I realize the readers on this site don't reach a high number, when compared to the number we have in uniform. However, with this wisdom here, and these reminders about the basics - why are the basics constantly ignored? The comments about laziness and complacency are dead on. The lazy and the complacent are marked by the enemy, without fail.
I think the problem is this: the vigilant are seldom attacked. And, it's hard to validate a TTP by virtue of negative contact. Nevertheless, it seems we should have a mechanism for instilling and sustaining good TTPs.
Yes, I know, that mechanism is called leadership. Just bothers me that it so often seems to be missing.
Knowing what "right" looks like is hard for a lot of folks, because in all honesty, they really don't know. To make matters worse, their idea of right can at times be very, very skewed. It is even further compounded by the fact that it's often human nature that folks try to do the least amount of work to get to that state of "right".Originally Posted by bumperplate
This is on of the times when I cannot resist the urge to point out that there's a discrepancy between the U.S. military self-image and reality.
The self-image of a professional, highly proficient force that faces undisciplined and incompetent opposing forces collides with repeated (likely systemic) symptoms of poor discipline.
A fighter-bomber pilot who bombs a wedding claiming it was self-defence because he saw muzzle fires is undisciplined. He uses an excuse that's ineligible because he was out of range anyway.
A NCO who returns fire in a firefight instead of ensuring that his team returns fire is undisciplined (or incompetent).
A (assistant) platoon leader who does not ensure that his platoon is fully disciplined and alert is himself undisciplined (or incompetent).
Soldiers who drive through Baghdad ramming every car that doesn't give way to their speeding are undisciplined (AND incompetent).
This sounds like anecdotes and can be explained with the sheer size of U.S. forces, but then again the overall picture doesn't inspire more confidence.
Not all that shines is gold.
I downloaded Skeen's book and read through it. He is right on the money.
I suggest that you can indeed form an accurate opinion about a unit through observation alone. Watching videos like the recent BBC series on Afghanistan and/or for example the movie Restrepo will give you a good idea. Weaknesses in fieldcraft, weapon handling, combat drills, combat leadership etc tend to jump out at you (and my my case often so vividly that I want to shout "you are going to get yourself killed you f**king idiot. Where is the sergeant? Where is the damn officer?") Often I can't bear to watch yet there are people who say they thought it was a great video/movie and saw nothing untoward... maybe that says something about them, I don't know.
Yes it is difficult to set a standard (and maintain it) until it becomes an ingrained part of unit culture because we tend to get lazy and slack off if there appears to be no immediate threat. It takes a great effort in a unit to achieve operational competence and no matter how good the CO and officers are if the Sergeants Mess (being the senior NCOs) are limited/weak you can go whistle into the wind it is not going to happen.
I suggest your last sentence sums it up well.
First, what I see as competent or incompetent is based on my personal frame of reference.
I would say that it would all depend upon how that military reacts to undisciplined or incompetent actions. If they are shrugged off or a blind eye turned then there is a BIG problem, while if appropriate action is taken against the perpetrators then the overall reputation of that military could in fact be enhanced by the disciplinary process.
But if you are saying that we all need to be a little more humble than normal about just how good we are (or were) then you are absolutely correct.
There are a lot of fine ways to die…
I thought Restrepo was a very good movie but I know what you mean about wanting to shout during your viewing. I watched it with my better half, neither of us have any military background but both of us being anthropologists we still managed to be unpleasantly surprised a number of times—wearing shorts in a country with endemic leishmaniasis and malaria took me aback a bit, but not as much as the fact that none of the Americans seemed to be able to say anything as basic as “stop” or “remain calm” in the local language (not a criticism of any of the individual soldiers, mind you, but certainly of their employer).
