Snipers Sniping & Countering them

[Firn]

Then as now if a unit looks alert and performs minor actions competently, most of the bad guys will leave them alone and await an easier target. Long time ago it was learned in such operations to never, ever do the same thing twice and never stay anyplace for more than 12-16 hours without modifiying your strength and positions. The basics aren't that hard -- we just do not teach them well.

And, like the Floating Platoon, sometimes even those that know just get lazy or sloppy -- always a killer...

Skeen certainly was rather keen on that being prepared point, and repeated it many times. He also wrotethat you could far tell more about the leadership, moral and discipline about a unit from all those small details in the field than by it's performance on the parade square. I think it is hard to argue against that. Of course doing the basics right under often very difficult circumstances requires a lot from training to the leaders and troops.

Looking for the weak and lazy as targets must be part of our inner wolves, as this is just how many larger carnivores operate. A Lynx will operate just like that, hunt for a while in an certain area of his range until the roe deer becomes too wary and than move on to find less alerted prey. Signs of force and vitality tends to make predators look for easier prey, unless the disperation is too strong.

I wonder how much has changed in this regard (still from Skeen's book, the link is in this thread):

Be particularly alert in the rear guard work on the return journey. For the friendly tribesman, having collected payment, is by no means above chivvying the rear guard home. He can always blame the bad men from the next valley (who may be—probably will be—there also on their own), and the rear guard, though it may have an easy time, ought to behave as if it expected trouble. If it does not, the odds are on getting it. And that is another reason against delay in any part of the work. Every moment wasted means a closer approach of evening and of increasing numbers of the enemy intent on harrying the withdrawal.

Coming back to "sniping":

Another hint—do not halt your men on tracks or near conspicuous rocks, and so forth. These are always known ranging marks. And your men will not halt near you. “Officers and white stones”—the old soldier’s rule still holds.

This is not a thing to neglect. The accuracy of these people’s shooting is sometimes astounding. I have mentioned the case of the Ahnai Tangi, when I was warning you not to bunch your men on a crest. This was not an isolated fluke. At Makin I saw four men knocked out by one sniper, known to have been fifteen hundred yards off; and shortly before that, taking up camp at Marobi, one man, who was bagged before he could do more damage, got two men and two mules in five shots, at a range of not less than five hundred yards.

I certainly have a hard time believing that Makin incident, maybe they missed a man (or men) which shot from a closer range. The second one sounds certainly doable, by a (very) good shot with good eyes and a good enough weapon.

And at last:

Wherever and however you get into camp, there is a most important point to keep in mind, that, in an inexperienced push—that is, almost invariably at the first entry into hostile country—there will be more than a tendency—an irresistible urge—to reply to snipers’ fire and even to
blaze off at noises or fluttering papers. The Manual is emphatic on the idiocy of this, but no matter, your men will do it unless you yourself see to it that they do not.

[bumperplate]

I realize the readers on this site don't reach a high number, when compared to the number we have in uniform. However, with this wisdom here, and these reminders about the basics - why are the basics constantly ignored? The comments about laziness and complacency are dead on. The lazy and the complacent are marked by the enemy, without fail.

I think the problem is this: the vigilant are seldom attacked. And, it's hard to validate a TTP by virtue of negative contact. Nevertheless, it seems we should have a mechanism for instilling and sustaining good TTPs.

Yes, I know, that mechanism is called leadership. Just bothers me that it so often seems to be missing.

[jcustis]

I realize the readers on this site don't reach a high number, when compared to the number we have in uniform. However, with this wisdom here, and these reminders about the basics - why are the basics constantly ignored? The comments about laziness and complacency are dead on. The lazy and the complacent are marked by the enemy, without fail.

I think the problem is this: the vigilant are seldom attacked. And, it's hard to validate a TTP by virtue of negative contact. Nevertheless, it seems we should have a mechanism for instilling and sustaining good TTPs.

