What are you currently reading in 2018

[Bill Moore]

David,

High risk missions are just that, they're high risk, meaning there is a good possibility things will go wrong. UK SOF seems to adapt that reality more than risk adverse U.S. military leaders. As the SAS motto states, "who dares wins," but it doesn't mean you always win.

Regarding the St. Nazaire attack was conceived and planned by the SOE. They trained the commandos involved in the mission, designed the bomb and firing devise for the ship, and developed the deception plan to get the ship into the slot. Amazingly there was only one night of the year they could do this based on tides, full moon, etc. Unfortunately the deception plan backfired, the odd flying pattern of the UK bombers intended to make the Germans look left instead of right, actually heightened their alertness. This resulted the British destroy being detected and engaged before it reached it target. Several commandos were killed in the final assault to get the ship next to the target 4 minutes later than planned. They crashed into caisson, and then flooded the stern of ship so the Germans couldn't tow her away.

The saboteurs then attacked the pump house, which was essential for filling and emptying the dock of water. Without the pumps the dock was useless. That part of the mission was a success, but most of the commandos were now killed, wounded, or soon to be captured. There was great concern that the firing mechanism that was set to trigger the large bomb in the ship failed, but a couple hours after it was scheduled to blow it did so with enough force to create a tidal wave that generated additional damage. The dock remained inoperable for over a decade. Obviously the mission came at great cost to the commandos, but they achieved a strategic impact.

Of course, some will claim using a conventional ship packed with explosives to destroy a target isn't a true special operation, but I beg to differ. This mission depended upon unorthodox tactics, specially trained and equipped men willing to accept the risk, precise target intelligence, and so forth.

[davidbfpo]

This is a 2012 book (340 pgs) borrowed from a specialist library two months ago and finally finished. 'Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence' by Brian W. Mobley, ex-CIA analyst and RAND political scientist, is certainly interesting and possibly a rare published work on the subject. The four groups looked at in detail are: the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Fatah and Black September, Al-Qaida (AQ) and the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG).

Alas it is marred by some serious factual mistakes and the lack of editing, so some sentences reappear a few pages apart. Northern Ireland and PIRA is something I know a little; the author refers to Captain Robert Nairac kidnapped by PIRA and his body being recovered, when it has not been (pg.56).
Link to Amazon USA, with eight reviews:https://www.amazon.com/Terrorism-Cou...pe=all_reviews

It would have been valuable to look at groups who were successful for a long time; ETA in Spain and November 17 in Greece come to mind.

Oddly his PhD, on which the book is based, is freely available (403 pgs):https://repository.library.georgetow...pdf?sequence=1

[Backwards Observer]

Hold Everything Dear by John Berger


21 Lessons for the 21st Century by Yuval Noah Harari

[Tasmanian Devil]

Salafi-Jihadism: The History Of An Idea by Shiraz Maher. Penguin Books 2017.

Maher’s book is a good introduction into the historical development of "Salafi-Jihadism", and offers a valuable overview of the current ideas focused around this subject.

The book is a careful and scholarly discussion of Salafi-Jihadism, well written and informative. Addressing the topic from a historical, theological, and legal viewpoint it is not meant for a casual read, although written with the general reader in mind, and, because of this, some might find it heavy going. For those of us, who are not specialist Arabic linguists, considerable application is required in understanding the many Arabic words which, though similarly spelt, have different meanings.

All in all I found it an extremely enlightening book, and a very worthwhile read (I am on my third reading and am still finding something new). With his excellent understanding of Salafi-Jihadism Maher’s indepth discussion, explanation, and erudite analysis, provide an admirable insight into a complex belief. Unlike many others, Maher tells us what Jihadists actually think. I particularly liked his arguments against the perceptions, held by many in the West, politicians, military, and the general public alike, that Salafi-Jihadists are irrational. He is emphatic that this is not so, and that Salafi actions are quite clearly based on a specific interpretation of the Qur’an.