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
JMA,
I agree with most of your comments about the demise of our infantry tactics and field discipline. Probably worth opening a separate forum for this needed discussion, but from my view I saw an immediate reduction in field craft when FM 7-8 was introduced and then enforced with a communist like reform movement. Many of the hard learned small unit tactics learnt during Vietnam, Korea, etc were discarded. Then we saw the rapid loss of basic field craft (movement techniques, tracking/counter tracking, camaflauge, observation, fighting positions, etc.). A pet pee of mine was all the sudden we were too good to drink muddy water treated with iodine tablets, so instead of self sustaining in the field soldiers carried excess purified water or had it air dropped/cached etc.. Besides weakening our ability to sustain in the field (which limits the tactics you can employ), it creates a mindset of dependency, and of course makes the companies that sell bottled water to the military quite rich (probably a conspiracy theory here). :-)
Back specifically to the sniper issue. Two enclosures below, the second addresses the traditional Afghanistan advanced marksmenship and sniping tacticcs, why they eroded, and now why they're making a come back. However, there is still a considerable difference between a well trained marksman and a specially trained and equipped sniper from Iran, especially if they're employing 50 cal sniper rifles.
http://globalcounterterror.com/?p=74
http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/...off-late-7523/Some of the information in The Ultimate Sniper, might at first glance seem outdated (especially with historical references to wars that probably occurred before your great-grandfather was born), especially with all the advances in technology that occur every year. But, if you know the military the way I know the military, you’ll know that often skills and knowledge can be lost only to have to be relearned again in the next war (case in point with so many successful counterinsurgency tactics and strategies gained and used in Vietnam and Central America, but had to be relearned in the war in the Middle East).
A lot more at the post, which is worth the read:
The Taliban have been finding NATO troops too clever by half. An example occurred recently when a British base in the south was being hit by accurate sniper fire, but it was not immediately obvious exactly where the sniper was. The reason for this was a clever gambit by the sniper, who was firing from a nearby compound, via a small tunnel dug through the wall of the compound, terminating in a 30x15 cm (12x6 inch) opening to fire out of. To further conceal his position, he had some nearby associates fire assault rifles and a machine-gun just before he took his shot at the British. To further conceal himself, the sniper only fired three times a day. The British would not say how many soldiers the sniper hit, but the British quickly identified seven possible firing positions. The sniper was then tricked into firing again while the seven suspected sites were being observed, and this revealed the small hole in the wall as the location. A British Apache helicopter gunship was standing by, and it fired a Hellfire missile which, because of its laser guidance, hit the small firing hole, killing the sniper and one of his spotters.
Bill DuPuy at TRADOC did a lot of things for the Army circa 1976, but a major downside was in not allowing combat experience to percolate up from the field. We focused on armor and mech infantry stuff in the Fulda Gap. Thus the other things were regarded as being off-topic or neither here nor there. Much of it was light infantry type of stuff, blending into the special ops types of things so important today. Light Infantry tactics.
During the 1980s the tendency of TRADOC and AMC to keep emphasizing the same points amounted to a willful self-delusion and self-blinding. I don't know whether this sort of thing goes on today, but tigers usually don't change their stripes.
He showed the same tendency in Vietnam, actually. Interesting stuff.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Traditionally snipers have been considered to be experts in fieldcraft/stalking/camouflage. But it seems that in Afghanistan in many cases they can just lean on the parapet wall of their base and engage Taliban out to 1,200m or so. In the book Dead Men Risen (about the Welsh Guards on tour in 2009) the one sniper team got 75 confirmed kills in 40 days. Easy as pie.
Not sure what the US experience has been. Would like to know.
As to the water issue, yes we used to filter water through socks and shirts etc where necessary (then it was only palatable when drunk as tea - the Brit heritage you see) but the bottom line was that you had to find your own water "out there". I posted details about a water filter product last year some time which I believe is now on standard issue to the Brits in Afghanistan. LifeSaver I understand that with this system you can drink your own urine (after passing it through the system) which would be a great help to those (like snipers or OPs) who need to lie-up/operate undetected from a static position some where for a few days.
Last edited by JMA; 07-21-2011 at 11:21 PM.