Yes, I know, that mechanism is called leadership. Just bothers me that it so often seems to be missing.

Knowing what "right" looks like is hard for a lot of folks, because in all honesty, they really don't know. To make matters worse, their idea of right can at times be very, very skewed. It is even further compounded by the fact that it's often human nature that folks try to do the least amount of work to get to that state of "right".

[Fuchs]

I realize the readers on this site don't reach a high number, when compared to the number we have in uniform. However, with this wisdom here, and these reminders about the basics - why are the basics constantly ignored? The comments about laziness and complacency are dead on. The lazy and the complacent are marked by the enemy, without fail.

I think the problem is this: the vigilant are seldom attacked. And, it's hard to validate a TTP by virtue of negative contact. Nevertheless, it seems we should have a mechanism for instilling and sustaining good TTPs.

Yes, I know, that mechanism is called leadership. Just bothers me that it so often seems to be missing.

This is on of the times when I cannot resist the urge to point out that there's a discrepancy between the U.S. military self-image and reality.
The self-image of a professional, highly proficient force that faces undisciplined and incompetent opposing forces collides with repeated (likely systemic) symptoms of poor discipline.

A fighter-bomber pilot who bombs a wedding claiming it was self-defence because he saw muzzle fires is undisciplined. He uses an excuse that's ineligible because he was out of range anyway.

A NCO who returns fire in a firefight instead of ensuring that his team returns fire is undisciplined (or incompetent).

A (assistant) platoon leader who does not ensure that his platoon is fully disciplined and alert is himself undisciplined (or incompetent).

Soldiers who drive through Baghdad ramming every car that doesn't give way to their speeding are undisciplined (AND incompetent).


This sounds like anecdotes and can be explained with the sheer size of U.S. forces, but then again the overall picture doesn't inspire more confidence.


Not all that shines is gold.

[JMA]

This is on of the times when I cannot resist the urge to point out that there's a discrepancy between the U.S. military self-image and reality.
The self-image of a professional, highly proficient force that faces undisciplined and incompetent opposing forces collides with repeated (likely systemic) symptoms of poor discipline.

A fighter-bomber pilot who bombs a wedding claiming it was self-defence because he saw muzzle fires is undisciplined. He uses an excuse that's ineligible because he was out of range anyway.

A NCO who returns fire in a firefight instead of ensuring that his team returns fire is undisciplined (or incompetent).

A (assistant) platoon leader who does not ensure that his platoon is fully disciplined and alert is himself undisciplined (or incompetent).

Soldiers who drive through Baghdad ramming every car that doesn't give way to their speeding are undisciplined (AND incompetent).


This sounds like anecdotes and can be explained with the sheer size of U.S. forces, but then again the overall picture doesn't inspire more confidence.

I suggest your last sentence sums it up well.

First, what I see as competent or incompetent is based on my personal frame of reference.

I would say that it would all depend upon how that military reacts to undisciplined or incompetent actions. If they are shrugged off or a blind eye turned then there is a BIG problem, while if appropriate action is taken against the perpetrators then the overall reputation of that military could in fact be enhanced by the disciplinary process.

But if you are saying that we all need to be a little more humble than normal about just how good we are (or were) then you are absolutely correct.

[Bill Moore]

JMA,

I agree with most of your comments about the demise of our infantry tactics and field discipline. Probably worth opening a separate forum for this needed discussion, but from my view I saw an immediate reduction in field craft when FM 7-8 was introduced and then enforced with a communist like reform movement. Many of the hard learned small unit tactics learnt during Vietnam, Korea, etc were discarded. Then we saw the rapid loss of basic field craft (movement techniques, tracking/counter tracking, camaflauge, observation, fighting positions, etc.). A pet pee of mine was all the sudden we were too good to drink muddy water treated with iodine tablets, so instead of self sustaining in the field soldiers carried excess purified water or had it air dropped/cached etc.. Besides weakening our ability to sustain in the field (which limits the tactics you can employ), it creates a mindset of dependency, and of course makes the companies that sell bottled water to the military quite rich (probably a conspiracy theory here). :-)

