from the OP article.

from OP link
About 10,000 people live in Santa Marta, a warren of 1,000 to 2,000 shoddy houses threaded with narrow concrete paths and perched on a hillside so steep that many residents ride a tram to get up the slope. About 50 to 60 drug dealers operate here, residents estimate, and the graffiti of the gang in charge -- "CV" for Comando Vermelho, or Red Command -- scar walls. Those are modest numbers, given the scope of the sprawling city -- an advantage for a police operation that employed just 150 men in the initial push. The small favela also has few entrances and is bordered by jungle, rather than blending into other slums.
A bit light on the "insurgent-counterinsurgent ratio", but as David correctly states, this was more of a police than a military operation (with favorable geography, to boot).

More important than the manpower ratio is the question of how long the government is inclined to keep the police presence - 10 months, 10 years, etc. In the long run, will Santa Marta become a pacified colonia ? - after all, even Colchester had its down before its ups, as David can attest better than I.

At least to some inhabitants, the police effort has survived its authoritarian phase, but has yet to win over them - perhaps, a question of valuation of principles in Bob's World terms.

from OP link
Nata Maravilha Nael, 48, a school security guard who grew up in City of God, said even the residents who want the officers in the neighborhood describe such police excesses as speeding through the narrow streets in armored vehicles, screaming at residents and demanding bribes.

"It's an abuse of power," he said. "They're like criminals themselves."

The police have shut down popular dance parties, and several residents said they do not feel comfortable being outside after dark anymore, because of the risk of being accused of criminal activity.

"It's going backward. They're acting aggressively against normal people," Nael said. "When the criminals were here, they didn't mess with normal people."
Nothing new here - we've heard it here so many times in regard to "real" armed conflicts.

It seemed to me to be an illustration of how the counterinsurgent's values (reduction of principles to practice) become the governing criteria for success or failure.