Great little book, as some of the quotes above illustrate, one of the classics of NW Frontier writing. But I'm a sucker for 19th and early 20th century British Army stuff. Looking through my copy just now though, I noticed it doesn't have the photos that were in the original Passing It On and in the Leavenworth PDF. Those are definitely a plus. I'd recommend either shelling out similar cash to print your own well-bound version of the latter, or trying to find a used copy of the original online ($94.95 from Australia is the only one a quick Google search turned up).
It should be noted that this is not comparable to most WW2 sniper kill counts.
During WW2 snipers of most nationalities did not count in-battle kills nor did they confirm them. The only kills counted were kills during calm phases.
Now if a sniper team killed many people in AFG during calm phases then I'd advise a criminal investigation.
I spent about five minutes trying to turn up an original copy of the Skeen work for sale with no luck but I did find Daniel Barton Mackenzie’s Mountain Warfare on the Sand Model if that is something anyone here is unaware of.
While skimming the Skeen and Mackenzie works I quickly recognized a tone similar to the 18th century journals I pore over in my research on Southeastern Indians.But I'm a sucker for 19th and early 20th century British Army stuff.
Last edited by ganulv; 07-22-2011 at 02:42 PM. Reason: typo fix
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Did Donn Starry take TRADOC in a different direction or was he a continuation of DuPuy?
Last edited by Rifleman; 07-22-2011 at 03:44 PM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
"C" Both of the above...
Both epitomized the "Leadership is Showmanship" and get there first with the most schools of military dominatrixisity. Both operated in an era where AMC and Congress had more to do with what the Army might think and do than did the Army itself, much less the brand new TRADOC. DePuy started and Starry continued movement of TRADOC into the decision making realm and wrestliing with AMC over primacy in future systems (I think that resulted in a broad draw...).
DePuy developed the concept of "Active Defense" (FM 100-5, 1976) It was badly flawed (created those dumb Battle Books among other things) and he had (probably unfortunately) won the battle with Jack Cushman at CAC who, surprisingly, had many much better ideas. Cushman was the first senior guy who pushed how to think, not what to think and who realized our training was marginal. When Starry took over at TRADOC, he kept up the push for info and Army dominance. He pushed and developed "Air Land Battle" (FM 100-5, 1981) an improvement over the active defense -- but still European and heavy forces oriented. Both concepts were very strong on WHAT to think (as is the whole Task, Condition and Standard process...)
Both of 'em were products of their time, responded to the Army's greatest threats (potential enemy AND domestic politics and budget) did probably more good than harm. They weren't perfect -- none of us are -- they did the best they could with what they had, I suppose...
Fortunately, Shy Meyer became Chief of Staff. He tried with little success to rein in the personnel bureaucracy but did curb some of Starry's wilder ideas and succeeded to an extent in fixing some of the damage and slowing the raging TRADOC monster created by two hard charging go-getters.
Interestingly, we are now approaching a period that will be broadly similar: Declining budget, end of long tedious wars, Army in flux, world in flux, prospects dim, much angst about everything. That happened post WW II with little effect, post Korea with good effect (though the inability of Congress and AMC to keep up with the Army doomed many good ideas) as well as in the Depuy and Starry post Viet Nam eras wiht mixed effect. Time for a good effect -- everything goes in cycles...
When I was in 6/9th FA in Giessen, Germany in '78-'81 I remember when someone in 3rd Armored Division lost his Battle Book during a terrain walk. He left it on top of the winterization kit (canvas roof) of his M151A1 jeep when they drove off to look at the next position. Thanks to him an entire brigade of 3rd AD had to change its war plans. Stars & Stripes even had a story about it.
Didn't Simon & Garfunkel have a song entitled "Fifty Ways to Leave Your Lover?" Perhaps the Kitakidogo Social Club should add a thread on "Fifty Ways to End Your Military Career." Being the modest and self-effacing guy I am I could only add 12 or 15 suggestions, based of course on my extensive military experience .
Mod's Note: Pete's idea for 'Fifty Ways to End Your Military Career' is now a thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=13831
Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-23-2011 at 11:00 AM. Reason: Add Mod's Note
Thanks you for that... another gem.
That will take up a few hours this weekend.