Back specifically to the sniper issue. Two enclosures below, the second addresses the traditional Afghanistan advanced marksmenship and sniping tacticcs, why they eroded, and now why they're making a come back. However, there is still a considerable difference between a well trained marksman and a specially trained and equipped sniper from Iran, especially if they're employing 50 cal sniper rifles.

http://globalcounterterror.com/?p=74

Some of the information in The Ultimate Sniper, might at first glance seem outdated (especially with historical references to wars that probably occurred before your great-grandfather was born), especially with all the advances in technology that occur every year. But, if you know the military the way I know the military, you’ll know that often skills and knowledge can be lost only to have to be relearned again in the next war (case in point with so many successful counterinsurgency tactics and strategies gained and used in Vietnam and Central America, but had to be relearned in the war in the Middle East).

http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/...off-late-7523/

A lot more at the post, which is worth the read:

The Taliban have been finding NATO troops too clever by half. An example occurred recently when a British base in the south was being hit by accurate sniper fire, but it was not immediately obvious exactly where the sniper was. The reason for this was a clever gambit by the sniper, who was firing from a nearby compound, via a small tunnel dug through the wall of the compound, terminating in a 30x15 cm (12x6 inch) opening to fire out of. To further conceal his position, he had some nearby associates fire assault rifles and a machine-gun just before he took his shot at the British. To further conceal himself, the sniper only fired three times a day. The British would not say how many soldiers the sniper hit, but the British quickly identified seven possible firing positions. The sniper was then tricked into firing again while the seven suspected sites were being observed, and this revealed the small hole in the wall as the location. A British Apache helicopter gunship was standing by, and it fired a Hellfire missile which, because of its laser guidance, hit the small firing hole, killing the sniper and one of his spotters.

[Pete]

I saw an immediate reduction in field craft when FM 7-8 was introduced and then enforced with a communist like reform movement. Many of the hard learned small unit tactics learnt during Vietnam, Korea, etc were discarded. Then we saw the rapid loss of basic field craft (movement techniques, tracking/counter tracking, camaflauge, observation, fighting positions, etc.).

Bill DuPuy at TRADOC did a lot of things for the Army circa 1976, but a major downside was in not allowing combat experience to percolate up from the field. We focused on armor and mech infantry stuff in the Fulda Gap. Thus the other things were regarded as being off-topic or neither here nor there. Much of it was light infantry type of stuff, blending into the special ops types of things so important today. Light Infantry tactics.

During the 1980s the tendency of TRADOC and AMC to keep emphasizing the same points amounted to a willful self-delusion and self-blinding. I don't know whether this sort of thing goes on today, but tigers usually don't change their stripes.

[Steve Blair]

Bill DuPuy at TRADOC did a lot of things for the Army circa 1976, but a major downside was in not allowing combat experience to percolate up from the field.

He showed the same tendency in Vietnam, actually. Interesting stuff.

[Rifleman]

Bill DuPuy at TRADOC did a lot of things for the Army circa 1976, but a major downside was in not allowing combat experience to percolate up from the field.....During the 1980s the tendency of TRADOC and AMC to keep emphasizing the same points amounted to a willful self-delusion and self-blinding.

Did Donn Starry take TRADOC in a different direction or was he a continuation of DuPuy?

