The Military’s Media Problem

[wm]

Interesting piece on Petraeus looking to reduce "barriers" between IO and PAO. My take is they somehwat miss the point; the real friction is between PAO and PSYOP. Most IO types I deal with look at PAO and IO as a linked subject--as do I.

This seems to be a rather limited view of IO. The following is lifted from JPub 3-13 (www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf)

"Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to
influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own." (emphasis added)

IO is a combat multiplier under the purview of -3 shops. The last time I checked, PAO was a special staff officer of the commander's, like the Chaplain, the IG, and the JAG. Seems to me that any friction between the two stands squarely in the directions given to the two staff sections by that commander. If the PAO story and the IO plan are at odds, someone is not synchronized and requires operator head space and timing realignment by the appropriate commander. PAO work falls under "specified supporting and related capabilities" IMO.

The funny thing about that LA Times piece is that it refers to a 2004 CJCS memo while the JPub I quoted from is from 2006. Who's reading the doctrine and where does it stand as authorizing action vis-a-vis a memo from an ex-Chairman?

[Tom Odom]

All good questions and I have the answers for none.

I also agree it (it being what the LA Times calls IO) is a very limited definition.

And that is why I found this article and the supposed debate to be curious; I am somewhat sceptical that Petraeus' IO staff--including his 3--would take the connection between what a PAO does and part of what IO does as verboten.

That aside the Joint definition itself is inadequate in describing IO at the operational and certainly the tactical levels. Commanders look to their PAO and their IOs for assistance in developing and delivering the correct message.

Best

Tom

[wm]

That aside the Joint definition itself is inadequate in describing IO at the operational and certainly the tactical levels. Commanders look to their PAO and their IOs for assistance in developing and delivering the correct message.

Concur that the JPub definition is only the tip of the iceberg for those guys at the pointy end of the spear. But Petraeus HQ is more at the strategic end of the spectrum where the JPub is very germane, is it not?

Decades ago when I tok the Psyops Officer correspondence course, the coursework made the point that PAO and Psyops probably had a lot in common and ought to work closely together.

[Tom Odom]

Concur that the JPub definition is only the tip of the iceberg for those guys at the pointy end of the spear. But Petraeus HQ is more at the strategic end of the spectrum where the JPub is very germane, is it not?

Agreed and that is why I find this supposed intiative rather strange.

And also agree on the logical connection between PAO and PSYOP--the disconnection/prohibition is emotional/political. FDrankly if you look at the Hollywood supported news machine in WWII as well as that of the Brits that connection was open because it was important get the message out. That was then, however, and I stronly doubt we will ever go back to that era.

Best

Tom

[Cori]

If I may, I believe the incoherence in the LAT article stems from an imprecision in the term "IO." (Although in fairness we all do it.) Doctrinally, PA has to do with the military's interest and responsibility in keeping the American people informed regarding its activities, via both the press and outreach. Psyops has to do with attempting to influence hostile and neutral foreign audiences and only foreign audiences. In my experience Psyops folks will barely even discuss questions regarding domestic public opinion with interviewers b/c it is so rigidly beyond their purview. IO involves the umbrella level "deconfliction" of messages as well as issues like ensuring OPSEC through computer security, electronic warfare, so on and so forth.

The problem is that we've all sort of casually begun using "IO" as a vernacular term to refer both to what are really Psyop operations and to questions regarding domestic public opinion, when the question of whether and how the military should attempt to influence American domestic public opinion is doctrinally closed, the answer being that it is an inappropriate role for the military.

So the debate the article is really referring to regards whether or not the military should take advantage of opportunities to influence domestic opinion. Is that appropriate? If it is, when is it? When is it a question of merely drawing the public's attention to something (such as the example in the story, using little kids to get a VBIED through a checkpoint) and when is it credibility-destroying spin? If the military only answers enemy propaganda, is that a strong enough and clear enough line to draw?

A number of PAOs believe the firewall b/w PA and IO (meaning efforts to actually influence US opinion) must be absolute, or PA's credibility will be irreparably damaged. Others argue that there are ways and times to go beyond merely answering questions that might be legitimate. The question is how and where the line can and should be drawn.

Hope that's useful.
-- Cori

[oblong]

The American Journalism Review ran this piece last year by the former press attache at the American embassy on how they viewed the media's efforts in Iraq.

http://www.ajr.org/article.asp?id=4071


I found this passage especially interesting:

The most persistent critics of the media in Iraq have argued that reporters ignore the good news. Of course, it is axiomatic in the profession that good news is no news. But in Iraq, I would argue, good news was news and, to be fair, the media did cover much of it. When Iraqis went to the polls in January of 2005, their ink-stained fingers became an international symbol of courage and defiance. The story led newscasts and dominated front pages. The election was an astounding success, and the media reported it as such. But what of the smaller, daily triumphs, the reopening of schools and clinics, the rehabilitation of water plants and the training of Iraqi security forces, the billions spent on reconstruction, reform and civic education? Where were these stories, the critics would ask, why only blood, mayhem and failure?

Well, the media did run positive stories, perhaps not as many as we would have liked, but again the situation in Iraq often made it difficult, impractical or counterproductive to get coverage for the good news. For example, we stopped taking reporters to the inaugurations of many reconstruction projects because, as we quickly learned to our dismay, publicity might invite a terrorist attack. On several occasions, one involving a school, terrorists struck the site and killed innocent people the day after an article or television story appeared. We concluded that good publicity simply wasn't worth the cost in lives and damage, and we stopped advertising them. It was frustrating, to be sure, but prudent.