Worthy of instant comment however are the following two passages:
Yes I know it is merely restating the obvious... but you'd be amazed at just how many people don't know this stuffThe Tribesmen.
" A great many people have tried to describe Afghan character, and found it difficult, because it is a mass of contradictions. They are often recklessly brave, and nearly always brave, yet rather easily discouraged by failure. Very proud of their race and of their honour, yet often treacherous and faithless. Capable of extraordinary loyalty, yet capable of extreme vindictiveness against a friend on account of even an imaginary wrong. Observant and intelligent, yet credulous and superstitious. Paying little attention to their religion normally, they can easily be worked up to fanaticism. Inclined to be lazy, yet with immense reserves of energy, and power of endurance, and often at their best under the worst circumstances. Cheerful, sportsmanlike, and frugal, but excitable and lacking in self-control. A strange mixture. However you size them up, their virtues and vices are at least virile and those of men, and few Britishers are not attracted to them. Lastly, they are clever and plausible at arguing. But do remember that it is never, at any time, safe to rely on their faith to carry out a promise unless they know you have the power to enforce it. To Afghan mentality it is stupid to do something you don't want to, unless you must."
A quotation from "Letters of a once Punjab Frontier Force Officer'' by Colonel J. P. Villiers-Stuart, C.B., D.5.O., O.B.E.
And
The Principles of War:
" The Manual of Operations on the North-West Frontier of India" (referred to throughout the following pages as the " Manual ") Chapter I, Section i, states :
" While the Principles of War enunciated in Field Service Regulations, Vol. II, Sec. 2, remain unchanged, in campaigns in undeveloped and semi-civilized countries the armament, tactics and characteristics of the inhabitants and the nature of the theatre of operations may necessitate considerable modification in the methods of application of those principles."
In response to my comment:
Fuchs responded such:
Originally Posted by JMA
In the book Dead Men Risen (about the Welsh Guards on tour in 2009) the one sniper team got 75 confirmed kills in 40 days. Easy as pie.
With respect to your last sentence.
I assume that you are suggesting that maybe the 'kills' claimed by the snipers out of contact are in fact not Taliban?
It appears that the efforts of these three snipers (4 Rifles) pushed the Taliban back from the specific bases to beyond 1,500m where before they skulked around at ranges as close as 30m. Wonderful deterrent.
If you read the book what is repeated over and over again is that warning shots are fired, that even though the sniper team had an RPG, a RPK and an AK visual they still had to get clearance to engage, and this "sometimes they decided not to take a shot even though an insurgent was carrying a weapon judging that he did not pose an immanent threat." ... McChrystal has a lot to account for.
One sniper after getting nine kills in one day stated that he wondered whether it was all worth it as they just get replaced. WTF. There are plenty of snipers/marksmen out there who would just keep on 'working' and take them out ten-a-day, 20-a-day or as many as show their heads. (There must be 1,000s of 'hunter' types who would gladly pay good money to sit in a sangar in Helmand with a can of Coke in one hand and pick off Taliban out to 1,500m - no uncomfortable stalking required.)
So I don't have a real concern that given the number of legitimate targets on offer that the snipers would be keeping their eye in by taking out the odd farmer.
My concern rather is that the snipers are becoming blasé to the extent that they let legitimate targets pass by as they wait for a more challenging shot (thereby letting a Taliban live to maybe kill a soldier another day). I seem to remember Dereliction of Duty to be an immediate Court Martial offence.
Interesting that the three snipers accounted for 131 kills in the six months (which was 70% of the total of 187 4 Rifles kills). Not sure what the stats of the other battalion snipers were (or indeed the yanks) but should be interesting as an indicator.
Criminal investigation doesn't necessitate a crime - it necessitates only that a crime is likely.
I think we all have heard and read enough about snipers lying in wait for a farmer picking up an AK that lies on his field and then shoot him when he gets curious...crap happens in war, and sometimes statistics lead to more unanswered questions than they do answer.
And nobody should ever trust reports that were filed 100%. Investigations in such claims do often discover outright lies.
An outstanding result always deserves scrutiny.
OK, fair comment.
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