[JMA]

JMA,

I agree with most of your comments about the demise of our infantry tactics and field discipline. Probably worth opening a separate forum for this needed discussion, but from my view I saw an immediate reduction in field craft when FM 7-8 was introduced and then enforced with a communist like reform movement. Many of the hard learned small unit tactics learnt during Vietnam, Korea, etc were discarded. Then we saw the rapid loss of basic field craft (movement techniques, tracking/counter tracking, camaflauge, observation, fighting positions, etc.). A pet pee of mine was all the sudden we were too good to drink muddy water treated with iodine tablets, so instead of self sustaining in the field soldiers carried excess purified water or had it air dropped/cached etc.. Besides weakening our ability to sustain in the field (which limits the tactics you can employ), it creates a mindset of dependency, and of course makes the companies that sell bottled water to the military quite rich (probably a conspiracy theory here). :-)

Traditionally snipers have been considered to be experts in fieldcraft/stalking/camouflage. But it seems that in Afghanistan in many cases they can just lean on the parapet wall of their base and engage Taliban out to 1,200m or so. In the book Dead Men Risen (about the Welsh Guards on tour in 2009) the one sniper team got 75 confirmed kills in 40 days. Easy as pie.

Not sure what the US experience has been. Would like to know.

As to the water issue, yes we used to filter water through socks and shirts etc where necessary (then it was only palatable when drunk as tea - the Brit heritage you see) but the bottom line was that you had to find your own water "out there". I posted details about a water filter product last year some time which I believe is now on standard issue to the Brits in Afghanistan. LifeSaver I understand that with this system you can drink your own urine (after passing it through the system) which would be a great help to those (like snipers or OPs) who need to lie-up/operate undetected from a static position some where for a few days.

[Fuchs]

In the book Dead Men Risen (about the Welsh Guards on tour in 2009) the one sniper team got 75 confirmed kills in 40 days. Easy as pie.

It should be noted that this is not comparable to most WW2 sniper kill counts.

During WW2 snipers of most nationalities did not count in-battle kills nor did they confirm them. The only kills counted were kills during calm phases.

Now if a sniper team killed many people in AFG during calm phases then I'd advise a criminal investigation.

[JMA]

Skeen certainly was rather keen on that being prepared point, and repeated it many times. He also wrotethat you could far tell more about the leadership, moral and discipline about a unit from all those small details in the field than by it's performance on the parade square. I think it is hard to argue against that. Of course doing the basics right under often very difficult circumstances requires a lot from training to the leaders and troops.

I downloaded Skeen's book and read through it. He is right on the money.

I suggest that you can indeed form an accurate opinion about a unit through observation alone. Watching videos like the recent BBC series on Afghanistan and/or for example the movie Restrepo will give you a good idea. Weaknesses in fieldcraft, weapon handling, combat drills, combat leadership etc tend to jump out at you (and my my case often so vividly that I want to shout "you are going to get yourself killed you f**king idiot. Where is the sergeant? Where is the damn officer?") Often I can't bear to watch yet there are people who say they thought it was a great video/movie and saw nothing untoward... maybe that says something about them, I don't know.

Yes it is difficult to set a standard (and maintain it) until it becomes an ingrained part of unit culture because we tend to get lazy and slack off if there appears to be no immediate threat. It takes a great effort in a unit to achieve operational competence and no matter how good the CO and officers are if the Sergeants Mess (being the senior NCOs) are limited/weak you can go whistle into the wind it is not going to happen.

[ganulv]

Watching videos like the recent BBC series on Afghanistan and/or for example the movie Restrepo will give you a good idea. Weaknesses in fieldcraft, weapon handling, combat drills, combat leadership etc tend to jump out at you (and my my case often so vividly that I want to shout "you are going to get yourself killed you f**king idiot. Where is the sergeant? Where is the damn officer?") Often I can't bear to watch yet there are people who say they thought it was a great video/movie and saw nothing untoward... maybe that says something about them, I don't know.

I thought Restrepo was a very good movie but I know what you mean about wanting to shout during your viewing. I watched it with my better half, neither of us have any military background but both of us being anthropologists we still managed to be unpleasantly surprised a number of times—wearing shorts in a country with endemic leishmaniasis and malaria took me aback a bit, but not as much as the fact that none of the Americans seemed to be able to say anything as basic as “stop” or “remain calm” in the local language (not a criticism of any of the individual soldiers, mind you, but certainly of their employer).