraq.

Gen. Sheehan's remark underscores the debilitating dispute between "hawks," who were once convinced that democracy was achievable in Iraq and would now settle for stability, and "realists" who believe the expanding civil war between Sunni and Shia insurgents demands a decisive change of course. The gulf in perceptions of the challenge before us could not be greater, nor could it portend greater consequences for American credibility and security.

The gap originated with the neoconservative belief that "regime-change" meant the United States could eliminate Saddam's mass weapons and replace his strong-man government with some form of democracy. Conditions on the ground have tempered this early idealism: Now the view is if democracy cannot be achieved, simple stability will do. Today, two elections, a constitution, and four declared strategies later, we see that having provided the structure for democratic governance, we can not establish the security needed for it to function -- a point underscored by the bombing of the Iraqi legislature inside the "Green Zone" when 30 were wounded and three killed earlier this month...

[SWJED]

30 April NY Times - Quiet Bush Aide Seeks Iraq Czar, Creating a Stir by Sheryl Gay Stolberg.

Stephen J. Hadley would be the first to tell you he does not have star power. But Mr. Hadley, the bespectacled, gray-haired, exceedingly precise Washington lawyer who is President Bush’s national security adviser, is in the market for someone who does — with the hope of saving Iraq.

Mr. Hadley is interviewing candidates, including military generals, for a new high-profile job that people in Washington are calling the war czar. The official (Mr. Hadley, ever cautious, prefers “implementation and execution manager”) would brief Mr. Bush every morning on Iraq and Afghanistan, then prod cabinet secretaries into carrying out White House orders.

It is the kind of task — a little bit of internal diplomacy and a lot of head-knocking, fortified by direct access to the president — that would ordinarily fall to Mr. Hadley himself. After all, he oversaw the review that produced Mr. Bush’s troop buildup in Iraq. But his responsibilities encompass issues around the globe, and he has concluded that he needs someone “up close to the president” to work “full time, 24/7” to put the policy into effect. He hopes to fill the job soon...

[BScully]

I know some of you guys are very skeptical about the usefulness of this position, but I really wish they'd find someone to fill it soon. While I can't blame folks for not wanting the job, we will not be successful in Iraq without it.

Brian

[tequila]

And the winner is ... LTGEN Douglas Lute, former operations officer for CENTCOM under retired GEN Abizaid.

[goesh]

It appears he can't do much policy-wise or with the budget(s) but I suppose he can by symbolically put against the wall like Czar Nicholas was if all doesn't go well....He will need a good game face when dealing with Pelosi and Reid

[Jimbo]

What the position is supposedly going to do is hold the different departments and agencies accountable for what they have "signed up" to do. A bunch of agencies have said things at the secretary level, and then they don't follow through at the bureaucratic level. Based on where I currently sit, a bunch of these agencies have not adequately addressed their capacity issues at the NSC/president level (a kind of emporer has no clothes thing). The Czar is supposed to follow up with access to the President. when you talk budgeting and such, some of these agencies and departments need somebody from the outside to tell them that they need to expand to meet mission requirements. If you think that the current structures are doing that, then you are mistaken.

[Ski]

How in God's name is a "war czar" going to make operations in Iraq successful?

[tequila]

Updated NYTIMES article with more info on Lt Gen Lute.

[Jimbo]

Lute could potentially make a ton of difference. Bscully and I have spoken written on this, and we could enumerate in painful detail about how DC doesn't work like it should for this. I think this is a good step forward.

[SWJED]

16 May Washington Post - Bush Taps Skeptic of Buildup as 'War Czar' by Peter Baker and Robin Wright

President Bush tapped Army Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute yesterday to serve as a new White House "war czar" overseeing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, choosing a low-key soldier who privately expressed skepticism about sending more troops to Iraq during last winter's strategy review.

In the newly created position, Lute will coordinate often disjointed military and civilian operations and manage the Washington side of the same troop increase he resisted before Bush announced the plan in January. Bush hopes an empowered aide working in the White House and answering directly to him will be able to cut through bureaucracy that has hindered efforts in Iraq...

[Ski]

How does creating another layer of bureaucracy add to our efforts?

I've read through this thread and seen a need to improve interagency efforts towards Iraq and the WoT in general. Hate to say this, but the bureaucracies of Washington DC are not the issue here. Improving interagency integration isn't going to do much when the Iraqi people don't have jobs, electricity, security or much of anything to be frank.

Now - if you told me this was being done to improve things for the future, I might buy off on that theory, but all of this is doing nothing in the short terms is building more bureaucracy and layers of "command" when we are fighting a most decentralized war.