The other issue that is not often kept in mind is which audience are we trying to affect and the limits of doing so. As we see in this thread, there's a great bit of concern about affecting U.S. public opinion--which sorely could use some "other side of the story" treatment. But there's also the message to the indigenous people of Iraq. I am not as familiar with what is going on in this realm beyond what gets reported in the U.S. news. Surely there's a huge effort being mounted here.

The conundrum will be, however, that despite a good message or the best of intentions of the messenger, the audience may not have much in common with the ruling entity whom the messenger represents. So despite our best "Madison Avenue" polling and message packaging--and our training of those who must deliver such messages--they do not resonate with some (possibly significant) segments of the populations.

I am particularly concerned about this given what Eric Bergerud wrote in his outstanding book, The Dynamics of Defeat: The Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province, regarding how well we performed pacification yet were ultimately ineffective given how the Saigon government was perceived. We could do everything right, but if the central government did not earn the loyalty of the people or--as Bergerud points out--they would rather die for the enemy than for a government they had no kith or kin or stake in when both sides put them under duress/coercion, it ultimately doesn't matter.

Iraq is not Vietnam, but this point is worth remembering as we survey the population and determine how they regard the government in Baghdad...and any potential local opponents of the central government.